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INTRODUCTION

Thoughtful observers have declared the law of prior appropriation obsolete,' no longer relevant, or even dead.' On the other hand, others have declared it the best-suited law yet devised to govern human uses of water, especially in water-limited places.' Many writers have criticized at least some
aspects of the law of prior appropriation.3 As further explored below, the criticisms take many forms. Far less has been written about the virtues of prior
appropriation despite the tact that principles originated in the mining districts
of nineteenth-century California ended up being adopted by seventeen western states.'
Under the prior appropriation system, millions of individual water "rights"
have been established that govern human uses of both surface and underground water. Based on these rights, individuals and organizations have built
the facilities necessary to divert/withdraw enormous quantities of water from
streams and aquifers all around the West. Particularly irrigated agriculture,
but also cities, industries, and even whitewater kayak courses, have used this
water. Economies have developed, in important part enabled by these water
uses, and the American West has transforned from a largely unsettled landscape to the home of approximately a third of the people living in the United
States and the fastest growing region in the nation.' That the basic legal system

has "worked" seems evident.
Prior appropriation proponents often point to its invitation, offered to one
and all, to find some use for water, in return for which the law grants to, and
protects in, the user a perpetual right.! Especially under the original system of
self-initiation, prior appropriation is a doctrine that promotes and encourages
human efforts to put water to some economically beneficial use; this includes
making the sometimes substantial investment of time and money necessary for
this purpose." The priority rule enables senior water right holders to count on
1. Alex C. Sienkiewicz, Note, Instream Values Find Harborin Bean Like III, )rown in
PiiorAppropnation,25 PUB3. LAND & RESOURCi.S L. Rrv. 131, 146 (2004).
2. Reed D. Benson, Alive but Inelevant: 7he PriorAppropriation Docrine in 7bdav's
lestern WaterLaw, 83 U. COLO.L. REV. 675, 678 (2012).
3. Charles F. Wilkinson, In Meinoriam:Prior Appropriaion 1848-1991, 21 ENV-FI.. L. v,
v (1991).
4. See Frank J. Trelease, Policies br Walter Law: PropertvRights, Economic Forces,and
Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RISOURCESJ. 1, 48 (1965) Ihereinafter Trelease, Policies Ibr Water
Law]; Frank J.Trelease, 7he Model Water Code, the Wie Adimistratorand the Goddaai
Burcauciat, 14 NAr. RESOURCESJ. 207, 228 (1974) [hereinafter Trelease, Model Water Codd;
see also ROBERT G.DUNBAR, FORGING NEw RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERs 209-10 (1983).
5. DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 209, 215-16; see infra text accompanying notes 45-84.
6. See infra Part I.C; see zZo GETcHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 7-8 (4th ed. 2009).
7. For a discussion of recreation water rights, see Glenn E. Porzak etal., Recreation Water RighL5: "7he Inside Sto,y" 10 U. I)ENV. WATEIR L. REV.209, 210 (2007).
8. A now somewhat dated but useful discussion of population growth in the western states
is provided in WESTERN WATER POLiCY REViEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST:

CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, at 2-14 to 2-18 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Trelease, Policiesfor Water Law, supia note 4, at 7-8.
10. This focus on protecting the time and effort invested by those appropriating water was
much on the mind of judges first considering the new doctrine of appropriation. See, e.g., Ir-
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getting most or all of the water they originally appropriated, even when flows
decline. Seniority, and the assurances it provides, encourages long-term investment in the facilities needed to enable water use. Those more junior water right holders are on notice that, when flows decline, they may have to curtail uses; thus they are likely to invest and operate accordingly. The ability to
make changes in the use of a water right allows appropriators to adjust uses as
opportunities change, thus enabling water rights to continue to supply changing needs and circumstances. Owners of water rights can readily transfer them
to others who are interested in making the changes necessary to allow for new
uses. Public supervision of water uses under a well-defined system of priority
rights helps to sort out disputes and ensure full use of available water. Limited
administrative authority protects private uses and serves as a check on possible
arbitrary or unreasonable requirements that would impair private uses."
Perhaps the most active proponent of prior appropriation has been Dean
Frank Trelease, who wrote in a period in which some scholars were promoting reforms of the riparian doctrine that embraced an administrativelysupervised permit system.'" Trelease applied an analysis strongly influenced
by economics. Defining the goal of water law as producing the maximum
benefits for society from the use of water, Trelease concluded that property
rights are necessary for that end, and that prior appropriation, as a user-based
system, is preferable to administrative allocation.'3 He argued that perpetual
rights, such as those provided under prior appropriation, are superior to termlimited rights proposed by riparian law reformers because of the certainty they
provide. 4 He favored well-defined rights that included a priority rule, as under prior appropriation, for sorting out conflicts:15
In the West this is usually done by describing the water rights in terms of
priorty, quantity of diversion, and time of diversion. When senior approp)nators had taken all of the dependable flow of the western streams, further
(levelopment was inaugurated by junior appropriators who stored spring

win v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855) (discussing "the rights of those who, by prior appropriation, have taken the waters fIom their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines, to supply the necessities of gold diggers"); Coffin
v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) ("IViast expenditures of time and money have
been made in reclaiming and fertilizing by irrigation portions of our unproductive territory.
Houses have been built, and perlnanent improvements made; the soil has been cultivated, and
thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with die understanding that appropriations of water would be protected.").
11. See Frank J. Trelease, New Water Lcgislation:Drafting for Development, Efficient Allocabon and Environmentai Protection, 12 L2aN,,D & WATER L. REv. 385, 410-11 (1977).
12. See Trelease, Model Waeier Code, supa note 4, at 207; FRANK E. MALONEY r AL., A

78-79 (1972).
13. See Trelease, Model Water Code, supia note 4, at 211-12.
14. Trelease, Policies for IVater Lau- supra note 4, at 25 ("One advantage of secure water
rights over short tenn or cancelable rights is that the forner will aid in the attaininent of the major goal of maximumn benelits by encouraging investment."). Trelease also argued that "[ilf
%vater rights are given attributes of property, the people owning these property rights %ill tend to
lnake tie best decisions for themselves as to their proper use, and these decisions %vill on the
whole add up to the best development fron the state's standpoint." Id. at 9-10.
MODEL. WATER COlE: TEXT AND COMMENTARY

15. Id. at 26 ("If a water right is to serve its owner and the public efficiently as a right of
property, it is essential that the right be sufficiently definite to identify the property and differentiate it from the property of others.").
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floods, built larger dams that stored the supply of good years against future
droughts, or brought water from long distances across or tl-ough mountain
ranges from other basins where the supply exceeded tie demanld.'6

The maximization principle, according to Trelease, also requires a means
of allowing water uses to adjust as changes occur, a process Trelease believed
is best accomplished through a market system that also depends on clear,
transferable properly rights, as with prior appropriation." In Trelease's view,
private uses of water that produce benelits meet the public interest standard."
However, Trelease acknowledged that a market system does not protect all
values, thus requiring some fbn of public supervision.'"
Professor David Schorr argues that the development of prior appropriation represented "contemporary radical, agrarian ideals of broadly distributed
property and antinionopolism."
Under this analysis, prior appropriation
sought not to promote wealth maximization through creation of well-defined
transferable rights, but to promote fairness and equity by enabling the widest
possible use of water resources.' His evidence for this view is the inclusion in
prior appropriation of such "inefficient" elements as declaring water to be
property of the state, beneficial use, anod fbrfeitlre " Schorr's analysis seems
primarily a reaction to modern-day property rights advocates who emnbrace
prior appropriation as an important example of the law recognizing the creation of private property rights to the use of a commons. '

16.
17.

Jd. at 28.
See id. at 29-34.
18. IM. at 37 ("Hence watcr uses that contribute to such incrcascs in individual, local and
national wealth are prima tacie in the public intcest.").
19. Md. at 38-42.
20. David B. Schon, Appropriation as Agiwianimn: Dila-ibutivc.Jsticeji the Creation of
Propetiy lilhts, 32 EcotLocY L.Q. 3, 3 (2005) Ihereinafter Schorr, Appropr
5eion.5cc
also
DAVID B. SCHORR, THE CO.ORADO DOC'RINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 26 (2012) Ihereinldter SCHORR,
COLORADO].
21. See Schorr, ApproprFitio, sup-a note 20, at 7.
22. Id. at 10 ("However, this consensus view, which stresses the wealth-maximizing locus of
prior appropriation, seems unlikely, as it fails to explain-other than as forcign ilplants in the
purc capture doetnine-tic many aspects of the law generally agreed to be incfficient, such as the
beneficial use requirement and lbrfciture for non-use. It also falls short in accounting 1or such
features of western law as the constitutional or statutory declarations of public or state ownership of waters found in all appropriation states.").
23. WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURcE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983) lhereinaftcr WATER RIGHTS, was described by
a reviewer as "a hymn of praise to the doctrine of prior apl)ropriation and to the ideal of water
rights as exclusively private property." Paul Herrington, Book Note, 94 ECON. J. 1013, 1043
(1984). Schorr, Appropia-mon, supa note 20, at 8-9 slates:
To some, the rule of pior appr'opliation represents the possibility and promise of etficiency in natural resources law, with the extension of this model to other resources
devouily wished. On this view, the certainty and transferabiliy associated with the
creation of private-property rights in a resource benefit society by enhancing efficiency, paticularly in comparison 'ith the coinnmon-properly-like riparian rights docti-ine.

He adds that:
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A leading defender of prior appropriation, Gregory Hobbs, now a Justice
on the Colorado Supreme Court, focused primarily on the intrusions of federal law that, in his view, confounded state intentions respecting uses of water."
In his critique of a document addressed to the new Clinton administration and
produced in 1992 by a group of academics and representatives of non-profits,
Hobbs provided this statement of western water law:
Because of scarcity, need, and many competing demands, water in the West
is allocated, administered, and surrounded by legal rights, remedies, and restuictions in order to provide stability, security, and flexibility in use of this
critical resource. Beneficial use without waste is the operative principle of
prior appropriation, a doctrine of sustainability which evolved friom local custom. A water right cannot be obtained except in the amount reasonably nec-

essary for beneficial use through a reasonably efficient meals of capture,
possession, and control. Speculative claims are prohibited. Water rights can
be bought, sold, and changed to other uses, so long as injury is not caused to
other water rights.2
In his view, western water law has been "remarkably adaptable in recognizing new uses while protecting existing uses.""
Nornan Johnson and Charles Du Mars offered this assessment of prior
appropriation:
The doctrine of prior appropriation has evolved to meet changing needs as
the West has matured and diversified. Changes have occuiTed with different

emphasis and at different rates from state to state. More modifications will
undoubtedly be made. The flexibility of the appropriation doctrine has been
proven one of its most important characteristics. It evolved as a method for
adapting to change in mining and27 imigation practices, and it will flourish if
that adaptation process continues.
Why, then, so many critics? What is prompting so many, including the
present writer, to argue for changes? What are the major motivations? One
might start by saying the system is, to some degree, a victim of its own success.
The ability to establish legally protected rights to divert and use water facilitated a level of development that started to produce its own problems and to
generate a backlash. Prior appropriation, with its priority system, inevitably
encourages early initiation of appropriations-sonietimes well in advance of

Criticisms of the western law from this quarter tend to locus on certain efficiencyimpairing aspects of the law, depicting such elements of western water law as public
ownership of waters, the rcquirecment of beneficial use and the rles of forfeiture and
abandonment as foreign impurities that have seeped into dihlaw.
Id.at 9.
24. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., lPioril:"77iw Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32
ENvri. L. 37, 48-49 (2002) Ihereinafter Hobbs, JrioniI.
25. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Ecological Integrity New Western Myth: A Crinque of the
Long's Peak Repot, 24 EN'TrL. L. 157, 164-65 (1994) (internal footnotes onitted).
26. Id at 165.
27. Norman K. Johnson & Charles T.DuMars, A Survey of the Evohition of Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest l)enands, 29 NAT.
REsoURCFSJ. 347, 387 (1989).
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actual need for tie water.28 It encourages appropriators to seek control of the
largest feasible quantity of water under (his early appropiiation, an incentive
only partially mitigated by having public officials review the basis and need for
this quantity.29 Its requirement that the manner of water use only meet local
customs works against other incentives to become more efficient, a problem
exacerbated by the fact that appropriators fear they will simply lose the right to
any undiverted water saved through efficiency.'
Return flows resulting from
sometimes excessive irrigation practices soon becamne built into the water system upon which downstreamn appropriators relied, potentially constraining
those whose more efficient uses night increase consumption and reduce these
return llows.' By highlighting the property rights aspects of water rights, judges promoted the view that there could be no impingement of any sort, that a
water right ensured the pernanent right to continue to divert and use a fixed
amount of water that could include every drop of water in the source, and that
new users wanting to take water from any particular source had to take what
3
remained without any obligations or limitations on existing appropriators. 1
For exanple, as cities in many western states gained population, especially IbIlowing World War II, they found that others had already fully appropriated
local sources of water, at least during the irrigation season.' They also discovered that most irrigators were not interested in selling their water rights since
28. Stephen F. Williams, The Requirement olBenelicvd Use as a Cause of l'asC i 1 a-.
tir Resource JDevelopment, 23 NAT. RE oURCE S.j. 7, 8-10 (1983).
29. The duty of water itself bases water requirenents on an amount considered necessary to
produce the nixLinauul anount of a given crop on an acre of land-a presumed perfect amount
of water. See, e.g., Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629,
634 (19.54) ("that measure of water, which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is
reasonably required to be applied to any given tract of land for such period of time is nay be
adequate to produce therefrom a maximum anlount of such crops as ordinarily are grown
thereon."). The focus today is shifting to deticit irrigation, defined as
lAin optimization strategy in which irrigation is applied during drought-sensitive
growth stages of a crop. Outside these periods, irrigation is limnited or even unnecessary if rainfall provides a minimuni supply of water. Water restriction is limited to
drought-tolerant phenological stages, ofien the vegetative stages and the late ripening
period. Total irrigation application is therefore not proportional to irrigation requirements throughout the crop cycle. While this inevitably results in plant drought
stress and consequently in production loss, DI maximizes irrigation water p)roductivity, which is tie main limifing fictor. In other words, DI aims at stabilizing yields and
at obtaining maximum crop water productivity rather than maximum yields.
Deficit Jrr 4taon, IN-r't. COMM'N ON IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE (ICID), http://www.icid.org/
ies irri-deficit.html (last visited Mau. 14, 2015).
30. Diversion or withdrawal rights can be reduced through partial al)andonment or forfeiture actions. See, e.g., V. Lane Jacobson, Snake River Basin Adjudication Issue 10: Prtial Fork.itre fbi- Non-use of a Water Jight in Idaho, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 179, 198-99 (1998).
31. Stephen F. Williams, Opthizing l ,ter Use: 7he Retumn Fow Issue, 44 U. COI.O. L.
REv. 301, 302 (1972-1973).
32. See, e.g., Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, 532 (1883) (upholding right to divert all de
water in Trout Creek); Arnstrong v. Larunie Cnty. Ditch Co., 27 P. 235, 237-38 (Colo. App.
1891) (no sharing of water under prior appropriation); CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREA-rISE ON
THE LAW OF IRRIGATIION AND WATER RIGHTS AND THE ARID REGION DOCTRINE OF
APPROPRIATION OF WATERS § 781, at 1357 n.2, 1358 (2d ed. 1912) (citing cases).
33. See John E. Thorson et al., Diviling Western Wateis: A Century ofAltidicahtg Rivers nd Streanms, llut II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. RIv. 299, 317-20 (2006) [hereinafter Thorson

Ill.

WA TEX LA I4 REVIE W

VoIl11ne 18

they would no longer be able to farm without those rights." Consequently, cities sometimes turned to distant sources of water not yet heavily used, provoking resistance from those living in the so-called area of origin who feared that
the loss of this water diminished their future development opportunities.P Inhabitants of places with unappropriated water still available discovered, however, that prior appropriation placed no limits on transbasin water transfers
and, in fact, created some incentives to use transbasin water.' Finally, individuals whose uses or interests in water were not protected as appropriations or
under the prior appropriation system simply had no standing. Traditional
prior appropriation had simply not acknowledged such interests.
It is at least arguable that the excesses of federal reclamation policy indirectly led to the wave of criticism of the prior appropriation system during the
past forty years. Marc Reisner chronicled the politics that produced water
projects constructed by the Bureau of Reclamnation, which were made possible
by subsidies largely supported by hydroelectric power revenues.' Our extraordinary effectiveness at controlling and using water, even when some of
those uses made little economic sense, produced widespread physical and environinental change in western rivers-change on a scale Ear exceeding that accomplished by the many thousands of appropriators who could only take the
water they could alford to divert and use. Coinciding with a period of rapidly
growing environmental awareness and a growing interest in outdoor recreation, these changes helped to galvanize the work of people like David Brower,
who successfully led the light against dans in Dinosaur National Monument
and Grand Canyon National Park." While such efforts produced important
new legislation from Congress, including the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,"
states did little or nothing to incorporate these considerations into their water
laws."
People began asking why states authorize and protect water rights without
taking into consideration the effects of the associated water development and
use on the recreational and environmental values of the source of water."
They discovered that state law does not account for these values when water
34.

SeCe e.g., LAWRENCEJ. MACDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABlrY 72-

74(1999).
35. For a discussion of area of origin issues, see Lawrence J.MacDonnell & Charles W.
Howe,Area-ot-Otigin Protectionin Transbasin 14 7ter Diversions:An Evaluation ofAlernaLive
Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L. Rlv. 527, 527-29 (1986).

36. The law authorizes an im)orter of water from another basin to make full use of that
water without limitation. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-106(1) (2014).
37. "The reclaniation marriage Iwith state water rightsl was so successful that it provokedbecause of river over-regdation-the paradigm shift Wilkinson and Blumnm heralded as ending
Prior's era in the early 1990s." Hobbs, Piioriky supra note 24, at 40.
38. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 139-41 (1986); see also RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER:
SUBSIDIES, PROPERTiy RIGHTS, ANI) THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 34-36 (1989).
39. See PHILLIP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE: THE COLORADO RtvER AND THE WEST

192-95 (1984).
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2012).
41. See, e.g., David H. Getches, 71e Metamorphosis of IVestern Water Policy: Have Federai La-s and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role, 20 STAN. ENVYL. LJ. 3, 24-25
(2001) 1hereinafter Getches, Metamioiphosil.
42. Id.at 19.

IRIOR APPI?OIRIA TION"A JEASSI.SSMIVT

Issue2

rights are approved, adninistered, and used. They becane aware of the dramatic changes to riverine function mid health associated with the construction
and operation of dams.'
People learned that prior appropriators not only used dans to store water
but also used diversion damns to divert water out of streams, thereby altering
stream conditions. They also learned that prior appropriators, a relatively
small group, effectively controlled the rivers, managed their flows, diverted
much or even all of their water, used most of that water to grow often lowvalue crops in desert and seni-desert conditions, and had 'no responsibility
whatsoever for the effects of these actions on fisheries or other riverdependent species, on recreational uses of rivers, or on water quality."
Here prior appropriation probably needs to accept some of the blame.
Despite tie warnings 'of George Perkins Marsh and the efforts of people like
Elwood Mead to insert public considerations into the decision process,'5 states
focused on encouraging development and use of their waters in support of
economic growth and resisted consideration of other values until well into the
twentieth century. By that time, most rivers had been fully appropriated, and
the appropriation of aquifers was not far behind. The law had established private rights to the use of pttblic waters, mad those rights now controlled the uses
of rivers and aquifers. Seemingly, these rights precluded regulation intended
to mitigate their harmful effects, or at least state leaders (and water rights attorneys) claimed so. As we will see, courts have applied only federal laws to
require modification of some water uses-usually under vehement opposition
from the states."
Still others have pointed to disadvantaged communities such as American
Indian tribes that have not received sufficient access to water under state prior
appropriation systelms. ' 7 Relatedly, these critics noted that state law did not
always enable federal land management agencies to manage the waters within
these lands in ways consistent with federal objectives." States, concerned with
protecting users holding established prior alppropriation water rights, have resisted efforts under the reserved rights doctrine to redress the situation."
43. See, e.g., WORI.D COMM'N ON DAMs, DAMS ANI) DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR DECISION-MAKING 74-84 (2000); MICHAEL COILI.IIR ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVY,
DAMS AND RIVERS: PRIMER ON THE DOWNsTREAM EFFECTI'S OF I)AMS 3, 7 (1996); SANDRA
PosTEI,& BRIAN RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE: MANAGING WATER FOR PEOPLE AND NATURE 2-

3, 20-21 (2003).
For a discussion of how state water law pays little attention to water quality, see DAVID
GETCHF.S ET Al.., CONTROLLING WATER USE: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WATER
QUALITY PROTECTION 89-92 (1991).
45. ELVWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DiscUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND
THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICUIEURF, IN 'HE WEST
LEGAL QUESTIONS CRErED mSV
347-48 (1903); WIIIAM D. ROWLEY, REcL.AMATION: MANAGING WATE.'R IN THE Wr.S'r, THE
BUREAU OF REcLAMATION: ORIGINS AND GROWTH TO 1945, at 60 (2006).
44.

H.

46.

See Getchcs, Mcarnoiphosl, supr note 41, at 24.

47. See DAVID M.

GILLIIAN & THOMAS
SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE

C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLO\v PROTECION:
193 (1997); Sally K. Fairl'ax & A. Dan Tarlock,

No W ter For 7he W4oods: A Ctkied Analvsis ofUnited States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L.

R.V. 509, 517, 528-29 (1979).
48. GII.LIiAN & BRO\VN, suipranote 47, at 204-05.
49. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Reversing the Winters Docti.)e-ilrilgReserved Ivter Rights for Idaho Wilderncss andits Implications,73 U. CoLo. L. REV. 173, 174-76 (2002);
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While not expressly a problem with prior appropriation law, these examples
illustrate interests not accommodated under most existing state laws.
Still another important source of pressure on the traditional water law system emerged from the need to meet continuing new demands for water in a
world in which water resources had been almost fully claimed by existing users, and in which there were increasingly few opportunities for additional water development."' With no new large federal water projects forthcoming and
with groundwater aquifers beginning to show signs of overuse, those with new
water needs started to look at existing uses. The first thing that becanle evident was the extent to which the West's water resources had been committed
to irrigated agriculture-ninety percent of all diversions were lor irrigation and
eighty percent of all water consumption resulted from such use.' This was, of
course, exactly what the early proponents of prior appropriation wanted: a
stable system of water uses benefiting as much land and as many farms and
ranches as possible, protected by their priorities to the continued use of the
"duty of water" needed to successfully grow crops. The system worked. Irrigators controlled the use of the water in virtually every stream and river in the
West with nearby irrigable land.
Given the often-marginal nature of irrigated agriculture in many parts of
the West, irrigators used water as easily and cheaply as they could." They
flooded pasture lands to grow grasses; they diverted water from the streams
using brush dams, gravel mounded up into temporary berms using bulldozers,
piles of rocks, or old car bodies; they ran water from the strean to the field
through ditches dug out of the earth with plows, scrapers, and shovels; and
they turned the water onto the fields at upper elevations, counting on gravity to
spread the water over the land. Sometimes they dug furrows to help move the
water past the roots of the crops. They worried mostly about getting plenty of
water to their fields, not really knowing how much their crops required but assuming that more was better than less. They didn't care much what happened
to tie water once it left their property. No law required them to return unconsumed water to the stream.
Yet, the West was changing, and an increasing number of its people wanted the region's water resources to be used differently-at least to some degree.
It seemed the doctrine of prior appropriation and its progeny, water rights,
stood in the way of any change. The critics set to work highlighting the beleaguered condition of western rivers and aquifers, the values and interests that
were not represented adequately (in their view) under the traditional prior appropriation system, focusing on the enormous quantities of water committed
to irrigation using practices that, on average, only consumed half of the water

Lois G. Wittc, Still
No Watcr [or the Woods, ALI-ABA Federal Lands Law Conference, Salt
Lake City, Utah 9-14 (Oct. 19, 2001), hlp://wwv.stream.1s.fed.us/publicafions/PDFs/Sfill_
no water for the woods.pdf.
50. A good overview is provided in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE
WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENvIRONMENT (1992).
51. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW ERA FOR IRRIGATION 52-56 (1996).
52. A summary of the economic value of crops grown using inigation in tie western states
is provided in MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION
FOR WESTERN WATER 32-34 (1990).
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diverted from streams and aquifers. 3 While the states have made modest
changes in their water laws, most notably in incorporating mechanisms to enable protection of instreaxn flows, the basic system remains substantially intact.'
Elwood Mead was an early critic of the self-initiation form of prior appropriationi5 In his 1903 classic, hiJgali'onInstitutions, he stated:
The whole principle is wrong. It is wrong in principle as well as faulty in procelure.
It LSSUIeICs that tie establishmelnt of titles to the snows on the mountains and tie rains
fatling on the public lamd and the water collected in fie lakes and rivers, ol die Use of
which the development of the state in a great measure depends, is a private matter. It
ignores public interests in a resource upon which the enduring prosperity of the
community must rest. It is like A suing B1 for control of properly which belongs to C.
Many able attorneys hold that these decreed rights %%ill in time be held invalid because when they were established the public, the real owner of the property, did not
have its day in coUirt.'

Colorado attorney Moses Lasky pointed to the strong bias against adninistrative decision making in the United States during the era in which prior
appropriation developed, the preference (and even necessity) for individual
assertion of rights under frontier conditions,'" and the strong preference
amnong common-law trained lawyers for determination of legal rights by courts
in the context of a specific dispute."' Because of the widespread adoption of
permitting systems by 1928, Lasky concluded that "Itloday prior-appropriation
is the law nowhere in the West."
The critic who pronounced prior appropriation dead, Professor Charles
Wilkinson, earlier identified four major problems with the law: economic failings, failure to respect 0interests of other governments, excluded policy objectives, ad bad science.
In addition to federal reclamation subsidies and the
benefits available through special water districts (neither specifically matters of
prior appropriation law), Wilkinson pointed to the absence of consideration
of the externalities of water development and use and, most importantly, the
Fact that appropriators take water without payment to the public. Other governments excluded under prior appropriation, he noted, are tribes and Mexico." Foremost among excluded policy objectives, in his view, is water conser-

53. The present author was atp)a'ricialut in this process, ollering his own prescriptions for
changes, most comprehensively in FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTt1NABILITY, supra notc 34, at
39-42, 45, 47, 49-51. He presented Isis suggestions under four broad headings: reducing the
gap between diversions and consumltion; allowing rivers to finction like rivers; chariging uses
to meet new demands; and place-based collaboration. Id.

54. See in/ iaPart I.
55. Mead believed strongly tiat states should control uses of water, as a common aid essentia resource, on behalf ofltheir citizens. See MFAn, suptia note 45, at 207.

56. Id.
57. See inh- Part I.A-B (discussion of dlevelopment of prior appropriation in mining
camps of California).
58. Moses Lasky, from PriorApproprition to Economitc i1tribution of Water bv the

State- via Im'gationAdrmintration, I ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 161, 168 (1928-1929).
59. I. at 170.
60. Charles F. Wilkinson, Akdo Lcopo ldand 1'Vestcm I'oter Lae 7hiinkbig lcipenclicidar
to tie Pior Appropriato)n Doctrine,24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 12-19 (1989).

61.
62.

Id.atl12-14.
Ild. at 14-15.

WA 7XER LA W REI'7JW

Volume 18

vation.' Also historically excluded was protection of instreamn flows.' He also
points to the absence of planning under prior appropriation.' Under science,
he points to the lack of integration of uses of surface water and groundwater,
failure to account for water needs of wildlife, and the absence of any consideration of water quality eflects of water use.' In an earlier article, Wilkinson locused on the changing values and interests of westerners, which he found differed from those that dominated at the time the prior appropriation doctrine
emerged and became institutionalized.
Wilkinson's colleague, David Getches, tended to focus his critiques more
broadly on water policy than just prior appropriation, but he found a number
of deficiencies in the basic appropriation doctrine as well. 8 To promote
greater water use efficiency, Getches proposed changing the law to enable an
appropriator who conserves water to retain the right to its use.' He called for
more active application of the beneficial use principle to impose restrictions
on diversions of water in excess of amounts required for actual use.7 Getches
also highlighted the limited consideration given under prior appropriation to
public values and suggested the need to incorporate these values into water
planning.'

63. Id. at 16 (refcening in particular to the substanfial anounts of water diverted compared
to tie anounts actually consumed by crops in inigation).

64. Id.
65.
66.
67.
317-21

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17-18.
Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Tansi&zin, ,56 U. CoinO. L. REV. 317,
(1985).

The field lof western water lawl has been dominated by die themes of appropriation
under state law; stable priority for historic uses; concern for private rights over public
rights; preference for consunipive, usually commercial, uses; and die provision of
subsidized water for irrigators. It goes virtually without saying that this range of nineteenth and early twentieth century priorities is not as broad as the spectrum of considerations that iiust be accommodated in current water policy.
d. at 321.
68. These two scholars, joined by Sarah Bates and Lawrence MacDonnell, produced
SARAH BATis EL AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADwATERS: CHANGE AN) REDISCOVERY IN
WESTrRN WATER PotIcY (1993). This book outlines the tour principles they believed should
guide the development of western water policy: die principle of conservation; die principle of
equity; the principle of ecology; and a water ethic. -d at 178-98.
69. David H. Gctches, Water Use Efficiency: The Vdue of Water in the West, 8 PUB.
LAN) L. REV. 1, 15 (1987) ("California made a major improvement in its law in 1983 by allowing the salvager to sell and reuse salvaged water. The law recognizes conservation as a heneficial
use and declares that rights to conserved water are not abandoned when they are trnused."
(footnote omitted)) [hereinafter Getches, Water Use Efticiencj].

70. Seeid.at26-29.
71. See id. at 29 ("The hmost
effective way to reflect public values in water decisions may be
to integrate them into ie considerations that are made during a comprehensive water planning
process."). Getches also suggested articulation of standards to guide public interest review. See
David H. Getches, Changing the River's ('ourse: Western Water Policy Refom, 26 ENqt. L.
157, 168-69 (1996); see adso Davis H. Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can't We Get It Right
the First 7hne, 34 ENVTL. L. 1, 13, 15 (2004); David H. Getches, Water Planing: Untapped
Opportunityfor the Vestem States, 9 J. ENERGY L. & Pot'Y 1, 18, 33 (1988-1989); David H.
Getches, From Askhabad, to Wellton-Mohawk, to Los Angeles: The Drought in Wyater Policy,
64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 523, 546 (1993) ("We follow the consequences of a commitment of water
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In a process Getches helped initiate while he was Director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources under Governor Richard LuTm, the
Western Governors' Association established a "water efficiency working
group" in 1986." A report by scholau-in-residence Bruce Driver emphasized
the importance of water transfers, water salvage and conservation, and conjunctive use for improving efficiency of water uses." Driver's report embraced
water marketing, including f'rom federal Bureau of Reclamation lacilities, supported state laws encouraging conservation while noting the challenges associated with not reducing historic return flows, and suggested additional steps to
protect instream flows.71
Prolessor John Leshy has called For the development of a progressive national water policy that would entail a number of improvements in existing systerns of state water m-anagement:''
A. States should have better information and more capacity to manage and
regulate water use within their borders;
1B.
States should have effective, comprehensive programs to )rovide enough
water flows in their streams to ensure a meaningful level of ecological health;
C. States should have eflective groundwater regulation programs to sustin
gqoundwater-dependent communities over the long term and to protect asso-

ciated surl~tce waters;
D.States should make stronger eflorts to link regulation of land use and water use;
E. States should vigorously prom1ote measures to conserve and make more

only so far as the next water user."). Getches recognizes that "governments still have not confronted the root cause of water problems: the absence of a comprehensive water policy," and
proposes tools such as new institutions, formulation of long-range goals, and thorough analysis
of alternatives and consequences. Id. at 549-52; see gcneralv Gctches, Meitanophosis,supia1
note 41 (noting that only limited changes in state
laws related to conservation and efficiency,
groundwater, instream flow, public interest, planning, and transfers and marketing, have occuIn-ed).
72. WFSTERN GOVERNORS' Ass'N, WATER EFICIENCY: OPPORTUNrTES FOiR AcION, A
REPORT TO THE WESTERN GOVERNORS FROM THE WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION
WATER EFFICIENCY WORKINt; GROUP, at ii (1987) Ihereinafter WATER EFF1CIENCI.
73. BRUCE DRIVER, WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, WESTERN WATER: TUNING THE
SYSTEM, at v (1986). The report's first finding was that
Transfers of water, salvage, and conservation of water, conjunctive
supplies of water and provision of alternative supplies of water for
changes and other measures can help meet western water needs
add new wealth to the regon. Western states should redouble
courage implementaion of these meuls.

use of substitutable
seniors through excost-cffectively and
their efforts to en-

Id.
74. I.at v-ix.
75. John Lcshv, Notes on a Progressive National Water Policy, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
133, 134, 144-45 (2009). Leshy' notes that "States have not always been very vigorous about asserting regulator' control and oversight over water management matters." Id. at 145. Moreover, Leshy observes that "water policy is stubbortly resistant to sweeping change." Id. at 144.
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efficient use of water;
F. States should have clear policies and processes for addressing transfers of
water rights, particularly for agricultural to municipal, industrial, and ecological uses; and
G. States should more vigorously monitor and, where necessary, regulate the
activities of special government districts to serve state policy objectives.
Water law scholar Dan Tarlock has suggested that the role of prior appropriation is increasingly of secondary importance in a changing West." According to Tarlock,
The principal criticisms are that perpetual "use it or lose it rights" lock too
much water into marginal agriculture and generally encourage ineflicient offstream consumptive uses to the detriment of aquatic ecosystem values and
the needs of growing urban areas. Critics have either pronounced the doctrine dysfunctional or dead or argued that it should be replaced by nonperpetual permit systems that better value consumptive and instream uses.'8
Tarlock argues prior appropriation will continue to forni the basic structure of western water law, but the importance of that structure will diminish."
Thus, he predicts:
In the future, prior appropriation will function primarily as (1) a default rule
to resolve small-scale conflicts, (2) a worst case enforcement scenano in
complex allocation negotiations to encourage parties to find creative ways to
avoid its actual application through cooperative management regimes and
other sharing arrangements that accommodate a wide range of competing
demands, and (3) a rule of compensation when water is voluntarily transf'erred or to inform the constitutional analysis when water is involuntarily reallocated. "
In his view, the best evidence for the reduced importance of classical prior
appropriation is what he sees as the diminished importance of the priority
rule.8
Tarlock is clearly right. The prior appropriation doctrine is essentially an
allocative mechanism. Its concern is with the fornation of use rights. That
job is essentially complete. Very little water in the western states remains unallocated for direct human uses. We are in a world of managing our sources of
water to meet as many of those allocated uses as we reasonably can. Moreo-

76. Id.at146-51.
77. A. Dan Tarlock, The ulivucof 1r0" Appropriation in the Nell, Vest, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J.769, 773-75 (2001) [hereinafter Talock, Jilim-c] (noting that "ltlhe new West
%illinevitablv produce changes in prior appropriation, but the changes %illbe miore subtle because they will be nore ones of practice than of fonn" and that, "the doctrine's importance as a
water allocation driver has decreased in the past decades.").
78. Id. at 772 (fbotnote omitted).
79. See id.at 775, 786.
80. Id.at 775.
81. Id.at780-85.
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ver, we are simultaneously attempting to find water in this fully allocated systen for the ecological and recreational benefits attendant to it and for the unmet needs on Indian reservations, as well as to enable some existing uses of
water to shift to meet new direct human demands. Some important modtiIicalions to existing prior appropriation law are needed, but so too are new approaches that move well beyond this regime."2
Perhaps the most visible critic of our mYisuses of water in recent years has
been Professor Robert Glennon.8
In the concluding chapter of Unquenchable, he provides the following list of proposed "reforms":
- encouraging creative conservation
- using price signals
- creating market incentives
- reexamining how we dispose of human waste
- requiring developers to pay their own way
- reconsidering the location of wastewater plants
- separating storm water from sewer water
- creating infrastructure with dual pipes to supply potable and reclaimed water
-

abandoning business as usual (more darns, diversions, and wells)

-

recognizing the link between water and energy

-

appreciating the critical role played by water in the economy

removing barriers to water transfers while providing for government oversight of them

-

- creating incentives for homeowners ad others to harvest water
- stimulating alternative waste disposal technologies
- metering water use
- securing water for the enVironment."

These reconnendations serve perhaps more as a statement of goals than
as prescriptions for reform-but they capture some of the most common re-

frains: the need for more efficient use of water and for improved environmental protection.
In Part I, this Article looks at prior appropriation's fornative period; examrines the process of its early development in California, Nevada, and Colorado; considers its transition into state statutory law; examines its relornation

82. Id. at 785-86 (suggesting these additions are likely to locus on ways to accomplish contemporary intercstslthat extend well beyond the adlocation hnction of pior appropnation).
83. See gcnci-affi ROBERT GI.ENNON, WATER FoHI-s: GROUNDVATER PUMPING AND
THE FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATER (2002) Ihercinafter GiENNON, WATER FOLIES];
RoBERTr GLENNON, UNQUENCHABIE: AMERICA'S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABouT rr
(2009) [hereinafter GLINNON, UNQUENCHABiLE].
84. GLENNON, UNQtJENCHANBLE, supi-a note 83, at 317.
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into a publicly-managed system; and assesses its evolution to the present. The
Article's principal purpose is to examine the state of prior appropriation today, to consider whether its principles and practices are developing and evolving consistent with the needs and interests it is intended to support. Part II
discusses ten fundamental features of prior appropriation that require modifi-cation to keep pace with a West that is currently concerned not with matters
of allocation of water use rights, but with management of rivers and aquifers to
support a wide array of needs and interests.'
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Use of water played an important role in the settlement of the American
West. The rules governing human uses of water emerged during the course
of this settlement and reflected many influences, including the customs of
Spain and Mexico; the common law riparian doctrine of the eastern United
States; the community principles brought by the Mormons to irrigation in
what became Utah; and the practices of gold miners on public lands in California, Nevada, and Colorado." Out of this rich stew emerged the doctrine of
prior appropriation, ultimately adopted, at least in part, as the law in at least
seventeen western states."
The basic principles of prior appropriation are well known. In its original
form, taking possession of (diverting or withdrawing) some portion of water-a
rule of capture-initiated the water right, so long as the possession was accompanied by intent to make some productive use of the water." As refined, the
use itself becamne necessary to vest the right; the use had to be "beneficial." A
still further refinenent limited the quantity of water taken from the source to
the amount necessary for the beneficial use, not just the quantity of water
physically possessed. " Unlike under the common law riparian doctrine, there
were no restrictions on the place of use.' In times of shortage, earlier appropriators (seniors) held the better right.' Failure to continue to exercise the
right, however, potentially resulted in its loss through abandonnent. "
As Donald Pisani has noted, there was nothing inevitable about the adoption of prior appropriation." Early court decisions justified this approach,

85. These ten elements are: priority, public ownership, beneficial use, conditional rights,

abandonment, forfeiture, changes of use, groundwater use, instream flow, and adjudication.
86. See Lasky, supta note 58, at 166; see also GCetches, Watcr Use Efficiency, supra note

69, at 4; Wilkinson, supra note 67, at 317-19; John E. Thiorson ct al., D)ividing Wcsicm Watcrs: A Centimy ofAcljudicatingRivers alwdStreams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. RExV. 355, 389-408
(2005) [hereinafter Thorson II.
87. Sec GE-rCHES, supra note 6, at 7-8.
88. See in/ia notes 236-42 and accompanying text.

89. See Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333, 343 (Colo. 2009).
90. See id. at 340.
91. Id. at 341; see also COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 6.
92. Archuleta, 200 P.3d at 344.
93. DONADIJ. PISANI, To RECIAIM A DIVIDED WESI': WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY
1848-1902, at31 (Ray A. Billington et al. cds., 1992).
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while simultaneously disregarding the common law of riparianism, on the
physical conditions and circumstances of settlement mad development in the
West-its general aridity, the limited sources of water supply, the unusually
large demands for use of water to enablermining and irrigation and, of course,
the actions of the users themselves that sometimes rellected a very different
view of the role of water and the manner of its use than prevailed under die
riparian doctrine.' Less often stated but obviously important was the uncertainty in the law that should apply, For although the United States owned virtually all the lands in its western territories through purchase and treaty and presumably "owned" the associated water, Congress had not expressed its intent
The new State of California was
respecting uses of water on federal lands
anxious to encourage mining on federal lands within its territory but was Lincertain about its legal authority on those lands.' Some territorial legislatures
eventually began to enact laws respecting uses of water within their boundaries,
but the effect of those laws on appropriations made on federal public lands
within the state was uncertain.97
B. ORIGINS OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION

The story is now a faniliar one in water law: how prospector-trespassers "
on newly acquired federal lands in the even more recently established State of
Cailornia developed their own rules to govern both the search for gold and
the use of water." The principles of prior appropriation as we know them today did not spawn hilly formed from this process. To the contrary, it was a
gradual process of development with many different ideas competing lor acceptance. The colnmon law existing in the eastern states known as the doctrine of riparianism substantially influenced the process.'" There was the possibility that state or territorial legislatures would make legislative grants to
individuals or corporations to use water. Congress itself might have decided
to establish its own rules respecting uses of water on public lands. Instead, die
original rules were largely those developed by the users themselves, its interpreted and applied by the courts.
First and foremost, it was the actions of prospectors needing water for
mining operations in the remote, unsettled mountains of California that
shaped the original rules. Despite the penchant for academics to inpose
ideological or philosophical labels on the ideas underlying the prospectors'
actions, it is perhaps more useful to simply acknowledge the particular nature

94.

See, e.g., Collin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Col. 443, 446, 448 (1882).

95. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 48 (1857) ("The lormer decisions of this Court,
in cases involving tie right of parties to appropriate waters for mining and other purposes, have
been based upon de wants of tei conmmnity and the peculiar condition oftdings in this Stale,

(tor which there is no precedent,) rather than may absolute rule of law governing such cases.").
96. Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 219, 223, 226-27 (1853).
97. S5eWillev v. Decker, 73 P. 210, 214-15 (Wyo. 1903).
98. See United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. 120, 120 (1845); see also SAMIUEI. C. WIEI., 1
WATER RicirTs INTHE WESTERN UNITED STATES 86-87 (3d. ed. 1911) Ihereinafter WIEt,
WATER RIGHTSj.
99. See, e.g., PISANI, supa note 93, at 11-14.
100. See id. al 31; Frank J. Trelease, Coordinationof Ripaian and Approprtiaive Rights to

the ULe of Waiei; 33 TIx. L. REV. 24, 31-35 (1954).
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of the needs for water that motivated their actions and the circumstances in
which they operated. Mining for gold, as it existed during the early years in
California, required the use of large quantifies of water.'"' Streams were relatively numerous but generally small, with wide variability in annual flows
common to snownelt systems. In some cases, the miners were interested in
the gravels in and along the streams; in others, they needed large volumes of
water under high pressure to blast rock off hillsides.' 2 Early on, it became
common for companies that were able to make the investnent in building the
diversion and conveyance systems needed for supply to provide water to miners.

103

Until 1866 the miners and water users operated on federal lands without
permission from Congress; °' their legal status was therefore unclear. California courts addressed conflicts between competing users and recognized their
possessory rights, at least as based on customs applicable in their mining district, while acknowledging their lack of ownership or express right to use the
land and water."' In a world where possession established claim of right,
many miners believed, and the courts eventually agreed, that priority should
serve to resolve conflicts between competing claimants-both for land and for
water.'°
But water is different than land. It doesn't stay put. One cannot place
stakes around water to mark out the area or amount claimed. Possession required physical control-diversion of water from a stream into a ditch. The act
of diversion manifested an assertion of claim to the amount of water diverted.
The miners needed large volumes to move the gravels and to separate the
gold, but the use was largely nonconsumptive. Nevertheless, miners often
permanently removed water from its original source and carried it to other locations of need. The consequences of mining included an enormous disruption in the landscape and a widespread rearrangement of the hydrology, according to the constantly changing areas of development and needs of the
miners. °7
It was under these conditions that the courts of California sought to define
legal principles that would help facilitate mining activities while also managing
the conflicts that required judicial resolution. Several decisions noted the
unique challenges presented by these new and substantial uses of water, especially due to the lack of legislation or even relevant precedent to apply.' 8 In
101.

See Titcomb v. Kirk, 51 Cal. 289, 289, 292 (1876), for an early California decision

providing historical background. See also WIEL, WATER RIGHTS, sup-t note 98, at 74.
102. ROBERT L. KELLEY, GOLD vs. GRAIN: CALIFORNIA's HYDRAULIC MINING
CONTROVERSY, A CHAPrER IN THE DECLINE OF THE CONCEPr OF LAIsSEZ FAIRE 21-56
(1959); RODMAN W. PAUL, CALIFORNIA GOLD 147-49, 152-53 (Harvard Univ. Press 1947).

103. PISANI, supra note 93, at 16-19.
104. See Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, §§ 1, 9, 14 Stat. 251 (repealed by Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2744, 2793) Ihereinaftcr Mining Act of 18661; Basey v.Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 678 (1874).
105. .See inhfra cases cited in notes 110-58.
106.

See PISANI, supra note 93, at 20-31.

107. Seeid.atl5-16, 18-19.
108. Thus, in Hoffinman v Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 48 (1857), the court stated: "The absence of legislation on this subject, has devolved on the Courts the necessity of fining rules for the proection of this great interest, and in determining these questions, we have conformed, as nearly as
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the words of a treatise writer on the new laws of mining and water in California: "There being no legislation to interpret, tie Courts have laid down ie
rules upon principles deemed proper at the time, and these have gr'adually
become incorporated into the jurispndence of the State, until they are as
as the principles of law regulating any other species of
firmly ''established
rights. °"
The first water law case to r-each the California Supreme Court, Eddv v.
Simpson,"0 aptly illustrates the new issues the courts laced involving uses of
water. In Eddy, both parties had initially diverted water from different sources

to use for mining. Some of the water originally diverted by the defendants
flowed into the source diverted by plaintiffs after defendants used it on their
land."' DefendanLs then constructed a diversion above plaintiffs' source and
clalimed the right to withdraw the water deposited in plaintiffs' source ats a result of these efforts." The trial court found for the defendants on the theory
that, but for the effort of the defendants, the diverted water would not otherwise have ended up in the plaintiffs' source."' The California Supreme Court

possible, to the analogies of the common law." Then, in 3ear River and Auburn Vater and
ew York Mining Co., 8 Cd. 327, 332 (1857), the court addcd:
MinhgCGo. .
It may be said, with truth, that tie judiciary of this State has had thrown upon it responsibilities not incurred by the Courts of any other State in the Union. In addition
to those perplexing cases that must arise, in the nature of things, and especially in putting into practical operation, a new constitution and a new code of statutes, we have
had a large class of cases unknown in the jurisprudence of our sister States. The mining interest of the State has grown up under the force of new and extraordinary circumstances, and in the absence of any specific and certain legislation to guide us.
Left without any direct precedent, as well as without specific legislation, we have been
compelled to apply to this anomalous state of things the aidogies of the common
law, and the more expanded principles of equitable justice. There being no known
system existing at the beginning, parties were left without any certain guide, and for
that reason, have placed themselves in such conflicting positions that it is impossible
to render any' decision that will not produce great injury, not only to the parties inmediately connected with the suit, but to large bodies of men, who, though no formal
parties to the record, must be deeply affected by the decision. No class of cases can
arise more difficult of a just solution, or more (istressing in practical result. And the
6f that most perplexing class of cases.
present is one of the most difficult
109. GREGORY YALE, LEGAL. TrriES TO MINING CIAIMS AND WATER RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA UNDER THE MINING LAW OF CONGRESS, Or.u.v, 1866, at 138 (1867).
110. 3 Cal. 249 (1853). Earlier that year the court considered a case involving water, Iain.sct
v. Chxidlcr, 3 Cal. 90 (1853), involving damage to a mining claim caused by overflow of water
friom a ditch. It was an action in nuisance and did not involve principles of water law. Ic.at 90.
111. Eddy, 3 Cal. at 251-52.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 250. The instruction to the jury made by the district court, though not accepted
in this opinion, provides a clear statement of what became the principles adopted by the Callfornia Supreme Court:
As a general principle, the party who first uses the water of a stream, is by virtue of
priority of occupation entitled to hold die smie. If a company or association of miners construct a ditch, to convey water from a finning stiean for mining or other purposes, and they are the first to use the water, locate and construct the ditch, they are
legally entitled to the same as their property, to the extent of the capacity of the ditch
to hold and convey water. For, if it appears that there is more water running iii the
streamn than the ditch of the first party can hold and convey, then any other party may
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reversed, holding that defendants had lost their rights to the water when they
lost their original possession.' 4 The court believed it was applying "known
principles and well-settled law""' in reaching this conclusion, but it was the law
of a world in which people did not divert water and move it to places outside
the watershed. The court recognized the matter involved a "novel question
growing out of the peculiar enterprises in which many of the people of this
State are embarked,""' 6 but it wanted to apply what it believed was well settled
law. The court noted that the legal right to water under traditional common
law is in its use, not its ownership."' It accepted that both parties claimed their
right based on their possession of water in accordance with the custom that

had developed in the mining districts on federal land. "'
Two years later, in the landmark case I-in v. Philh'ps, the court considered a dispute between one party claiming a right based on the new custom of
"prior occupation" and another party asserting rights under the common law
riparian doctrine as the miner of a claim riparian to the stream.' 9 Noting,
however, that the claimant was not the owner of the land, the court deterinined that riparian principles did not apply.'" It went further, however, in affinning its recognition of the local customs that governed rights to hold both
land and water on the public domain and stated that "Courts are bound to
take notice of the political and social condition of the country, which they judicially ntle."'' This included the legitimacy of occupying federal lands for
mineral development and "the rights of those who, by prior appropriation,
have taken the waters from their natural beds, and by costly artificial works
have conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines, to supply the necessities of gold diggers, and without which the most important interests of the
mineral region would remain without development.'.. Ultimately the court
rightfully take and use the surplus, and it does not matter whether the excess of water
be taken from a point above or below the dam of the lirst party.

Id. (citation omitted).
114. ld.at252-53.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. h. at 252. Contrastingly, Yale believed the actual custom of appropriation in California
regarded diverted water as property, giving its appropriator full rights to (1o whatever he wished
with the water. Thus, he says in commenting on the Eldy decision: "we trace the law of approl),ialion as the rule of right in determining the ownership to water as a commodity." YALE, supra note 109, at 157(emphasis in original).
118. Eddy, 3 Cal. at 249-50, 252; seC WIEL, WATR RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 80-81 (discussing recognition of possessory rights developed by miners on federal land).
119. 5 Cal. 140, 145-47 (1855).
120. Id. For a very helpful discussion of the continuing legal uncertainties both concerning
the status of the common law and the question of legal rights on federal lands faced by both
miners and water providers until Congress enacted the 1866 Act, see WIL, NVATER RIGHTS,
supra note 98, at 80-103.

121.

lIin, 5 Cal. at 146.

122. Id. As to this, Yale finds what he believes is the true policy of tie new principlesencouragement of mining and reward for one's labors:
That this policy may be stated with sufficient deliniteness to be the right of individual
appropriation, subject to such rules and limitations as may be necessary to give effect
to tie two leading principles: First, the most productive working of the mines. See-
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decided the case based onl priority, giving the better right to the senior upstream water supplier.'
The numerous cases that followed during the remainder of the decade
presented a variety of different conflicts between water users and added some
further detail to the basic principles in contention. For examjple, the following
year, in Conger v. Weaver; the court detennined that the right of appropriation vested from tie first steps taken to .its diligent accomplishment, not from
the time of completion of the facilities or the time of actual use:
Illn the case of constructing canals, under the license from the State, the survey of the ground, planting stakes along the line, and actually commencing
and (iligendy pursuing the work, is as much possession as the nature of the
subject will admit, and forms a series of acts of ownership which must be
conclusive of the right.'
In that same year, the court explained that "[plossession, or actual appropriation, must be the test of priority in all claims to the use of water, whenever
such claims are not dependent upon the ownership of the land through which
the water llows.""
In 1857, the Court offered this explanation of the law:
ond, the interests, convenience, and profit of the greatest number. But these last
principles are subservient to another principle, which is necessary to ive effect to
these primary principles, and this principle is protection to labor and encouragement
of it, which can only be given by allowing to mining claims and appopiations a right
of )rop)erty, with its incidents.
YALE,suplu note 109, at 158-59 (emphasis in original).
123. ILrin, 5 Cal. at 146-47. Yale provides this statement of the holding:
The broad doctrine was then announced for the first time in any system of jurisprudene, that tie right to the unlimited use of water in a running stream vested in the
first appropriator, whether a riparim owner or not, with the correlative right to divert
it to any extent, for sale or other use; and that subsequent locators, even for mining
purposes, upon the banks of the sane stream, as riparian owners, could only acquire
an interest in the water for any purpose subordinate to the right of the first appropriator, provided any water was left.
YALE,supwa note 109, at 137.

124.

Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 548, 558 (1856). The Court stated:

But, from the nature of these works, it is evident that it requires time to complete
them, antd from their extent, in some instances, it would require much time; and the
question now arises, at what point of time does the right commence, so as to protect
the undertaker from the subsequent settlements or enterprises of other persons. If it
does not commence until the canal is completed, then the license is valueless, for alter nearly the whole work has been done, any one, actuated by malice or self interest,
may prevent its accoml)lishment; any small squatter settlement might eflkctually destroy it.

Id.
125. Kelly v. Natoma Water Co., 6 Cal. 105, 108 (1856). The issue concerned whether defendant's appropriation was senior because of evidence of some intent to divert water prior to
the construction of plaintiff's diversion. The court stated that "Isluch appropriation cannot be
constructive, because there would be no rule to limit or control it, resting, as it must, only in
intention." Id.
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The fact early manifested itself, that the mines could not be successfully
worked without a proprietorship in waters, and it was recognized and maintained. To protect those who, by their energy, industry, and capital, had
constructed canals, and races, carrying water for miles into parts of the country which must have otherwise remained unliuitful and undeveloped, it was
held that the first appropriator acquired a special property in the waters thus
appropriated, and as a necessary consequence of such property, might invoke all legal. remedies for its enjoyment or defense. A party appropriating
water, has the sole and exclusive right to use the sane for the purposes for
which it was appropriated, and so long as he is not obstructed in the use
thereof, he has no ground of action.'

Here the court upheld the ability of an appropniator to recapture and use
water it transported to another watershed, considering the bed of the intermittent stream in the watershed comparable to a ditch."'
In Maeis v. Bickuell,' the California court considered whether a diversion made to shift water out of the channel so that the gravels in the bed could
be worked constituted an appropriation of water.a It concluded that a valid
appropriation "must be for some useful purpose" and that diverting water to
drain ihe channel (lid not constitute such a purpose. '

126. Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 49 (1857); see also Butte Canal & Ditch Co. v. Vaughn, 11
Cal. 143 (1858).
127. 1d. Thus, tie court altered its previous position in Eddy ,: S11pson. A case decided
that same year, Bear River andAuunb
Water andMinifg Co. v. New York Mbhang Co., raised
the question of the quality of water to which an appropriator was entitled. 8 Cal. 327, 333
(1857). The BearRiver court noted the common law principle that a riparian is entitled to enjoy the flow undiminished in both quantity and quality, but found these requirements unsuited
to conditions in the mining region of California. Id. It pointed out that water is commonly diverted not only out of the stream but often out of the watershed, clearly diminishing or even
eliminating the natural flow and that:
Itlhe water is taken to a locality where it is used; and after being so used, it finds its

way to other mining localifics, where it is again used. The effect of the diversion is
not to diminish the number of times the water may be used. In the majority of cases,
it is used as often, and upon the whole, as profitably, as if it had never been diverted,
but had continued to flow down its natural channels. Tlhie general usefulness of the
element is not impaired by the diversion. It may be very safely assumed, that as much
good, if not more, is accomplished by the diversion, as could have been attained, had
such diversion never occurred. In fact, we must, in reason, presume that the water is
taken to richer mining localities, where it is more needed, and, therefore, the diversion of the stream promotes this leading interest of the State.

Id. at 334. Similarly, the court pointed out that upstreanl mining uses necessarily introduce sedimnent into streams, thereby diminishing the quality of the water. To require that water quality
not be impaired would be to deny the ability to mine. Id. at 335-36. It thus concluded that
such impainnent constituted injury without compensable damage. Id. at. 336.
128. 7 Cal. 261 (1857).
129. Id. at 262.
130. Id. at 262-63. Crandal v. Woods, another 1857 decision, also deternined the nile of
priority applied not only to claims of water for mining but for other purposes as well. 8 Cal.
136 (1857). In that case, the parties claiming public land for agriculture resisted appropriation
of water originating from springs on the fanned land on the basis that their possession of the
land included the right to the use of appurtenant water. Id. at 140-41. The court rejected this
assertion of ripamian rights, stating:
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In 1859, Oimim v. Dixon'3. raised the question of whether a senior appropriation of water to power a mill could be moved upstream, apparently for
different uses, to a ditch above that of the objecting plaintiff. The court reasoned that because the defendCt's mill did not require use of all of the flows
all of the time, the plaintiff, an upstrearm junior appropriator, had established
rights to the water he had diverted that could not be infi-inged by the proposed
change of use."2 In the court's own words, "Itihe measure of the right, as to
extent, follows the nature of the appropriation, or the uses for which it is taken.

In McDonal v. Bear River & Auhumin H'"iler & M'ining Co., ' a case involving a dispute between an upstrean diverter for mining and a downstreamn
mill operator, the court made this statement of law:
The ownership of water, as a substantive mad valuable property, distinct,
sometimes, From the land through which it flows, has been recognized by our
Courts; and this ownership, of course, drawvs to it all the legal remedies for its
invasion. The right accrues from appropriation; this appropriation is the intent to take, accompanied by some open, physical demonstration of the intent, and for some valuable use. We have held that there is no (ifference in
respect to this use, or rather purpose, to which the water is to be applied; at
least, that an appropriation for the uses of a mill stands on the same footing
as an appropriation or the use of the mines. Each of these purposes, indeed,
may be equally useful, or even necessary to the miners themselves. But the
nature of the use may be important, as denoting the extent of the water appropriated. Water taken for a mill is not taken as an uticle of merchandise,
to be sold in the market; it is merely used as a motive power, and after it
passes the mill and subserves its purposes, may be used as an aid to the
working of the mines. But this last use must not be inconsistent with the prias his necessary use is concerned.
or right acquired by the mill owner, so fra"
This right of water may be transferred like other property."
In Kicd v. Lab-cl,' the trial court had instructed the jury that an appropriator could divert the till extent of its appropriation at any point on the stream
3
so long as it caused no hann to other appropriators. ' The plaintiff objected,

If he admits, however, that he is not the owner of tie soil, and that die tact is established that lie acquired his rights subsequent to those of others, then, as both rest
alike for their foundation utpon appropriation, the subsequent locator must take subject to the rights of the former, and the rile, qui priorestin temporc, poiJer est injurc, must apply.

d. at 143.
131. 13 Cal. 33, 36 (1859).
132. d. at 39-40.
133. M.at 38.
134. 13 Cal. 220 (1859).
135. Id.at 232-33.
136. 15 Cal. 161 (1860).
evidence was to show that the defendants were entitled to
137. Id.at 179 ("The Object of this
a certain quantity of water for their Gold Flat ditch, and that they diverted this quantity through
their new ditch instead of the other, which it was claimed they had the legal right to do. The
evidence having been admitted, the Court instructcd the juiy in effect, that a person entitled to
divert a given quantity of the water of a strearn, may take the same at any point on tie stream,
and may change the point of diversion at pileasure, if the rights of others are not injuriously al-
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arguing that the effect was to give appropriators ownership of a certain amount
of water.'" The court stated that "jai right may be acquired to its use, which
will be regarded and protected as property; but it has been distinctly declared
in several cases that this right carries with it no specific property in the water
itself,' '3 but it upheld the trial court's instruction, stating:
[tihese authorities show conclusively, that in all cases the effect of the change
upon the rights of others is the controlling consideration, and that in the absence of injurious consequences to others, any change which the party
chooses to make is legal and 0proper. It follows that in this case the law was
conectly given by the Court.
Water litigation reaching the California Supreme Court slowed in the
1860s. The 1863 decision in McKL'nney v. Snmilh involved the claim by parties that had originally diverted water to clear the channel for placer mining so
that they could subsequently use this aimount for additional purposes in different locations. ' The court determined the original "appropriation" was for
limited purposes that did not include these additional uses. "' That sarne year,
4
the court considered a complaint by a
in Phoenix Water Co. v. Flecher,1
prior appropriator that a subsequent upstream darn and lumber mill was interfering with his use (for mining) because of alteration of flows and deterioration
in water quality. Using the language of the riparian common law, the court
stated that the rule of law was well established that "the owner of hydraulic
works on the stream above, has no right to detain the water unreasonably" and
must build and use the water in a manner that persons downstream can "parFurthermore, acticipate in its use and enjoyment without interruption."
cording to the court, "Itihe prior appropriator is clearly entitled to protection
against acts which materially diminish the quantity of water to which he is entitled, or deteriorate its quality, for the uses to which he wishes to apply it.""..
In Wxon v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co.," 7 the court rejected an argument based on
the theory that, in the mineral districts of ICalifornial, the rights of miners
and persons owning ditches constructed fbr mining purposes are paramount
to all other rights and interests of a different character, regardless of the time
fcctcd by the change.").
138. Id.at 180.
139. Id.
140. Id.at 181.
141. 21 Cal. 374 (1863).
142. Id.
143. Id.at 382-83.
144. 23 Cal. 481 (1863).
145. Id.at 486.
146. Id.at 487. The decision references Hill v:King, 8 Cal. 336 (1857), and Ber River&
Auburn Water & Mining Co. i' New York Mining Co., 8 Cal. 327 (1857), for the proposition
that, "the prior appropriator below was entitled to the water so as to fill his ditch as it existed at
the time of subsequent locations above; and that such subsequent locators bad no right to so
use the water as to diminish the quantity to which the prior appropriator %as entitled." Phoenix
Vater Co., 23 Cal. at 487.
147. 24 Cal. 367 (1864).
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or mode of their acquisition; thus annihilating the doctrine of priority in all
cases where the contest is between a miner or ditch owner and one who
of any other kind of right or the ownership of any other
claims the exercise
8
kind of interest.1

The court further stated that "Itlo such a doctrine we are unable to SuLbscribe, nor do we think it clothed with a plausibility sufficient to justiF, us in
combating it."''
Hill v. Smithi' involved the question of liability for the harmfl effects of
mining on an existing water supplier. The Court stated
That the defendant's work caused luge quantities of rubbish and sediment to
be deposited in plaintiffs reservoir and ditches, thereby lessening their capacity and entailing upon her additional expense in cleaning then out and
maintaining their original capacity, hardly admits of debate. And it is very
clear from the evidence that the value of the water for mining purposes, by
reason of the mud and sediment mixed with it by the defendant's mining operations, was diminished by from one-fourth to one-halft'

The court rejected the defendait's argument that he had conducted the
mining activities with ordinairy care and that plaintifl's harln was the conse-

quence of an unavoidable effect of mining. It reasoned that it was immaterial
how carefully the defendant had worked, because if his work in fact injured
plaintiff he was nonetheless liable.' 5' The court considered but rejected the
notion that conditions in the mining districts required changes in the common
law that might justify the injury here:
[Tlhe entire charge impliedly if not expressly proceeds upon and sanctions
the idea that as between ditch-owners and miners using the water of a stream
in the mineral regions of the State for mining tpurposes, the law tolerates and

winks at some uncertain and indeterminate amount of injury by the one to
the prior rights of the other. This is due in a great measure doubtless to the
notion, which has become quite prevalent, that the rules of the common law
touching water rights have been materially modified in this State upon the
theory that they were inapplicable to the conditions found to exist here, and

touchtherefore inadequate to a just and ftir determination of controversies
:
1 1
ing such rights. This notion is without any substantial foundation.

The HIlldecision prompted a sharp rebuke from mining lawyer and treatise writer Gregory Yale, who complained dat it "confoundledl" the principles
of appropriation and the common law riparian doctrine.' ' In his view, "Itihe
Yale further noted that,
two principles are the opposite of each other."'

148. Id.at 373.
149. Id.
150. 27 Cal. 476 (1865).
151. Id at 480-81.
152. Id. at 481.
153. Id.at 481-82.
154. YALE, Splr)1a note 109, at 194.
155. Id. at 194-95.
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"One admits of equality ... while the other is based on the priority of time." 6
Since, in his view, the conditions that waranted equality of right did not exist
on the public mineral lands of California, its principles no longer applied. 7
The continuing influence of the conmon law on the thinking of the court became evident later that year when the court applied riparian principles to resolve a dispute between two agricultural users on public lands.' "
The ability to make a change of use of an existing appropriation without
loss of priority arose again in Davis v. Gale.9 The Court concluded that
Appropriation, use and nonuse are the tests of his right; and place of use and
character of use are not. When he has made his appropriation lie becomes
entitled to the use of the quantity which lie has appropriated at any place
where he may choose to convey it, mid
for any useful and beneficial purpose
60
to which he may choose to apply it.

The principles that emerged from these cases were later summaiized as follows:
The waters of these streams on the public lands of the United States were all

subject to appropriation at any time by any person who proposed to devote
the water so taken to a beneficial use. The making of a diversion with such
intent and for such purpose would vest in the diverter, at once, the right to
use the water. No length of time of such use was essential to the acquisition
of the right. The water was treated as property having no owner. The rights
of the United States as riparian owner of the abutting lands were completely
ignored. With respect to contending appropriators of water from the sane
stream, he who was first in time was considered superior in right. Such right
vested by relation as of the time when the appropriator began the actual work
of constructing his diversion works and ditch for that purpose, provided the
work was done in such a manner as to be visible and to manifest to others his
intent and purpose to prosecute the work to completion, and provided further, that he did so and actually took and used the water. The right so obtained was a right to only so much of the water as was beneficially used. The
owner of such right was entitled at any time to change the place of diversion

156. Id.at 195.
157. Yale explained:

One admits of equality only, without regai-d to time, as between all the owners on the
stream, above and below, and between whom the maxim of the proper use of the water applies; while the other is based upon the priority of time, admitting an appropriation of the water for all time to come, of a quantity unlimited only by the use for
which it is taken, and this use is unrestricted, and may extend to tie diversion of the
whole streamn to distait points, leaving the natural chamel below entirely barren of
water, mid utterly destroying all riparian rights upon the streamn below, and qualifying
those above.
Id.
158. Ferrea v. Knipe, 28 Cal. 340, 344-45 (1865). Ultimately, the California Supreme Court
decided riparian principles should apply for uses on private lands. Lux v. Hagan, 10 P. 674,
782-83 (1886).
159. 32 Cal. 26 (1867).
160. Id. at 34.
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or the place of use, if the rights of others were not impaired thereby.'
In 1866 Congress finally ratified the actions of the miners on public
lands.' ' Section 9 of the Mining Act of 1866 provided that:
IWIhenever, by priority of possession, ights to the use of water for mining,
argicultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and
the same are recognized and acknowledged lby the local customs, laws, and
the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall
he maintained and protected in the same.""
The effect was to ratily existing water uses and to recognize the principle
of "priority by possession." Justice Field, who had served on the California
Supreme Court during the development of prior appropriation, atthored two
opinions in 1874 explaining ils meaning. In Atchison v. Peteson,'6 ' he declared:
By the custom which has obtained anong miners in the Pacific States and
Territories, where mining for the precious metals is had on the public lands
of the United States, the first appropriator of mines, whether in placers,
veins, or lodes, or of waters in the streams on such lands for mining purposes, is held to have a better right ihan others to work the mines or use the waters. The first appropriator who subjects the property to use, or takes de
necessary steps for that purpose, is regarded, except as against the government, as the source of title in all controversies relating to the property. As
respects the use of water for mining )ulrposes, the doctrines of the common
law declaratory of the rights of riparian owners were, at an early day, al'ter the
discovery of gold, found to be iiiapplicable or applicable only in a very limited extent to the necessities of miners, and inadequate to their protection. '6

161. Lucien Shaw, 77'e Development o/ the Law oflIttes in the West, 10 CAL. L REv.
443, 451 (1922) (footnote omitted). It is worth noting that this summary omits dhe water quality
protections generally found by the California Suprcme Court.
162. See Mining Act of 1866, supira note 104. In 1870, Congress expressly declared tat
patents were subject to rights established by pior appropriation. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, §
17, 16 Stat. 218. In 1877 Congress declared all "surplus" water on the public lands to be available for appropriation. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as aniended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (2012)).
163. Mining Act of 1866, supra note 104, § 9.
164. 87 U.S. 507 (1874).
165. Id. at 510-11. He explained the rationale:
This equality of right anong all die proprietors on the same stream would have been
incompatible with any extended diversion of the water by one proprietor, and its conveyance for mining purposes to points from which it could not be restored to the
strean. But the government being the sole proprietor of all the pub)lic lands, whelther
bordering on streams or otherwise, there was no occasion for the application of the
common-law doctrine of riparian )roprietorshi) with respect to the waters of those
streanis. The government, by its silent acquiescence, asscnted to the general occupation of the public lands for mining, muid, to encourage their free and unlimited use for
that purpose, reserved such lands as were mineral irom sale and the acquisition of titie by settlement. And lie who first connects his own labor with property thus situated
and open to general exploration, does, in natural justice, acquire a better right to its
use and enjoyment thaii others who have not given such labor.
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Referring to California cases, Justice Field described the law of prior appropriation in the following terms:
The right to water by prior appropriation, thus recognized and established as
the law of miners on the mineral lands of the public domain, is limited in
every case, in quantity and quality, by the uses for which the appropriation is
made. A different use of the water subsequendy does not affect the right;
that is subject to the same limitations, whatever the use. The appropriation
does not confer such an absolute right to the body of the water diverted that
the owner can allow it, after its diversion, to run to waste and prevent others
friom using it for mining or other legitimate purposes; nor does it confer such
a right that he can ihsist upon the flow of the water without deterioration in
quality, where such deterioration does not deleat nor impair the uses to
which the water is applied."'
Then, in Basey v. Gallaghe;'7 Justice Field concluded that prior appropriation also applied to deterinine rights between two irrigation uses operating
on the public lands.' " Referring to Atchison v. Peterson, he stated: "[elver
since that decision it has been held generally throughout the Pacific States and
Territories that the right to water by prior appropriation for any beneficial
purpose is entitled to protection.' 69
In its 1872 Civil Code, California spelled out its law of prior appropriafion:
Section 1410. The right to the use of running water flowing in a river or
stream or down a cafion or ravine may be acquired by appropriation.
Section 1411. The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, mad when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it
for stch a purpose, the right ceases.
Section 1412. The person entitled to the use may change the place of diversion, if others are not injured by such change, and may extend the ditch,
flume, pipe,
or aqueduct by which the diversion is made to places beyond that where the
first use was made.

Section 1413. The water appropriated may be turned into the channel of
another stream and mingled with its water, and then reclaimed; but in reclaiming it the water already appropriated by another must not be diminished.

Section 1414. As between appropriators, the first in time is first in right.
Section 1415. A person desiring to appropriate water must post a notice, in

Id.at 512.
166. Id. at 514.
167. 87 U.S. 670 (1874).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 683.
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writing, in a conspicuous place at the point of intended diversion, stating
there in:
1. That he claims the water there flowing to the extent of (giving the
number) inches, measured under a four-inch pressure;
2. The purposes [or which he claims it, and the place of intended use;
3. The means by which he intends to divert it, and the size of the flume,
ditch, pipe, or aqueduct in which he intends to divert it;
A copy of the notice must, within ten days after it is posted, be recorded
in the office of the Recorder of the county in which it is posted.
Section 1416. Within sixty (lays after the notice is posted, the claimant must
commence the excavation or construction of the works in which he intends
to divert the water, and must prosecute the work diligently and uninterruptedly to completion, unless temlporarily interrupted by snow or rain.
Section 1417. By "completion" is meant conducting the waters to the place
of intended use.
Section 1418. By a compliance with the above rules the claimant's right to
tie use of the water relates back to the time the notice was posted.
Section 1419. A failure to comply with such rules deprives the claimants of
the right to the use of the water as against a subsequent claimant who complies therewith."'
The law of prior appropriation developed in California as a means of
providing basic rules governing the possession of mining claims and water for
mining uses on federal lands. By granting a superior right to an unowned
thing on the first possessor, it sought to remedy the absence of authorization
by federal law. It adopted the principle of priority as a simple and f tir means
to sort out conflicts between two competing claimants when there was not
enough water for both sides. Further, it required that the appropriation be for
a useful or beneficial purpose to obtain the protection of law. It also reqtuired
diligence in its development and use to maintain the valuable priority right. It
allowed the point of diversion and place of use to change without loss of priority so long ats the diverter did not injure others thereby. Additionadly, the new
system included a posting system to provide notice to others and, as codified,
required users to record these notices with the county clerk. Finally, the new
system abolished the right upon the termination of its use.

C. THE SPREAD OF PRIOR APPIROPRIATION
Prior appropriation, especially after its recognition by Congress in 1866,
seemed to apply to uses of water on the federal public lands. In 1866, the
170.

1 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1410-19 (enacted 1872) (Creed Haynond &John C. Burch eds.,

1st ed. 1874), available at http://books.google.cons/books?id-loQOAQAAMAAJ&printsec

frontcover#v=oncpagc&q&f=falsc.
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Nevada Supreme Court applied appropriation principles to address a dispute
between two competing users of water from the sane source for irrigation on
public lands."' Three years later, the same court addressed the issue of who
held prior rights between two competing users of water on public lands; after
applying the requirement for diligence in completion of facilities, it decided
that defendant's claim was junior to plaintiffs claim.' 72
Then, in 1872, the Nevada Supreme Court decided that a party obtaining
a patent of federal lands with an appurtenant strean enjoyed riparian rights,
even as against a party previously appropriating the water of the stream. 7 In
addition, the Colorado Territorial Legislature enacted a statute in the late
1860s providing that
All persons who claim, own or hold a possessory right or title to any land or
parcel of land within the boundary of Colorado territory, as defined in the
organic act of said territory, when those claims are on the bank, margin or
neighborhood of any stream of water, creek or river, shall be entitled to the
use of the water of said stream, creek or river, for the purposes of irrigation,
mad makin, said claims available to the full extent of the soil, for agricultural
purposes.
In the event of insufficient water the law further established a mechanism
to "apportion, in a just and equitable proportion, a certain amount of said water upon certain or alternate weekly days to different localities, as they may in
their judgment think best for the interest of all parties concerned."''
Other
western territories and states, including Montana, also adopted these provisons. In 1872 the Montana Supreme Court considered what law to apply to
a dispute respecting use of a strean between two property owners, both riparian users.' While the two justices who wrote opinions both affirmed the district court decision, they expressed sharply contrasting views respecting the law
governing uses of water in Montana. Justice Knowles asserted that the common law had been displaced by the actions of settlers in the Territory, such as
the plaintiff claiming rights to use water on the basis of appropriation, and that
Congress in 1866 had recognized this custom as the basis of establishing rights
to water on public lands. '" Moreover, he interpreted the provision Montana

171. Lobdell v. Simpson, 2 Ncv. 274, 277-79 (1866) (acknowledging the development of
this law in California cases).
172. Ophir Silver Mining Co. v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 546-48 (1869); see also Proctor v.
Jennings, 6 Nev. 83 (1870).
173. Van Sickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 289 (1872). The court stated: "He became the owner of the soil, and as incident thereto had the right to the benelit to be derived from the flow of
the water therethrough; and no one could lawfully divert it against his consent." Id. at 256. The
appropriator used the water on non-iparian lands.
174. The Revised Statutes of Colorado: As Passed at the Seventh Session of the Legislative
Assembly, ch. xlv, § I (David. C. Collier ed., 1868).
175. Id. § 4. Apportionment was to be made by three commissioners appointed by the county probate judge. Id.
176. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 144 n.28.
177. Thorp v. Freed, I Mont. 651 (1872).
178. Id. at 655-56; see also id.at 660 ("The right to appropriate water for the purposes of
irrigation having, in our opinion, been acknowledged and recognized by the customs, laws and
decisions of die courts of this Territory, the law of congress comes in and says that whenever, by
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had adopted from Colorado as recognizing appropriation for irTigaion and
rejecting the common law.'78 Chief justice Wade, in contrast, believed that
prior appropriation was ill suited to the circumstances in Montana ivolving
patented land used for agriculture:
And because this princil)le of "prior in time, prior in right" became thus established in California, as applied to mineral lands of the public domain, an
elfort has been made in this Teritory to apply the same doctrine to agricultural or farming lands, hut the principle has never been acquiesced in by the
people, and is now in litigation all over the Territory. And it seems to me
perfectly clear that the reason for the doctrine as applied to trespassers upon
when applied to actual purchasers from the
the public domain, utterly fails
government of agricultural lands.'8
Chief justice Wade pointed to the provisions of the Montana statute for
shauing of water and concluded its intention was a rejection of prior appropriation."' He added:
So, then, we say that water for irrigation in this coUntry as naturally belongs to
the lknds through which the stream passes, in certain proportions as in other
countries it belongs to the land to supply the necessities of life. Irrigation in
this country is what rain is to other countries, and a monopoly of one would
be equally as appropriate as that of the other, and equally sustained by any
principle of justice and equity. As in other countries, the rains come to the
prior and to the subsequent locators of lands upon a stream in equal proportions, so in this arid country should the waters of my given stream be divided
18
equdly among the fIariners for the pl)uposes of irrigation.

In his view, the bestowal of absolute property rights in the flow of a stremn
to the first appropriator gave that appropriator extraordinary control of a limited water supply, potentially akin to a monopoly."' He concluded:
If this decision necessitates the adoption of the common law respecting running water, and the manner in which the same may be used and the rights incident thereto, we cap see no objection to it on that account. It may operate

priority of possession, te right to tie use of water for this purpose 'have vested and accrued,'

'the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the
salnc."').

179..Se icL at 657.
180. Id. at 667 (Wade, CJ., concurring).
181. Id. at 668 ("WIe say most unhesitatingly, that the whole purpose of the statute was to
utterly abolish and annihilate the doctrine of prior appropriation, and to establish an equal distribution of the waters of any given streamn in the agricultural districts of de Ten-itory.").
182. I. at 676.
183. Id. He added:
The doctrine of prior appropriation goes to the extent of (eclaring that he who first
appropriates the waters of a stream upon the government lands thereby acquires an
absolute pro)erty therein, as against all the world, which property is capable of being
bought and sold, mortgaged, devised, inherited and transmitted, from generation to
generation, like other property.
Id. at 678.
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unjustly in certain peculiar cases, but as a general rule it will secure justice
and equity. Whenever any old and long established rule or principle of law
is to be modilied or changed, it should be done with the greatest care and
prudence, for such rule or principle generally speaks the wisdom of long experience, much thought and much learning, and should not be inconsiderately trifled with. We believe our Territory should not form an exception to
the just operation of the rules and principles that govern and control the
rights and remedies incident to running water. We have arrived at this conclusion after much thought and study, having in view solely the interests of
our. people and tie prosperity of the Teritory. '
In language that presaged the message of John Wesley Powell, Chief Justice Wade concluded:
It is well known to any individual who has resided in this Territory for one
season, that there is not sufficient available water in the Territory for the
purposes of irrigation, and if the doctrine of prior appropriation, as contended for by appellants, is to prevail, long before one-tenth pail of the tillable
land in the Territory is subjected to cultivation the entire available water of
the country will have been monopolized and owned by a few individuals,
thereby defeating any advance in the agricultural prosperity of the country,
and thereby directly repelling immigration thither.
Powell's survey of the arid regions of the American West persuaded him
that access to water was the limiting factor in the region's development." His
major recommendation was to survey lands in a manner that would provide
such access. He did not object to prior appropriation, noting that western development depended on separating water from its natural channel.' 7 But he
feared that if water rights were transferable they would end up being concentrated in a few hands and suggested two limitations: that the "user right"
should attach to the land where used, not the individual or company; and that
the right should depend on the diligent development of the facilities necessary
to use the water.' " In effect, he was proposing a hybrid system in which the
user could take water from the stream as necessary to make the land productive, but the right stayed permanently with the land.
In its constitution drafted in 1876 in preparation for statehood, Colorado
broke new ground by declaring that "[tihe water of every natural stremn, not
heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be
the property of the public, and the sate is dedicated to the use of the people
of' the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.'..
Colorado
added that "[piriority of appropriation shall give the better right" mad stated
that "Itihe tight to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to
184.
185.

Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 686.

186. Sce genemllyJ. W. PO\vEII. REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE
UNIrEI) STATES, vrrn A MORE DETAILEI) AccouNTr OF THE LANDS OF UTAH (2d ed. 1879).

187. Id. at 42 ("All of the waters of all of the arid lands will eventually be taken from their
natural channels, and they can be utilized only to the extent to which they are thus removed,
and water rights must of necessity be severed from the natural channels.").
188. Id. at 43. In his draft bills, Powell proposed that if the individual acquiring fide to land
(lid not begin irrigating his land within five years, ie right would lapse. Id. at 32.
189. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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beneficial uses shall never be denied."'" The constitution's declaration that all
water was the "property of the public" was an indirect way of saying that it was
not the property of riparian landowners-an intention made explicit by the following provision, which rendered unappropriated water available for appropriation.'"' In this way, Colorado expressly adopted prior appropriation as the
sole means of establishing a private right to use water.
The Colorado Constitution's declaration that the waters within the state
were the property of the public also served to deny any federal claim of title to
those waters on public lands within the state. The California prior appropriation cases assumed the United States was the owner of the land and water and
that, either because of early Congressional inaction or because the 1866 Act
served as a grant of the right to use waters to those who had established rights
through possession and use, ultimate tide to all water on federal lands rested
with the United States. The Nevada Vu Sickle'2 case rested on that premise.
Additionally, in Thoip v. FReecl,' Justice Knowles based his legal conclusions
on federal ownership of water. However, in Colorado's constitution the state
was rejecting any notions of federal ownership of water and asserting instead
the authority of the state to establish rules governing rights to use all waters located within the state.' 4 The water belonged to the people of Colorado, the
constitution asserted, not the United States.
Not long thereafter, a dispute arose between landowners/irrigators situated
along St. Vrain Creek and others who diverted from the south fork of the St.
Vrain out of the watershed and into Left Hand Creek to irrigate lands they
owned.") The downstream riparian users, who had taken up irrigation after
the Left Hand users, discovered the existence of the diversion darn during a
period of drought and tore it out. ' The Left Hand users sued for damnages,
asserting their superior rights as prior appropriators."'. The downstream users
asserted their riparian righLs by pointing to the territorial statutes enacted in
the 1860s, and by arguing that prior appropriation was not tie law of Colorado until the 1876 Constitution and that they had patented their lands and used
water before then.'
The Colorado Supreme Court responded that prior appropriation had
190. Id.§ 6.
191. The common law had always (lenied the possibility of "ownership" ol"running" water
(water flowing in a stream), ard made clear the nature of the legal right enjoved by a ripalrial
A. DAN
landowner was usufructuau-that is, a right of enjoyment without owncrship.
TARLOCK, IAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURC1S, § 3.10, at 3-12 to -14 (2010) lhereinafter
TARLOCK, lAW OF WATER RIGHTSI. This physical property of water-that it does not stand still
in nature, that everyone in the state enjoys it, that it exists ats a product of natural processes, that
it is essential for all life, and that therefore tie court must consider water ats available for all to
use and enjoy-Roman law had identlied. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN tit. 1,pts. 1-6, 65
(J.A.C. Thomas trans., North-Holland Pub. Co. 1975) (c. 553 CE).
192. 7 Nev. 249 (1872).
193. 1 Mont. 651 (1872).
194. See SCHORR, COLORADO, SuplYltnote 20, at 42-43 (stating that the Colorado Constitution prohibited the denid of the right to appropriate its order to prevent the legislature from
making exclusive grants to individuals or companies).
195. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 444 (1882).
196. Il.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 448-49.
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always been the law in Colorado.'" It declared that "imperative necessity" had
made it so:
The climate is diy, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual rainfall, is
arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections, artificial irrigation
for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in the various streams thus
acquires a value unknown in moister climates. Instead of being a mere incident to the soil, it rises, when apprgriated, to the dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate, or right of property.
Economic considerations also demanded recognition of this law:
It has always been the policy of the national, as well as the territorial and state
governments, to encourage the diversion and use of water in this countiy for
agriculture; and vast expenditures of time and money have been made in reclaiming and fertilizing by irrigation portions of our unproductive territoly.
Houses have been built, and permanent improvements made; the soil has
been cultivated, and thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that appropriations of water would be protected.
Deny the doctrine of priority or superiority of right by priority of appropiation, and a great part of the value of all this property is at once destroyed.
The Court found support in the language of a US Supreme Court decision,
Broder v. Natoina Water & Miing Co.,' in which the US Supreme Court
stated that congressional action in 1866 was a "voluntary recognition of a preexistIng right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use, Irather than the establishment of a new one. " °" The Colorado Supreme Court
interpreted the territorial statutes as an expression of appropriation principles,
rather than riparian law."° To the argument that users should not be allowed
to use water outside of the original watershed, the Court responded: "the right
to water acquired by priority of appropriation thereof is not in any way dependent upon the locus of its application to the beneficial use designed."'
In 1885, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that local customs
should govern rights to use water on lands within the state.' The court found
support in the actions of Congress, and overruled Van Sickle." The court,
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447; Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879).
Brode,; 101 U.S. at 276 (emphasis in original).
Collin, 6 Colo. at 447-48.
Id. at 449. The court added:

The doctrine of priority of right by priority of appropriation for agriculture is
evoked ... by the imperative necessity for artificial irrigation of the soil. And it would
be an ungenerous and inequitable rule that would deprive one of its benefit simply
because he has, by large expenditure of time amd money, carried the water from one
stream over an intervening watershed mid cultivated land in the valley of another.
Id.
206. Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442, 447 (Nev. 1885).
207. Id. at 445, 447.
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speaking through Chief'Justice Hawley, stated:
ITihe ninth section of the act of congress conlirnd to the omners of waterrights ol the public lands of the United States the same rights which they
held under the local customs, laws, and decisions of the courts prior to its
enactment; that the act of congress (lid not introduce, and was not intended
to introduce, any new system, or to evince any new or (illerent policy upon
the paut of the general government; that it recognized, sanctioned, protected,
and conhirmed the system already established by the customs, laws, and decisions of corts, and provided for its continuance.In 1889, die Nevada Supreme Court followed Collin by determining that
the common law could not apply in Nevada because of the different physical
conditions in that state:
Its inal)lacability to the Pacific states, as shown in Atchison v. Peterson ...
applies forcibly to the state of Nevada. Here the soil is arid, and unlit for
cultivation Unless irrigated by the waters of running streams. The general
surface of the state is table land, traversed by parallel mountain ranges. The
great plalns of the state aliord natural advantages for conducting water, and
lands otherwise waste and valueless become productive by artificial irrigation.
The condition of the country, and tie necessities of the situation, impelled
settlers upon the public lands to resort to the diversion and use of waters.
This fact of itself is a striking illustration, and conclusive evidence of the inapplicability of the common-law rule.'
Wyoming also moved allirmatively to establish prior appropriation as the
rule governing uses of all water in the state. Wyoming's Constitution, adopted
at statehood in 1890,20 expressly adopted prior appropriation: "Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the better right.""' The constitution
also asserted state control of water: "The water of all natural streams, springs,
lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are
hereby declared to be the property of the state."' In Moyer v Preston, the
Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that riparim principles never applied in
Wyoming."' The court, citing to Collin, noted that tie arid conditions prevailing in the state required the diversion of water for irrigation use and that there
was a much greater area of irrigable land not riparian to streams.' In a subsequent case involving a dispute between water users in Montana and Wyoming,

208.

kI.at 446.

209. Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317, 321 (Ncv. 1889).
210. WYO. CONsT. Ratification.
211. Id.art. VIII,§ 3.
212. Id.art. VIII, § 1; sce;so 18A6 Wyo. Srss. LAws 294, 299 ("Thc water of every natural
stream not heretofore appropriated %ithin
this Tcnitory, is hereby declared to be de properly
of the public, and ti stone is dedicated to tie usc of the people, subjcct to appropriation as
herein provided.").
213. 44 P. 845, 847 (Wyo. 1896) ("The common-law doctrinc rclating to de rights of a riiainU proprietor in de water of a natural stream, and the use thereof, is unsuited to our requircinents and necessities, and never obtained in Wyoming.").
214. Id. ("A dilierent principle, better adapted to the material conditions of this region, has
been recognized. Thai principle, briefly stated, is that the light to the use of water for beneficial
purposes depends upon a prior appropriation.").
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Willey v. Decker; Justice Potter of the Wyoming Supreme Court provided an
2
extensive discussion of the adoption of prior appropriation in western states. 1
He stated that-along with Colorado and Wyoming-Arizona, Nevada, and
Utah had fully embraced prior appropriation. 6 Montana, he noted, had followed California in only recognizing prior appropriation when practiced of).
public lands within tie state."' Nebraska had decided to allow both appropriation and riparian principles to co-exist in that state."'
In the landmark case of Lux v. Haggin, the California Supreme Court upheld the superiority of common law riparian rights over prior appropriation
on private lands in the state." ' The court examined the presumed policy reasons favoring adoption of prior appropriation and asked "whether the recognition of a doctrine of appropriation... would secure the greatest good to the
2
greatest number."1
The court noted that the appropriator "by his appropriation makes the running water his own, subject only to the trust that he shall
employ it for some useful purpose.22 ' It added:
lIlt does not require a prophetic vision to anticipate that the adoption of the
rule, so-called, of "appropriation," would result, in time, in a monopoly of all
the waters of the state by comparatively few individuals, or combinations of
individuals, controlling aggregated capital, who could either apply the water
to purposes useful to themselves, or sell it to those from whom they had taken it away as well as to others. 2
California still recognizes riparian rights to use water for private lands located on watercourses. 2 Those states that initially established a so-called hybrid system authorizing uses of water either on the basis of appropriation or
riparian principles now have shifted to prior appropriation only. 24 Yet, as we
shall see, the influence of some riparian principles such as reasonable use continues to shape the development of prior appropriation today.2
D. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION

While uses of water, for mining in the mountains of California drove the
early development of prior appropriation, uses of water for irrigated agriculture in the arid and seni-arid regions of the West motivated the evolution of
prior appropriation-especially concerning needs for public administration of
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

73 P. 210, 213-23 (Wyo. 1903).
Id. at 215-16 (citing cases friom Arizona, Nevada, and Utah).
Id.at 214.
IM.at 217 (citing Crawford Cnty. v. Hathaway, 93 N.W. 781 (Neb. 1903)).
10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
Ic.at 702.
Id.at 703.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Other western states where riparian rights may still exist arc Nebraska and Oklahoma.

TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 191, §§ 5.11, 5.13, at 5-19 to -21.

224. In general, these states authorized tie transfonnation of riparian rights that people had
placed into actual use into prior appropriation rights. Id. § 5.11; see adso Frank J. Trelease,
Coordinationof Riparian and Approplivae Rihts to the Use of Water; 33 TE.x L. REV. 24,
40-41 (1954).
225. See infra note 401 and accompanying text.

Issue 2

PRIOR AJIROPRIA TION A RE4SSESSMIEAT

uses. In many respects, the. basic principles of prior appropriation have
changed very little from those established in the 1850s and 1860s. Perhaps
the most important fundanental development occurred early as irrigation uses
took center stage and water uses became more tied to particular lands. Unlike
the fast moving world of gold mining where water uses (generally made possible by companies established specifically as water suppliers) moved from location to location as needs arose, irrigated agriculture required the long-tenn
supply of water to particular lands. Irrigators, as landowners either individually or collectively, took charge of supplying their own water. While some private, lor-prolit companies entered into the water supply business for irrigation,
they were almost entirely unsuccessful. " ' Accordingly, the law shifted from
favoring the interests of water suppliers under which it gave them almost total
control of the water they diverted ad delivered to favoring the interests of the
users of the water-the irn'igators.
Samuel Wiel has characterized this shift as moving from an assumption of
rights based on possession of water to rights based on water's use."' The real
value of the water right was to enable the permanent settlement of lands based
on irrigated agriculture. Just as it had been important in Calilornia to protect
the investment of the water companies in facilities necessary to provide water
for mining, now it was important for the settler/landowner to control the water
right to protect his efforts to inprove the land. States extended prior appropriation to emphasize the importance of use.' While early prior appropriation recognized the requirement of use, the doctrine evolved to make use
(more accurately, beneficial use) its central eleinent." Simultaneously, the
courts began to emphasize the legal rights of the user, even in situations in
which a separate entity that had constructed the diversion and primary delivery facilities provided water."
The emergence of use as the central feature of prior appropriation also
brought attention to the nature and extent of the right. A use-based right restored the usufructuary status understood to be the nature of the right under
the riparian doctrine."' It erased any notions that might have arisen in the California gold fields that the appropriator was in fact the owner of the water it-

226. See PISANI, Supita note 93, at 85-98. Opposition to for-proiti water supply companies
was intense in Colorado in the 1880s. See DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 209-10; see also David B.

Schorr,

he Thxt ,Vater-lrivatilationDebate: Golorado Water Corpoi-atons in the Gilded

Age, 33 EcOLOGY L.Q. 313, 322-28 (2006). Most of these vcnturcs Iailed as a matter of economics. Irrigators simply could not alcord to pay the full costs of the water and opposed tie
idea of a company making a profit from delivery of water.
227. See WIE, \VATER RIGHTS, supra note 98, § 139, at 214-15. States also adopted possession as the basis of the right on the public domain because only the United States owned
land. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
228. Confusion continued, however, as mnmay assumed their right resulted from the "appropriation" of water-that is, its diversion and possession-aid regarded their possession as establishing ownership of the amount of water possessed and giving them he right to (1o whatever
they ished with the water. See infiv notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
229. .CWIIe .WAI'ER RIGHTS. supinoite 98, at 214-15.
230. See, e.g., Wheeler v. N. Colo. Inigating Co., 17 P. 487 (Colo. 1888) (discussing the status of a company supplying water).
231. See WiEi., WATER RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 216-17; see also Saunuel C. Wiel, Run-

jnig Wale,; 22 HARV. L.Rrv. 190, 199-202 (1909).
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Combined with state declarations of ownership of water, adherence to

the usufructuary concept underlined the responsibility of the user to make
careful use of the resource. Moreover, adherence to the usufructuary concept
highlighted the essential shared nature of water uses-that the commitment of
water to any given use may limit or preclude other valuable uses. As we shall

see, people like Elwood Mead picked up this concept and applied it as a basis
for extending public supervision over all human uses of water. 3
Basey v. Gallagher contains an important early statement reflecfing this
emerging awareness, in which Justice Field stated:
[Tihe right to water by pnior appropriation for any beneficial purpose is entitled to protection. Water is diverted to propel machinery in flour-mills and
saw-nills, and to irrigate land for cultivation, as well as to enable miners to
work their mining claims; and in all such cases the right of the first appropriator, exercised within reasonable lifits, is respected and enforced. We say
within reasonable limits, for this right to water, like the right by prior occupancy to mining ground or agricultural land, is not unrestricted. It must be
exercised with reference to the general condition of the country mad the necessities of the people, and not so as to deprive a whole neighborhood or
community of its use and vest an absolute monopoly in a single individual."
Similarly, Chief Justice Hawley (then of the Nevada Supreme Court) noted:
In a diy mad arid country like Nevada, where the rains are insufficient to
moisten the earth, and irrigation becomes necessaiy for the successful raising
of crops, the rights of prior appropriators must be confined to a reasonable
mad necessary use. The agricultural resources of the State cannot be developed and our valley-lands cannot be cultivated without the use of water from
the streamns, to cause the earth to bring forth its precious fruits. No person
can by virtue of a prior appropriation claim or hold any more water than is
necessary for the purpose of the appropriation. Reason is the life of the law,
mad it would be unreasonable mad unjust for any person to appropriate all
the waters of a creek when it was not necessary to use the same for the purposes of his appropriation. The law which recognizes the vested rights of
prior
appropriators has always confined such rights within reasonable limits. 2s
i s 235

Correspondingly, courts moved away from holding that the amnount of water appropriated equaled the capacity of the ditch in favor of a rule that the
quantity of water appropriated could be no more than the amount reasonably
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the appropriation.2
They began us232. See sup,a note 117 and accompanying text (appropriation provided ownership of diverted water).
233. See infra Part I.E.

234. Baseyv. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 683 (1874).
235. Barnes v. Sabron, 10 Ne'. 217, 243-44 (1875).
236. See, e.g., id.at 244 ("If the capacity of his ditches is greater than is necessary to inigate
his farming land, he must be restricted to the quantity needed for the purposes of inigation,for
watering his stock and for domestic purposes."); Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083, 1102-03 (Or.

1909) (citations omitted) ("The result is that tie law has become well settled that beneficial use

and needs of the appropriator, and not the capacity of the ditches or quantity first applied, is the
measure and limit of the right of such appropriators.").

Issue 2

PRIOR APPROPRIA TION- A REASSESSMENT

ing the term "beneficial use" to refer to the anoufit of water that users may
appropriate (not as a type of use) and to make clear that diversion in excess of
this amnount constituted waste to which no legal right pertained. " Thus, in
Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Ferji7, the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada remanded the case back to a master to make findings:
[Wihether the defendant has adopted the mode which causes least waste in
taking the water l'rom the river, and if not, what mode consistent with the fair
and beneficial use of the water by him can be adopted; what means are employed to return the water to its natural channel, and are they the means best
calculated to prevent waste, if not or if none have been emlployed, what
method will best effect that object; what amount of water per acre is needed

during the irrigating season to irrigate defendant's land; some standard of
melasurement of the water, and the quantity ineasured by such standard,
flowing in the river and in defendant's ditch at the time mentioned in the

bill.m
As already mentioned, Chief judge Hawley recognized that the limited supply
of water available in most parts of the West meant users had to restrict their
diversions to their reasonable needs.") In Comhs v. Agriculturid )ich Co.,
the Colorado Supreme Court stated: "An excessive diversion of water cannot
be regarded as a diversion to beneficial use, within the meaning of the constituttion. Water, in this country, is too scarce, and consequently too precious, to
admit of waste."'. In Power v. Switze,; the Montana Supreme Court noted:
"The intention of the claimant is therefore a most important factor in determining the validity of an appropriation of water. When that is ascertained,
linitations as to the quantity of water necessary to effectuate his intent can be
applied according to the acts, diligence, and needs of the appropriator. ' .. In
the 1902 Reclamation Act, Congress declared, "benelicial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."'
While the courts continued to use language emphasizing the importance
of economical use of water, there also emerged the view that it was better to
237. See KINNEY, supra note 32, § 911, at 1612-13 (footnotes omitted) ("But as an appropriator acquires no tite to the corpiis, or very body of water, and only acquires a right to the use
of such quantity of water within the extent of his appropriation as he can use economically and
without waste, he cannot lawfully acquire a right to am excessive amount of water foi the purpose for which he appropriates it, nor can he acquire a right to use the water in a wasteful manner andotherehy deprive others from its use.").
238. Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Ferris, 24 F. Cas. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 1872) (No. 14371).
239. Barnes, 10 Nev. at 233 (citations omitted) ("It logically follows from the legal principles
we have announced that the plaintil, as the first appropriator of the waters of Currant Creek,
has the right to insist that the water flowing therein shall, during the irrigatilg season, he subject
to his reasonahle use and enjoyment to the full extent of his original appropriation and beneficial use. To this extent his rights go, hut no further; for in subordination to such lights the defendrnts, in tie order and to the extent of their original appropriation and use, had the unquestionable right to appropriate the remainder of the water running in said stremn.").
240. Comhs v. Agric. Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 968 (Colo. 1892).
241. Power v. Switzer, 55 P. 32, 35 (Mont. 1898).
242. Reclunation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (now codified at 43 U.S.C. § 372
(2012)); see also N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3; 48 NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.035 (2014); N.D.
CFNT. CODE § 61-04-01.2 (2013); OKtA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.10 (2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 540.610(1) (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-3 (West 2014); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101
(2014).
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have the full amnount of water needed to produce the maximum amount of
crops thani to have a larger number of farms but all with inadequate water
supplies." This view emphasized the importance of priority in ensuring the'
senior user obtained tie full amount of his appropriation. Thus, Kinney -argued:
[Ojwing to the great scarcity of water in this part of the count-y, compared
with the amount which might be used if every one got what he wanted, or
needed, the rule of priority of right is the only one which could have been
adopted, and at the same time have the water do the greatest good to the
greatest number. In a strictly agricultural country, it is better that one man
who was first in appropriating the water of a certain stream should have a
well inigated farm from which he can ralise plentiful crops than that a hun-

dred families who have settled near the stream have barely enough water for
domestic purposes."'
In contrast, at about that same time Wiel suggested the idea of "reasonable priority," under which "the exclusiveness of a prior right should be recognized only to a certain degree, and that priorities should not be enforced when
to do so would be 'unreasonable' to water users upon the same stream,
though subsequent in tine of use."" He explained:
To-day the lands have been far more fully settled, the water users on many
streams are beginning to crowd each other, and the "exclusiveness" rule of
priority comes more and more in conflict with the community idea. Justice
is coming more and more to demand an equitable co-relation of the users
for the common good, and these changed conditions have caused here and
there revivals of the idea that the priority must be reasonable, all things and
evidence being considered, or it will not be fhlly enforced.'
Despite Wiel's forecast that the concept of reasonable priority would be a
"growing doctrine," the rule of absolute priority largely triumphed in the twentieth century.2 '

Consider this classic 1897 summary of the principles of prior appropriation by then US District CourtJudge Hawley:
Under the principles of prior appropriation, the law is well settled that the
right to water flowing in the public streams may be acquired by an actual appropriation of the water for a beneficial use; that, if it is used for inigation,
the appropriator is only entitled to the amount of water that is necessary to
irrigate his land, by making a reasonable use of the water; that the object had
in view at the time of the appropriation and diversion of the water is to be
considered in connection with the extent and right of appropriation; that, if
the capacity of the flume, ditch, canal, or other aqueduct, by means of which
243. See, c.g., Frank J. Trelease, Ia-w, W-ater and People: 7he Role of Water ILaw inConsernhg and Developing NaturalResources fi d West, 18 WYO. LJ. 3, 9-10 (1963-1964).
244. KINNEY, supra note 32, § 780, at 1355.
245. Samuel C. Wiel, 7"in'ory'in Western Water Law, 18 YA, LJ. 189, 190 (1909).
246. Id.at 194; see also WIFL, WATER RIGHTS, supra note 98, §§ 310-14, at 329-39.
247. See A. Dan Tarlock, Prior ApproplTation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L.
RE,. 881 (2000) [hereinafter Tarlock, PriorAppropriationl, for a more contemporary critique
of die priority rule.
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the water is conducted, is of greater capacity than is necessary to irrigate the
lands of the appro)riator, he %1II1
be restricted to the quantity of water needed fbr the purposes of irrigation, for watering his stock, and for domestic use;
that the same rule applies to an appropriation made for any other beneficial
use or purpose; that no person cal, by virtue ofl his appropriation, acquire a
right to any more water than is necessary tor the purpose of his appropriation."
He defines beneficial use in terms of the amount of water necessary for
the use and makes clear the size of the ditch does not determine the anount
of water legally appropriated."
judge Hawley continued:
Tihe intention of the appropriator, his object and purpose in making the
appropriation, his acts and conduct in regard thereto, the quantity and character of land owned by him, his necessities, ability, and surroundings, must
be considered by the courts, in connection with the extent of his actual appropriation and use, in determining and defining his lights."0
The considerations here identified suggest an active role for the reviewer of a
proposed
appropriation in what states and courts came to call the "duty of water. "
Judge Hawley's opinion went on:
TlIhe mere act of commencing the construction of a ditch with the avowed
intention of appropriating a given quantity of water from a stream gives no
right to the water unless this 1purpose and intention are carried out by the
reasonable, diligent, and effectual prosecution of the work to the linal completion of the ditch, and diversion of the water to some beneficial use. ,

Here he is restating the principle of relation back with the added requirement
that not only must the water user complete the ditch diligently, but also the user must in fact divert the water through the ditch lor a beneficial use.
judge Hawley then states:
ITIhe rights acquired by the appropiator must he exercised with reference
to the general condition of the country and the necessities of the conmmity,
and measured in its extent by the actual needs of the particular purpose for
which the appropriation is made, and not for the purpose of ohtaining a mo-

248. Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 94 (C.C.1). Ncv. 1897).
249. Id. ("llf the water is used for thc purpose of irrigating lands owned by the appropriator,
the right is not confined to the anount of water used at the time the appropriation is made; that

tie appropriator is entitled, not onlv to his needs and necessities at that fine, but to such other
andIfurther amount of water, within the capacity of his ditch, as would be required for the future
improvement and extended cultivation of his Iuids, if the right is otherwise kept up."). This
view that anuirrigation appropriation may expand (presumably with the same priority) along with

future needs seems inconsistent and only makes sense if the irrigator always intended to irrigate
additional lands that the courts have identitied in the original appropriation. Se, e.g., Laramie
Rivers Co. v. Le Vasseur, 202 P.2d 680, 684 (Wyo. 1949).

250.
251.
252.

Union MiI& Mmhing Co., 81 F. at 94-95.
See infia Part I.E.
Union Mill& Miing Co., 81 F. at 95.
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nopoly of the water, so as to prevent its use for a beneficial purpose by other
persons.
253

This statement highlights the concern about uses that unjustifiably interfere
with or prevent other valuable uses, but it limits the standard to evaluate use
compared to use generally exercised by similar users in the satne community254
judge Hawley's statement of principles next adds "that the diversion of the
water ripens into a valid appropriation only where it is utilized by the appropriator for a beneficial use."' Thus actual beneficial had become the touchstone of the legal right.
And finally, judge Hawley states:
ITIhe surplus or waste water of a stream may be appropriated, subject to the
rights of prior appropriators, and such an appropriator is entitled to use all
such waters; that, in controversies between prior and subsequent appropriators of water, the question generally is whether the use and enjoyment of the
water for the purposes to which the water is applied by the prior appropriator have been in any manner impaired by the acts of the subsequent appropriator.5

Others may use unappropriated water, but only so long as they do not impair
the senior's "use and enjoyment."
The only general principle missing from this summary is the ability to
make a change of use so long as it does not cause injury to other appropriators. Otherwise, even today it represents a generally correct statement of the
doctrine of prior appropriation. The shift to a use-based right and the evolution of beneficial use to establish the amount of water appropriated were the
last major doctrinal changes in prior appropriation until the introduction of
instream flow laws, primarily beginning in the 1970s. This development is
discussed in Part I.G, below. The next major development in prior appropriation was the inclusion of state supervision.
E. THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC SUPERVISION
The original version of prior appropriation that developed in the California mining regions worked well in part because little public supervision was
needed. Courts addressed disputes as they arose. In general, the rules were
simple and easily understood. With the development of more pernianent,
irrigation-based settlement requiring regular use of large quantifies of water
during the summer irrigation season, the need for supervision arose.
Colorado was the first state to respond to this need. In 1879 its legislature
enacted a law establishing water administration units called irrigation districts,
each with a water commissioner appointed by the Governor."' Water coin-

253. Id.
254.
255.

See infa Part II.E.2, concerning local custom.
Union Mill& Mining Co., 81 F. at 95.

256. Id.
257. 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94, 98-99.
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missioners were empowered to apportion water amnong the various ditches according to the priorities of their water rights and to close the headgates of
those out of priority." In 1881, the legislature provided for a judicial proceeding by which the priority lates of all water uses from the same source could be
i
law established the office of the State Engineer with
Another
deterlined.
die responsibility to measure streaun flows and the authority to determine
ditch capacity upon re(liest) That law also required ditch owners to construct and maintain measuring devices.2 '
Initially, Wyoming followed Colorado's lead, but in 1888 Wyoming started to add features and took a major leap forward when it adopted its constitution in 1889 aid new statutory provisions in 1890."3 The position of territorial
engineer, established in 1888, mostly followed Colorado's approach but also
directed the engineer to make recommendations for changes in law." Wyoming became the first territory or state to adopt a statute stating that nonuse
for a specified period (here two years) resulted in "abandonment" of the
right."' Elwood Mead became the first Wyoming territorial engineer in 1888,
bringing with himr from Colorado both his own research about other water law
systems as well as direct experience working for the Colorado State Engineer
He was familiar, for example, with William Hammond Hall's scholarly review of irrigation laws in France, Italy, and Spain."'; He knew George
Perkins Marsh's writings."' He had read John Wesley Powell's Report on the
Arid Lands. ' From these readings he becamne convinced that public supervision of hunman water use was essential to ensure that society enjoyed the greatest possible benefits from its water."' Mead believed that assertion of govern258. d. at 99; )UNBAR, supr inote 4, at 88-93. (stating that motivation for the use of water
commissioners resulted from ti well-kniowu dispute bctwecn the water users in the Greeley
water colony and subsequent upstream irrigators in the vicinity of Fort Collins).
259. 1881 Colo. Sess. Ltws 142, 142-61. Upon a petition to a district court to request a(juprompted the judge to appoint a
dication of priorifies within an irrigation district (water district)
relerce to take evidence and prepare a decree, and following adjudication, the clerk was to issue
a certificate to each claimant. Ic.
260. 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 119, 119-21.
261. Id. at 121-23.
262. See WYO. CONsT. art. VIII, §§ 1-5; 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws 91, 91-104; IA\WRENCEJ.
MACDONNEI., TREATISE ON WYOMING WATI-R LAw 8-16 (2014) [hereinafter WYOMING
WATER LxwI.
263. 1888 Wyo. Sess. Laws 116,116-17.
264. 1d. at 121. The Wyoming statute uses the word "abandonment," but this is actually a
forfeiture statute because nonuse alone for the statutory period provides the basis for loss of the
water right.
265. JAMES R. KiLUGER, TURNING ON WATER WrTH A SHOVEL 8-12 (1992); DUNBAR, supia note 4, at 93.
266. See STATE ENG'R OF WYOMING, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT 57-61 (1896) Ihereinafter
THIR) BIE'NNIAL REPORTI; see generallv WIIIJAM HAMMOND HALL, IRRIGATION
DEVELOPMENTr: HISTORY, CUsTOMS, L\VS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS REIATING TO
IRRIGATION, WATER-COURSES, AND WATERS IN FRANCE, ITALY, AND SPAIN (1886).
267. See gcncrallv GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, THE EARTH AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN
ACTION: MAN AND NATtJRE. (1874).
268. See generalv POwELL, supra note 186.
269. KLUGER, sopra note 265, at 12. In language probably drafted by Mead, the Wyoming
Constitution prmides that, "\Vater being essenfial to industial prosperity, of limited aunount,
audi easy of (liversion from its natural chanels, its control must be in the state, which, in provid1, § 31.
ing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved." WvYO.CONST. art.
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mental ownership of water was necessary lor this purpose."0

Because he

thought of water as part of the common heritage, he strongly opposed allowing
individuals or corporations to gain control of the resource independent of the
use to which it was being placed.' He believed there was an overriding public
interest concerning uses of water that needed to be considered when approving new uses.7 He resisted the ordinary application of principles of property
to water use rights, preferring to view individual control of a portion of water
for use as a privilege conditionally granted by the public. 3 As Mead saw it,
1

270.

For example, the Wyoming State Engineer's Second Biennial Report stated:

It was based on the belief that water being one of the gifts of nature the title
thereto should forever remain in the public; that such public ownership was recognized by the people of this State prior to the adoption of our State Constitution and
prior to the enactment of any specific law on this subject, and that in the adoption our
State Constitution such public ownership was made a part of the fundamncntal law of
this State; that such public ownership is not only in accord with our laws lut that the
greatest prosperity of our citizens will be secured by maintaining the limitations above
stated.
STATE ENG'R OF WYOMING, SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT 35 (1894) [hereinalter SECOND
BIENNIAL REPORTI. Mead added:
If state ownership is to be anything but a delusion, if it is to be more than nominal, there must be the same authority and control over streams and over diversion of
water as is now exercised by the general government over the occupation and settlement of public lands. No diversion or appropriation should be permitted, therefore,
until the sanction of the territory, through its constituted authorities has been obtained, and the beneficial character of the proposed use established. Such oversight
and precaution is necessary for the proper protection of public interest (public water
supply being of grcater agricultural value than public lands) and in order that controvcrsies growing out of extravagant and injurious claims may be avoided.
TERRITORIAL ENG'R, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 97 (1890) Ihereinafter SECOND ANNUAL
REPORTI.
271. In the Second Biennial Report, Mead stated:

INjo right to tie water of our streams exists except the right of use; that this right is
restricted not only to tie use by which acquired but to the place where acquired, and
that it cannot be separated therefrom; that to recognize the right to sell water is to
recognize a property right in water not contemplated by the laws of this State, and that
its recognition would work untold injury to the material interests of the State.
SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 34.
272. The Third Biennial Report stated:
It will also show that the rights of the public in streams have to some extent been
disregarded, and that the liberality, which permits an appropriator to take and use this
public property without cost, has not been appreciated, but on the contrary it has
been perverted to mean an entire sunender of public interest therein, so that the individual who has acquired a right to use water to irrigate a field has come to believe
that he owns that quantity of water whether he in-igates the field or not.
THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 266, at 39-40.
273. The Second Biennial Report stated:
The surrender by the public to the individual of this right of use and the protection
by the public of the individual in its enjoyment is a free grant from the public, the on-

Issule 2

PRIOR APPROIP'RIA TION"A REASSELSMIENT

the public is oflering the perpetual use of its water because that use produces
benefits to society. But the offer is a highly circumscribed one: it is only of the
amount reasonably needed for the use; it is only for the specified use; it is
permanently ied to that use; and it is only for so long as that use continues.
Use of water is not to enrich an individual or corporation but to benefit the
pullic.Y To enable the widest possible array of beneficial uses, each user is
obligated to exercise care with the public's water-taking only what is needed
and using that amount with prudence." If the authorized use ceases, the water returns to the public for redistribution in accordance with needs and interesLs at that time.
The flndamnental requirement of beneficial use is unchanged with public
supervision, but the premise of prior appropriation is different.2' A use of water is no longer a matter determined solely by the individual or entity building
a diversion and conveyance works. Now, before any steps are taken to gain
control of water, an application for a permit is necessary. The application has
to specify the point along the stream at which the water will be diverted or
controlled, the amount of water (i.e., rate of flow) to be taken, the purpose lor
which the water is to be used, and the intended place of user 7 Under Mead's
system, a representative of the public must review the application, determine
the sufficiency of the inloration provided, ensure the potential viability and
utility of the proposal, and determine if there is unappropriated water in time

lv consideration bcing the public benefit to be derived therefrom. So long as this protection is afforded it Furnishes an adequate incentive to the outlay which may be made
in the construction of ditches or in preparing land to use the water, and this is as far
as the surrender by the public ought to go.
SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, sulpra note 270, at4l
274. Ic.
27.5. The Tenitorial Engineer's Second Annual Report stated:
The theory has aparently been that whoever first. laid claim to the waters of a stream
acquired therein unrestricted ownership. This is shown in the absence of any supervision or approval being required when filing claims, in the extravagant character of
many of those recorded and in the views of citizens who are tamiliar with the law.
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supr, note 270, at 96
276. Mead believed the move to public supervision eliminated the doctrine of prior appropriation:
As the demands upon the water-supply have grown, necessity has led to a gradual decrease in the freedom of the appropriator and ari increase in the control cxercised by the public authorities. This change has been so gradual that the legislatures
of Wyoming and Nebraska have in effect abadoned the doctrine of appropriation,
adthough retaining the word in their statules. The person wishing to use water must
secure a permit from a board of State oflicials, and the right acquired is not governed
by the appropriator's claim, but Iwvthe license for the diversion issued by the State authorities. This tendency toward public si)ervision is manifest in the other arid States,
and it seems only a qtICstion of time when the doctrine of apl)ropriation will give way
to complete public supervision.
EL.WOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 82 (1910); see also Moses Lasky, supra note 58, at
39-40.
277. Lasky, supra note 58, at 38.
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and amount lor the stated purpose."' In this way, not only would good records about uses be developed, but also there would be a check to ensure that
the use would in fact benefit not only the appropriator but also the public.
Assuming the reviewer was satisfied on these accounts, then and only then
would the appropriator be free to move ahead. Importantly, however, the reviewer held the authority to deny the permit."'
Public supervision did not end here. Rather, the permif established the
period of time within which the facilities had to be completed to ensure the
would-be appropriator pursued actual water development in a diligent fashion.
The common law relation-back doctrine still applied so that if the appropriator completed the facilities in a timely fashion and then applied the water to
beneficial use, the law would protect the original priority date. The Wyoming
statute allowed for extensions of tine for good cause shown, but it provided
oversight and the means of administratively eliminating claims not actually diligently pursued.
Mead's system added another major innovation: administrative adjudication. Mead had witnessed the ineffectiveness of courts evaluating water rights
claims, relying heavily or exclusively on testimony of clainants who often were
themselves unable to accurately quantify their actual uses and were perhaps

278. Wyo. ENG'R'S OFFICE & WYO.WATER Ass'N, SEIECrED WRrTNGS OF ELwooD
MEAD ON WATER AIMINISTRATION IN WYOMING AND THE WEST 13 (2000) 1hereinafter
SELECT'ED WRITINGS1. According to Mead,
The most unfortunate feature, however, is the fact that the location and manner
of construction of (litches has been left entirely to the inclination or financial resources of the settler. There has been no preliminary control of the streams and the
waters have been diverted in a haphazard fashion, rather than in pursuance of a definite policy, having for its end their full utilization and economical distribution. As a
result, while we have many works of an excellent character, leaving in their admirable
design and substantial construction nothing to be desired, considered as a whole the
result is far from satisfactory. In many instances defective works make the proper supervision and control by the state extremely ditlicult and expensive. These evils will
in time undoubtedly disappear but they could almost wholly have been obviated by
the exercise on the part of the territory of an intelligent preliminary supervision over
the location and construction of all irrigation works.
1I.at 11-12.
279. Mead stated:
The policy of the territory refusing permission under any circumstances to divert
the public water has been seriously questioned, but a brief acquaintance with the evils
growing out of over appropriation will dispel that objection. Every ditch built in excess of the capacity of a stream means one of two things, either it will be a useless and
losing investment or those entitled to water will be robbed thereby, and as a rtle it results, to a certain extent in both. Nor should ditches be permitted to carry water
where the diversion is against the public welfare, as is the case with some ditches now
constructed. A large part of the productive wealth of this territory is in our grazing
lands and the water supply which makes them available should be as carefully protected and permnalnently secured to these lands as to lands reclaimed by irrigation; if
not done their abandonment must follow. I believe, therefore, that the ultimate benefits
to be derived from the use of our public waters will as largely depend on restraining injudicious diversion as in permitting appropriations which are beneficial, and that
the duty of the government is as nmuch involved in one as in the other.
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supa note 270, at 98.
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more often inclined to inflate their claims in the hopes of future benefits." °
His solution was to place this responsibility in a board of engineers with the
technical knowledge necessary to determine the actual extent of use that warranted recognition under law.2" The Wyoming Supreme Court, in a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, upheld this procedure in the face of an attack
arguing that only courts could make such deterlninations."
Yet, as Mead later remembered, "Itihe idea of a public control which
would operate was not readily accepted.".'.. He added:
In fact, it was generally objected to, outside of those whose water su))ly had
been interlered with by diversions above, and this mental attitude was (ue to
the fact that these early irrigators had built their ditches and diverted water
without having to ask the consent of anyone. They had taken and used
streans just as they used the grass on the public range, and they fought control of the streun just as they fought all leasing laws for governing the range.
They looked on their water right as they did on a homestead filing, and they
thought tie claim which they had recorded gave them a Title to the amount
of water stated in the claim, just as their homestead filing g ave them a title to
160 acres of land. The idea of absolute right to the water claimed went even
further. They looked on the stream as they (lid on the air, as something to
be enjoyed without any limitation firom a public authority, and to be taken
just as they shot game or caught fish. 8 '
While first Nebraska and then other states adopted some form of the Wyo-

ming system over the next three decades, many were reluctant to fully em-

280. See id at 71-88.
281.

STATE EN(;'ROF WYOMING;, FIRST BIENNIAl REPORT66-67 (1892). Mead nlote(d thai

The evils which extravagant grants would in the end entail, would not at once be
manifest. Few persons have an accurate knowledge of the volume of water dhy have
)cen using, and few would, at first, appreciate the possibilities of an extravagant allowance. It is probable that the making of large appropriations would, for the present,

have been a popular proceeding for the Board, because it would have more nearly

coincided with the ideas of the great lnaJority of clainnimts. Those who believed
themselves to be die owners of 20, 50 or 100 cuhic feet of water felt somewhat aggrieved at ai order which only gave two or three cubic feet, and it was only a partil
satisfaction to be assured that this volume covered all the water that had ever been
used, and was ample for all their present requirements.

Id. The role of public supervision, in Mead's view, was to enable the fullest possible benelits
From use of water to all:
It is also necessary that in our administration of water laws we give as careful consideration to tie right of the last appropriator as is generally given to that of the first.
Where all the water of a stream is used, anything which augnents earlier rights robs
later ones. A careful study of the laws of many States and of the decisions of their
courts will show that this fact has not been properly considered, but that the tendency
has been to augment the irnl)ortance and unjustly extend the control of early priori-

ties.
THIRD BIENNIAl. REPORT, suprt'a note 266, at 39.
282. Farm hy. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 267 (Wyo. 1900).
283. SELEUED WRiTINGS, supli note 278, at 9 (discussing Mead's Recollections of Irrigation Legislation in Wyoming).
284. Id.
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brace Mead's approach. " Nevertheless, the states generally adopted the noion of public or state ownership of water, the requirement that anyone wishing to use water first file an application with a state entity, and the caveat that
an application could be denied under appropriate circumstances. "6 The states
established agencies responsible for authorizing use of water and for administering uses in times of shortages. 8 ' Several adopted statutory measures of the
lmaximum amount of water that could be appropriated. " Many adopted statutory forfeiture provisions under which a water right might be lost if it went unused for some specified period of time. 9 Several states authorized administrative tribunals to determine priorities, but others continued to use courts for
this purpose.'
Only Colorado (and Montana until 1973) continued to embrace the California mining camps' version of prior appropriation, under which any person
was free to divert and use water without state pemaission."8 In practice, however, would-be appropriators in Colorado apply for judicial recognition of
their conditional claims shortly after taking the steps of intent and notice necessary to initiate the appropriation. 2 The intfnrniation required in this application is similar to that required for permit applications in other states.
While the water court cannot reject an application on public interest grounds,
it must find all the other necessary elements, including that there is unappropriated water available and that other water rights will not be impaired." In
Colorado, the primary difference is that these are specialized legal proceedings in which a judge, trained as a lawyer, is simply determining whether the
applicant's materials meet the minimum legal requirements." Other parties
with water rights from the same source actively monitor all new applications to
protect their interests, and they often file statements of opposition to enable
them to participate in the proceeding and potentially affect the court's decision.' Without an independent means of evaluating information included in
the application for decrees, the courts depend primarily on the adversary sys-

285. DUNBAR, supiw note 4, at 113-32.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-202(3) (2014).
289. KINNEY, supnm note 32, § 1119, at 2022-25. Kinney, in his 1912 treatise, identified
eight states other than Wyoming that had enacted statutory forfeiture provisions. Id.
290. Id. at 2842, 2883.
291. TARLOCK, LxW OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 191, § 5:44, at 5-77; MONTr. DEP'T OF
NAiTRAI RES. AND CONSERVATION, WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA 2-3 (2012), available at
hlttp://leg.mt.gov/conteint/Publications/Environmental/2012-water-rights-handbook.pd f.
292. A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMEN-: A CASEBOOK IN LAW
AND PUBLIC PoLicy 304 (6th ed. 2009); see also GEORGE VRANFSH, VRANESH'S COLORADO
WATER LAW 100-03 (James N. Corbridge, Jr. & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999).
293. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(a) (2014); see also COLO. JUDICIAL DEP'T,
APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTls (SURAcE) AND CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE, JDF 296W
(2013), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/Fons/renderFonn I .cfm?Forum= 175.

294. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(1); Lionelle v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 676
P.2d 1162, 1166 (Colo. 1984).

295. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-303(1) (providing that applications are first referred to a wa-

ter referee who is to make any necessary investigations and then rule on the application);
VRANESH, sttpra note 292, at 147-48, 166-67.
296. VRANESH, supm note 292, at 146-47.
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tern to raise issues."'
Colorado notwithstanding, the major developments in western water law
between the 1880s and 1920s concerned the emergence of a strong state role
supervising the issuance of new water rights and developing records reflecting
the priority, purpose, and quantity of rights from the sane source or supply"
Water right records inproved dramatically and, with improved understanding
of irrigation, appropriations of water more nearly matched actual needs. Priority remained the basis for resolving conflicts regarding use of water when
law
supplies became scarce. Otherwise there was remarkably little change ill
or administration for use of surface water until the rise of environmental concerns in the 1960s and 1970s.'
F. PRIOR APPROPRIATION AND GROUNDWATER
The law governing uses of groundwater developed more slowly than for
surface water. Early American decisions assumed the owner of land had the
right to access and use the groundwater underlying his property." Indeed,
some courts suggested that groundwater was an inherent part of the land, in
the sane manner as the soil."' Courts were reluctant to consider whether uses
of groundwater by one landowner might unduly interfere with the ability of an
adjacent landowner to access and use groundwater underlying his property,
often noting the lack of understanding of groundwater and its underground
movements."' From these decisions grew the doctrine of absolute ownership,
under which a landowner's right to extract and use groundwater found underneath his land was essentially unlimited." Eventually some courts began to
put limits on groundwater use occurring off the property, subjecting such uses
to the test of reasonability in which harm to adjacent landowners could be
considered."' Courts began distinguishing landowners' rights to capture un297. See CoIO. RFv. STAT. § 37-92-302(l)(b) (authorizing the State Engineer to participate
as an objector). In addition, the referee is authorized to make "investigations as are necessary to
determine whether or not the statements in the application and statcments of opposition are
advised with respect to the subject matter of the applications and
true and to become fully
statements of opposition." § 37-92-302(4). The referee is to consult with the state or division
the referee. ld.
enginecer who is to write a report. l. In some water divisions, the judge acts ;is
298. Lasky, sUpi; note 58, at 35-45; see also DUNBAR, So/w)m note 4, ai 209-11.
lII.C.
Part
299. See inti;
300. See, e.g., Road v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 534 (1850).
301. Id. at541.

302.

Id. at 537.

303. TARLOCK, LM\V OF WATER RIGHTS, supzia note 191,§ 4:6, at 4-6. Interestingly, there
was an assertion in court decisions during this period (aid later) that underground water flowing
through "subterranean channels" would be treated in the same manner a.s surface water. Ball v.
United States, I Cl. Ct. 180, 184 (1982) ("Waters flowing in a defined and known subterranean
stream or channel are, however, generally govenied by the same rules of law applicable to natiralwatercourses or surface stieauns."); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 869 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1971) ("Subtenanean and percolating waters are governed by the rules applying to natural
watercourses on the surface."); HUelsniann v. State, 381 N.E.2d 9,50, 953 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977)
("However, as stated, when dealing with subterranean waters, it is only where Underground
streams of water flow in well defined and well known channels which can be traced that rights of
omership arise to die same extent as exists between riparian owners of surface water.").
304. See, e.g., Martin v. City of linden, 667 So. 2d 732, 734 (Ala. 1995); Meeker v. City of
E. Orange, 74 A. 379, 384 (NI. 1909); Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644, 645 (N.Y.

1900).
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derlying water from ownership of the water itself.'
In any event, the law
closely linked the right to use groundwater to ownership of the overlying land
in a manner analogous to tie riparian law principle tying rights to use adjacent
watercourses to ownership of riparian land.
Early court decisions in western states tended to follow the sane principies, associating ownership of land with either ownership of groundwater or
the right to its use. 6 California courts developed a somewhat different approach, however, under which overlying landowners hold correlative rights to
the underlying groundwater in common with all others owning land overlying
a common supply and must share the resource reasonably."° In the event of
shortage, rights are allocated308in proportion to the surface area they own overlying the groundwater supply.
The application of prior appropriation principles to groundwater developed gradually in the West, first fornialized by statute in the 1920s and 1930s
by Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah.' Groundwater use in the American West burgeoned lollowing World War Two," ' prompting the need for
development of better laws and administration governing these uses. Today
most western states follow some version of prior appropriation for allocating
and administering uses of groundwater."
Rights are based on possession
(withdrawal) and actual application of groundwater to beneficial use." ' Overlying land ownership is relevant only to the matter of access and right of surface
use, not as the basis of the right to use the water. The extent of the right, as
with surface water, is based on the reasonable needs to accomplish the purpose of the use.3 3 Priority remains an element of the right, but its application
has been modified in some important respects to account for the physical nature of the groundwater resource."' Groundwater rights are subject to the
rules of abandonment and lorfeiture.
There are attributes of groundwater that raise special concerns for rules
governing its use-attributes not necessarily shared by surface water resources.
Most obviously, we cannot directly see groundwater, so our understanding of
its presence, volume, movement, rates of recharge and discharge, and response to human uses is imperfect."' In most areas of the western states, well

305. See e.g., Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109, 112 (Mich. 1917).
306. See WELLS A. HUTCHINS, U.S. DEP'T or AGIIC., MISC. PUB. No. 418, SELECrED
PROBLEMS IN THE LAw OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 155-61 (1942).

307. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 769-73 (Cal. 1902); Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water
Dist. v. Arnstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 1001 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
308. Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 98 P. 260, 263 (Cal. 1908).
309. HU'rCHINS, sqpni note 306, at 157, 255.
310. KENNETH D. FREDERICK & ROGER A. SEDJO, AMERICA'S RENEWABILE RESOURCES:
HISTORICAL TRENDS AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 45 (3d ed. 2011).
311. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGITS, supra note 191, § 6:4, at 6-4 to 6-6.
312. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 439 (4th ed. 2006).
313. Id.

314.
315.
316.
(1998);

Id.
Id.
Helpful introductions to groundwater science include E.C. PIELOU, FRESH WATER
RALPH C. HEATH, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATR1 SUPPLY PAPER 2220, BASIC
GROUND-\VATI.R HYDROLOGY (1987), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/wsp/wsp2220;
R. ALLAN FREEZE &JOHN A. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER (1979).
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punping and natural discharges may well exceed the limited anual recharge
of aquifers, meaning our uses cause a decline in water storage. States wrestled
with tie question of managing this mining of groundwater, an issue that is not
present with renewable surface water sources. Even if depletion of an aquifer
is not an immediate concern, the decline in an aquifer's water table or hydrostatic pressure affects existing users-and raises questions about protecting existing uses from new or expanded withdrawals that further reduce water or pressure levels."' In addition, many groundwater aquifers are closely linked to
surface waters, providing their base flow in winter months and adding additional water (and sometimes diminishing flows) along the surface water's
course." ' Pumping groundwater from linked aquifers can diminish stream
flows, and putting large quantities of water on land surfaces (such as in irrigation) can recharge underlying aquifers that then add water back to the
stream. " These considerations have required recognition in associated water
laws.
The concept of priority assunes the most senior user is fully protected to
the full extent of the appropriation if required for beneficial use as against all
those whose appropriations are junior. ' This concept has not worked well as
applied to groundwater uses."' The effect of fully protecting the most senior
groundwater pumper can limit or exclude additional water users from that aq2
uifer if those uses impair the senior's right."
Thus in Noh v. Stone]; the Idaho Supreme Court limited pumping from wells determined to reduce water
levels below the bottom of the senior appropriator's well, requiring the junior
pulpers to pay the costs of deepening tie senior's well and installing a more
powerful pulnp.. The Utah Supreme Court initially followed this approach. '
Then the Colorado Supreme Court decided that all well pumpers have an obligation to maintain a "reasonable means of etfectuating [their] diversion[s],"
which may require them to deepen their wells if it is within their economic
reach.
In consequence, senior groundwater appropriators are not protected
its to any particular groundwater level or pressure. While they have a legally
recognized right to use some portion of the groundwater, they may need to
take the additional steps necessary to maintain their access to that water."'
Similarly, the concept of priority would seem to require limiting the nuinher of appropriators withdrawing water from an aquifer substantially in excess
317. Se, e.g., City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961); Mathers v.
Texaco, Inc. 421 P.2d 771, 776 (N.M. 1966); Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, 344
P.2d 528,531 (Utai 1959).
318. THOMAS C. WINTER 1T AL., U.S. GEOI.OGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1139, GROUND
WATER ANt) SURFACE WATER: A SINGi.E: RESOURCE 10-11 (1998), avaiible at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ 1139/pdt/circl 139.pdf.

319.
320.

Id.
See, e.g., Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Mover, 39 P.3d 1139, 1148 (Colo.

2001).
321. See, cg., Fellhater v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc., 513 P.2d 627, 634 (Idaho 1973).
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

See, e.g., Noh v. Stoner, 26 P.2d 1112, 1113-14 (Idaho 1933).

Id.
Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, 344 P.2d 528, 530-31 (Utah 1959).
City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 556.
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of its recharge. In fact, many states do just that for heavily used aquifers by
establishing some kind of special management regime that may limit or preclude the issuance of new or expanded permits and even regulate the rate of
withdrawals and the manner in which the water is used."' By comparison,
New Mexico allowed a new appropriation of groundwater from a supply
whose economic life for irrigation use had been determined to be forty
years. 28
The problem of integrating uses of tributary groundwater with uses of surface waters is, in some respects, made easier when prior appropriation applies
to both types of uses. The leading example is Colorado, which began the
work of integrating these uses in 1969 by applying the rule of priority.aa Junior
users of tributary groundwater can be curtailed if their uses interfere with or
harm the uses of senior surface water appropriators."
If groundwater users
are able to replace their depletions to the stream in quantity and timing, however, they are allowed to continue their pumping." Idaho has recently instituted a similar progranL." Priority remains the basic rule determining superiority of right when water is insufficient to meet all uses, but a replacement
mechanism is provided to enable out-of-priority groundwater use so long as
there is no harn to senior rights.'
While the general principles of prior appropriation now are applied to
groundwater uses in most western states, they have been modified to meet the
particular problems associated with use of this source of water. We turn next
to the most recent change in western water law-protecting instrean flows.
G. PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS
The emergence of interest in maintaining streamn flows for environmental
and recreational purposes ran headlong into the traditional view that diversion
of water out of a stream was an essential element of an appropriation. How
then could there be legal protection under prior appropriation for maintaining
flows of water instrean? Moreover, could leaving water instrean constitute a
beneficial use as traditionally understood? Finally, if there were to be legal
protections, who could seek and hold such protection and for what purposes?
It is perhaps- instructive to note that the franmework applied in many western
states to protect what are essentially public values of water was that initiated to
establish private rights-appropriation.
The states have proceeded to answer these questions in their own ways
and in their own time, but the trend is clear: flows needed to protect in-place
327. See Susan Batty Peterson, Designation alnd Potection of Critieal GroundwaterAreas,
1991 BYU L. Rev. 1393, 1417-18 (1991).
328. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 421 P.2d 771, 774 (N.M. 1966).
329. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a)-(b) (2014) (adding the consideration of mLxi mum
utilization, reflecting de state's authorization of augmentation plans to replace water depletions
fron groundwater pumnping).

330. Secid. § 37-92-301(3).
331. See id. § 37-92-103(9) (defining augmentation and stipulating that replacement occurs
under a plan for augmentation).
332. See IDAHO ADMIN. ConE r. 37.03.11.000-.010 (2014).
333. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Out-of-Prioriv Water Use: Adding Flexibilii,to the 144iterAppropnation System, 83 NEB. L. REv. 485, 486-97, 529-31 (2004).
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values such as tishenies may be protected under state law from future appropriation, but generally only by a designated state agency and for the minimm
m
amrount of flow necessary to accomplish the intended purpose."
For those
states applying the approl)riation doctrine to protect instream flows, it becamne
necessary to eliminate the traditional diversion requirement and to declare
flow maintenance for specified purposes to be a beneficial use of water.' A
lew states have simply exercised their broad authority respecting uses of water,
either by withdrawing certain portions of watercourses from additional appropriation or by reserving some specified
portion of the remaining unappropri33
ated flows for instream purposes.
This recognition of environmental instrean values of water represented a
significant shift in thinking about water. It reflected the changing values of
many people living in the American West, their increasing interest in using
rivers for recreational purposes, and their interest in protecting the remaining
environmental functions and values of their hydrologic systems. From a doctrinal perspective the changes were modest. It had long been recognized that
a diversion might not be necessary to accomlplish the intended water use."
And courts have acknowledged that the concept of beneficial use is dynamnic,
changing with changing values and interests." In general, states have imposed
13

334.

There is a growing literature on the law of instrcam flow protection. See, e.g., Steven J.

Shupe & Lawrence J. Macl)onnell, lecogniz'ing the Vldue ofi-Plaee Uses of IWv7ter in the
West: An Introduhctionto 'the Law5, Strategies, and Issues, in INSTRI.-AM FLOW lPROTECIION IN
THE WFsr, at 1-6 (LawrTence J. MacDonnell, Teresa A. Rice & Steven J. Shupe, eds. 1993).
This state-bv-state summar' was followed by a more topical discussion of instream flow policy.
DAVID M. GILLIL\AN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREA,M FLOW PROTECIHON: SE:KING A
BAIANCI: IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997). A series of law review articles followed. See, e.g.,
Cvnthia F. Covell, A Sum ev of State histream liow' Prognainsli the
estern United States, 1
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 177 (1998); see adso Adell Louise Amos, The Use o/'State histream
on'I, lws fb FedelralDuls: Respecting State Control hVhle Meeting Iet'emal Juiposes,36
ENVTL. L. 1237, 1239-40 (2006); Charlton H. Bonlhan, Perspecivesti-oni the Field:A Review
of*l4estern Instream H'ow Issues and Reconnendations fbr a Neiv 14'hter Ptiture,36 ENVTL.
L. 1205 (2006); Jesse A. Boyd, Note, Hipj)Deep: A Suev of State histream Flow Law li-oni the
Rocv Motntains to the Pcific Ocean, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1151, 1152 (2003). The Colorado Water Conservation Board supported a comprehensive analysis of instrean flow prograis in western states. See generli]SASHA CHARNEY, COLO. WATER CONS ERVATION BD.,
)ECADES DOWN THE ROAD: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTRFAM Fi.ow PROGRAMS IN COLORADO AND
THE WESTERN JNITED STATES (2005). Trout Unlimited commissioned a report focusing on
the transactional aspects of shifting existing water uses to environmental flows. STEVEN
MALLOCH, TROUr IJNImrrIED, LIQUID ASSETS: PROTECINC AND RESTORING THE WEST'S
RIVERS AND WE IANDS THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL WATER TRANSACTIONS 17 (2005), available
at
http://wvw.tu.o-g/atf/cf/%7BED0023C4-FA23-4396-9371-85091)C5B4953%7D/
Midloch.UquidAssets.2005.pdl For a discussion of relevant laws in all states as well as the Canadian provinces, see Lawrence .. Macl)onnell, Retturn to the River: Environmental low Polic wi the United States and Canada,451. AM. WATER RI.-S. ASs'N 1087 (2009).
335. See, e.g., hi re Adjudication of Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within the Missouri River Drainage (Bean Lake 11), 55 P.3d 396,
401-02 (Mont. 2002).
336. Se, e.g., Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Environmentall'ow: ul the Rocky Motid West:
A Progress Repol, 9 WYO. L. REV. 335, 359-61 (2009) [hereinafter Envim,01menta] Mlowsl
(discussing the Montana programn).
337. Sec; e.g., Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, 532-33 (1883).
338. See, e.g., Bean Lake I11, 55 P.3d at 400-01; Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho l)ep't of
Water Admin. (In re Permit Application No. 37-7108), 530 P.2d 924, 926-31 (Idaho 1974); In
re All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992).
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strict limits on setting aside such flows because of continuing concerns about
the need for additional consumptive uses of water."' Nevertheless, instream
flow protection is now an accepted use of water in virtually all prior appropriation states."'
We turn now to a discussion of the existing law of prior appropriation and
proposed changes to that law.
II. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION TODAY
A. INTRODUCTION
The following assessment is intended to be a substantially comprehensive
consideration of how effectively the major elements of prior appropriation in
their present lorn are meeting today's needs. It begins with a reconsideration
of the principle of priority, examines the legal significance of public ownership, turns to the constitutionally-protected property in a prior appropriation
water right, then moves to a suggested refraining of the beneficial use concept.
It then takes up the matter of conditional rights, addresses changes of use, examines forfeiture and abandonment, considers instream flow protection, and
concludes with a discussion of adjudication. In each topic area, the existing
law is recapitulated, its perceived shortcomings identified, and suggestions for
improvements are made. Proposals are reasonably specific and are tied directly to the existing law so that the proposed changes are evident. While
these changes are proposed in the belief that they would be beneficial, no pretense is made that they alone would resolve the many issues tacing western
states respecting uses of water." In a few cases, policy suggestions are made
that go beyond revision of prior appropriation, but the focus of this paper is
this existing body of law and ways for its improvement. This examination begins with the principle of priority.
B. PRIORITY
Assigning superiority of right on the basis of priority took root as a custom
in the frontier world of mining, in which it provided a simple and easily understood basis for sorting out disputes. It comported as well with a fundamnental sense of fairness, captured in the maxim "first in time is first in right." The
need to protect the investments companies made to build the substantial facilities needed to control and deliver water to ever changing places of use was a
compelling rationale. That rationale remained, though perhaps in less-

339. See, e.g., Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 311 P.3d 6,
8 (Wash. 2013).
340. Covell, supra note 334, at 180-90.
341. Management and use of water in the American West is heavily influenced by federal
law and policy-a matter largely unaddressed in this paper, but an important one in making a
full consideration of how law affects uses of rivers, aquifers, id their water. See generally
Getches, Aletinoiphosis, supra note 41, at 53-55. Moreover, the more fundamentd legal
changes that are necessary go beyond tie framework of prior appropriation and are foreshadowed by tie changes presently underway in Australia. See, e.g., Robert David Pilz, Lessons in
Vater Policy Innovation /ore the World's DriestInhabited Continent: Using WIater Allocaion Plans and Water Markets to Manage Vater Scarcit 14 U. DENV. WrER L. RlEv. 97,
120-21 (2010).
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compelling forn, as the predominant uses of water shifted to irrigation and
water users nore often developed their own water and generally opposed private conpanies providing water. Under these circumstances, the rationale
appeared to shift to ensuring that at least some irrigators-those first to settle in
a given watershed-could secure a reliable supply of water year after year."'
This preference for those first in time, however, ram contrary to the competing
interest in enabling widespread settlenent of the land, supported in important
part by irrigation, and with tie value of sharing in the use of water as a gift of
nature. ' These competing impulses caused sone courts to search for ways to
moderate the harshness of absolute priority and to introduce considerations
such as reasonable use to take into account the actual needs associated with a
S'
senior s use.
The treatise-writer Samuel Wiel proposed the concept of "reasonable
priority" in a 1909 law review article.:' In his view, "bjlustice is coming more
341

and nore to demand an equitable co-relation of the users for the conmon
good, and these changed conditions have caused here and there revivals of the
idea that the priority must be reasonable, all things and evidence being considered, or it will not be Fully enforced.""' More recently, Professor Tarlock
suggested that priority no longer mattered in practice."' Rather, he asserted,
"pl)riority's nodern significance lies in the threat of enlorcement rather than
the actual enforcement because it encourages water users to cooperate either
to reduce the risk of enfbrcenment to as close to zero as possible or to share
nore equitably the burdens of shortages." "

In response to this rather opti-

mistic view, Justice Hobbs argued that priority, "the iost misunderstood stick
in the bundle of a water right," remained an essential elenent of a fthnctioning
system of water rights mad that priority-based administration is necessary so
that appropriators can enjoy their legal rights."'
Priority renains the basis of water rights administration across the western
prior appropriation states.

On streams where uses exceed supplies, junior

rights are regularly curtailed so that senior users can divert their legally-authorized water. These junior users typically totally cease diversions so
that the senior users can enjoy "the full extent" of their right." No considera-

342. See, e.g., KINNEY, stpa note 32, § 780, at 1355 ("In a strictly agricultural country, it is
better that one man who was first in appropriating the water of a certain stream should have a
well irigated fum from which he can rdse plentiful crops tlan that a hundred families who
have settled near tie stream havc barely enough water for domestic purposes.").
343. SCHORR, supra note 20, at 68.
344. .See supia notes 236-42aud accompanying text.
345. Wiel, supra note 231, at 194.
346. Id.
347. Tarlock, PI-orAppropriation,sup1-i note 247, at 883.
348. Id.
349. Hobbs, Priority,supia note 24, at 44 ("To Function effectivelv, priority muns be emploved in determining if mid how much unappropriated water remains for appropration by
new users, taking into account actual river conditions in the operation of perfected water rights.
To function effectively, priorities must also be enforced in tines of short supply. If not, distribution of water is ca)ricious and water user self-help occurs to the detriment of senior rights."
(footnote onitted)).
350. See, e.g., Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1148-49 (Colo.
2001) (p,'oviding a useful discussion of priority enforcement).
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lion is given to the relative economic value of these uses; uses are made strictly
according to the time in which they first were made." Since the most senior
rights are held by the owner of the lands first settled within a watershed, these
rights most often go to support the agricultural uses of these lands. Yet today
irrigation uses of water in most parts of the West generate only a modest economic return from that use."'
The effect of priority administration on a watercourse is determined in
part by the degree to which diversions and withdrawals have been authorized
and are sought to be made in excess of the reliably available supply." In such
"over-appropriated" water sources, priority administration is likely to happen
regularly. It is not unreasonable to point out that those obtaining junior rights
from a fully- or over-appropriated source should be on notice that their uses
are likely to be restricted or curtailed. Presumably they went ahead with the
appropriation with this understanding and determined that the appropriation
nevertheless made sense. Unfortunately, it may not be entirely accurate to assume that these appropriators in fact understood that their uses would be'regularly shut down. Records of actual water use are notoriously unreliable. Uses under previously permitted rights vary, especially in irrigation, and may
legally increase if crop prices improve. Flows may have been gauged in a period of above-average precipitation, such as with the Colorado River in the
early 1900s, leading people to believe such supplies were in fact reliably available long-tenn.' 5 Apparent flows may include significant anounts of imported
water that can and will be increasingly consumed as water becomes more valu-

351. Charles W. Howe, Water Law and Econonics:An Assessment of l?iver Cdls and the
,South JPlatte Well Shut-lon, 12 U. DENy. WATER L. REv. 181, 186 (2008) ("The underlying
priority-etliciency contlict occurs because there is a low correlation between water right prioritics and the values (net incomes) those rights generate."). The economic inefficiencies potentially inherent under this system are illustrated in Howe's analysis of the effect of the priority
system on water uses in the South Platte basin during the serious drought of 2006. Id. at 183187.
352.

See EtIZABI.ETH SCHUSTER ET A1,.,UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF WATER IN

AGRICULTURE: TOOLS FOR NEGOTIATING WATER TRANSFERs 5-7 (2011), for a helpful introduction to determining the economic value of irrigated agriculture. See generally ROBERT A.
YOUNG, DEFERMINING THE ECONOMIC VAI.UE OF WATER: CONCEIrS AND METHOI)s (2005),
for a more theoretical treatment.
353. For many years, Colorado courts decreed ights to appropriate water so long as there
was evidence that water might be available, based on the misguided view that Colorado's constitution prohibited denial of an appropriation. Cf Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v.Frank,
105 P. 1093, 1096 (Colo. 1909). Fortunately, the courts came to accept the idea that they were
not denying the right to appropriate water if there was no unappropriated water available. Lionelle v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Colo. 1984); Se. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 717-18 (Colo. 1984). The effect is
that there are decreed rights to divert and use water on streamns running east out of the Rocky
Mountains that far exceed the available waler supply.
354. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 722 P.2d 598, 602 (Mont. 1986) ("We can also accept as
true their contention that the volune of water used by irrigators tipto or within the limit of their
appropriation rights would vary greatly from year to year depending upon circumstances not
within the control of the irrigators, such as climatic conditions from year to year, subsoil types,
lengths of the ditches, l)orosity, permeability, di, years, wet years and so on.").
355. See, e.g., John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contri, Views of the Lawofie Colorado River: An Ewanination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, 32 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 21.01, 21.051lllb]lil (1986); David H. Getches, Competing Dlemands
for the ColoradoRiver, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 413, 425-26 (1985).
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able.' We have learned that even the longer-term historical record cannot be
considered a reliable guide to future water availability in a warming world."
In some respects this discussion is moot because so many streams are already fully- or over-appropriated. The water rights already exist. Few new,
large water appropriations are still possible. Still it seems worth mentioning
that states should at this point be conservative when considering any new appropriations. A more significant concern is with the enormous number of
conditional rights/unused permits outstanding that may become absolute-that
8
is, may be placed to actual beneficial use.&
As we will discuss, many of these
conditional claims are potentially senior to existing uses. In an increasingly
flow-limited world, these senior conditionals will displace some already existItg uses.
The Colorado Supreme Court experimented with a concept it called
"maximum utilization" when faced with the (tilemna of potentially having to
curtail all junior tributary wells along the lower Arkansas River that were depleting surface flows used by senior rights holders."" The court explained:
It is implicit ill these constitutional provisions that, along with vested rights,
there shall be mavimum utihiation of the water of this state. As administration of water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon the
new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine
can be integrated into the law of vested tights. We have known for a long
time that the doctrine was lurking in the backstage shadows as a result of the
accepted, though oft violated, principle that tie right to water does not give
the right to waste it.3 6'
The court soon found it had opened a problematic door, with people attempting to obtain water rights through removal of phreatophytes growing oil the
banks of streamns,"2 by cutting down trees and claiming the saved evapotranspiration, 3 and by paving land surl'aces."' On the other hand, this doctrine has
been cited in support of allowing out-of-priority groundwater use under a plam

356. See Lawrence 1. MacDonnell, Colorados Law of "Undeiground Wate": A Look al the
Sout Platte Basin and Beyond, 59 U. COLO. I. REv. 579 (1988), for a discussion on imported
water in South Platte River masking the effectls of groundwater pumping.
357. BUREAU Ot, RECLAMATION, I)EP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM
GUIDEINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR IAKES
POWELL AND MEAD FINAl, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, APPENDIX U: CLIMATE

TEtCHNICAL WORK GROU REPORT, at U-I (2007), available at http://wwwv.sbr.gov/lc/region/

p)rograms/strategies/FEIS/AppU.pdtl
358. See ili'd Part II.F.
359. For an exaunple involving conditional waler rights For oil shale see LAWRENCE

J.
MAcDONNELL, WESTERN REs. ADVOcATFs, WATER ON THE RocKS: O11, SHALE WATER

RIGHTS IN COtLORADO vi (2009), avmlable at http://www.westernresorceadvocates.org/media!

)(1/waterontherocks.pd(l.
360. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
361.
362.

Id. at 994 (emphasis in original).
Sc. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1327 (Colo.

1974).
363. Giflien v. State, 690 P.2d 1244, 1246-48 (Colo. 1984); Sec also RJ.A, Inc. v. Water
Users Ass'n of Dist. No. 6, 690 P.2d 823, 824 (Colo. 1984).
364. 5eeCot.o. REV,. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (2014).
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for augmentation that avoids injury to senior rights.36 In a subsequent opinion, the Court changed "maxinun" to "optinunl," explaining that
the policy of maxinmum utilization does not require a single-minded endeavor
to squeeze every drop of water from the valley's aquifers. Section 37-92501(2)(e) makes clear that the objective of 'maximum use' administration is
'optimum use.' Optimum use can only be achieved with proper iegard for
all significant factors, including environmental and economic concerns." '6
As refined, the doctrine seems intended to soften the sharp edges of priority,
encouraging 6decision
makers to support legitimate efforts to better utilize our
7
water supply.
Professor Tarlock concluded the purpose of priority today can better be
achieved through what he calls "alternative risk allocation mechanisms."' In
general, such mechanisms appear to depend on voluntary, cooperative water
management approaches." While there are indeed examples of such approaches, they are not common-probably because of the difficulties of obtaining the necessary agreement of all the affected parties. 7 1 More commonly,
mechanisms have developed to allow "out-of-priority" water uses so long as
they can occur without injury to senior rights. 7' These include so-called "physical solutions," in which the junior user improves the senior's use so that the
junior's use can occur without impaimient to the senior, 7 or in which the junior provides a replacement source of water to the senior."
A recent dramatic illustration of the potential consequences of strict water
rights priority administration occurred in Idaho where a trout farm with a right
to use water from a spring placed a call on all junior rights using water from
the Eastern Snake Basin aquifer, which is the source of the spring's water.
According to one account, "Itihe order would have affected more than 2,300
1

365. Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 294 (Colo. 1976).
366. Alamnosa-La Jara Water Users Prot. Ass'n v.Gould (In rc Rules mad Regulations Governing the Use, Control, and Protection of Water Rights for Both Surface and Underground
Water Located in the Rio Grande mid Conejos River Basins and their Tributaries), 674 P.2d
914, 935 (Colo. 1983); see also CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-501(2)(e) (stating that the Slate Engineer's rules and regulations "shall have as their objective the optimum use of water consistent
with preservation of the priority system of water rights"); Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles,
LLC., 181 P.3d 252, 259 (Colo. 2008) ("an optimum or naximum use niust be sustainable.").
367. On the other hand, it may be viewed as a rationale for increasing consumptive use of
water. We return to this matter in the discussion of public ownership of water. See inla Part

l.C.
368. Tarlock, PiorApproiation,supra note 247, at 884.
•369. Id. at 883-84.
370. Rotation of water available tinder a water right, For examnple, requires agreement among
all the parties that hold an interest in that right. A user is not required to rotate water against his
will. See, e.g., Strole v. Guvmon, 37 P.3d 529, 532-33 (Colo. App. 2001).
371. MacDonnell, supra note 333, at507-08.
372. Harrison C. Dunning, The "PhjsicalSoludon"in Western Water Lawg 57 U. COLO. L.
REv. 445, 448 (1986).
373. Replacement water can be provided under an exchange or, in Colorado, tinder a plan
for augnentation. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-83-104, 37-92-103(9) (2014).
374.
)istribution of Water to Water Right Nos. 36-02551 and 36-07694 (Rangen, Inc.), No.
CM-DC-2011-004, at 1-2 (Idalho Dep't of Water Resources Jan. 24, 2014) (final order).
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water-rights holders, including 14 cities, live school districts, irrigators, dairies,
Jerome Cheese Co. and Glanbia. It would have shut off 3,000 cubic feet per
second of water to push a mere 9 cfs to Rangen's spring. " a3 Shortly thereafter,
the Idaho Department of Water Resources Director stayed his order for users
who were members of an organization offering to mitigate the adverse elects
Idaho has adopted procedures under which junior apof their p)umping.
propriators can continue to use water out-of-priority so long itsthey can implement an acceptable mitigation plan. : '
Still another recent case, involving use of groundwater for domesfic wells,
wrestled with how the role of priority relates to water rights administration.
Plaintiff Bounds brought an action against die New Mexico State Engineer for
issuing permits for domestic wells located in a fully appropriated water basin
as required under New Mexico statute.17' Bounds argued the allowance of
such additional water use effected an unconstitutional taking of his 1869 surface water right.Y'9 The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that "the
priority doctrine is not a system of administration. It does not dictate any particular manner of administration of appropriation mad use of water or how
senior water rights are to be protected from junior users in time of water
shortages..". The Legislature was therefore free to authorize issuance of domestic well permits independent of die priority system "as long as senior water
rights are not in fact impaired or subject to impending impairment because of
"
water shortages requiring priority administration to protect those rights."
The New Mexico Supreme Court also found the statute constitutional in
denying Bounds's claims, but it followed a different rationale." Because, in its
view, the statute only prescribed a means of pernritting, it did not violate what
the Court held was the constitutional requirement for state protection of senior users." In the absence of evidence that Bounds's water rights had in fact
been impaired by use of water from domestic wells, the Court decided there
had been no deprivation of property. 8
Perhaps the most direct means of dealing with the effect of priority is to
purchase or lease the senior rights. New water users in locations without unappropriated water have few other options. Yet, the process of making changes in use of existing water rights is expensive and time consuming, and there is
375. Brian Smith, Slate Dekivs Rangen Cwlajimeni Orde, MAGICVALI.EY.COM (Feb. 2.5,
2014), http://mabgcvallvy.coi/news/loca/state-dclavs-rangen-curtailent.-oder/aricle-2917a96
8-157t-5b7a-9954-711227f0d912.hifil.
376. Distribution of Water to Water Right Nos. 36-02551 and 36-07694 (Rangen, Inc.), No.
CM-DC-2011-004, at 3, 5 (Idaho Dep't of Waier Resources Feb. 21, 2014) (order granting petition to slav curtailment).
377. See IDAHO ADMIN. COI)E r. 37.03.11.000 (2014); see aso 2014 (_urtalimeni Notices
and Orders, IDAHO DEP'T OF WATER RE-SOURcES, http://ww.idw.idaho.gov/lews/
ciritailent/Cuiitailenit.htm#rngn (last visited Mar. 14, 201,5); see also MacDonnell, supia note

333, at502.
378. Bounds v. State, 2.52 P.3(1 708, 709 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).

379. Id. at 710.
380.

Id. a1721.

381. Id.
382. See Bounds v. State ex rel. )'Antonio, 306 P.3d 457, 468 (N.M. 2013).
383. Id
384. *Id.at 470.
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considerable resistance in the agricultural community to these voluntary transactions.' This issue will be discussed in the section on changes of use.'
Priority is a defining attribute of a water use under the prior appropriation
doctrine and is deeply embedded in the legal rights and expectations of those
holding valid water rights." Yet it is worth reexamining its meaning. It is most
certainly not, as was originally viewed, a guaranteed right to some fixed flow
rate of water."" At best, it is the ability to divert up to the maximum authorized amount of water as actually required for beneficial use at that period of
time, ahead of others taking water from the same source with junior priorities.

In today's world, the anount of water required for beneficial use has changed
considerably from the time in which senior rights were originally permitted
and adjudicatedY" Continued enforcement of priorities should be adjusted to
reflect those changing realities, as discussed below. '
Given our increasingly sophisticated ability to model and manage hydrologic systems, states should consider ways to better manage water uses in highconflict areas to f'acilitate more effective use of available water." While priority administration would necessarily be the starting point, such management
would seek to meet the full array of valuable uses. It would require seniors
placing a call to verify their actual need for the water. It would also search for
opportunities to meet actual needs in ways that do not necessarily require all
junior appropriators to curtail their diversions." In settings where uses unreasonably diminish the public values of the water source, additional steps should
be taken to reduce unnecessary diversions and to retain needed flows instreanm."'
A useful illustration of the problem is provided in the South Platte Basin

385.

See Charles W. Howe et al., 7he ic onoin

Inpacts of AgTiculaire-to-Urban Water

7)Tansfcls on the Area of Orign: A Case Study of ie Arkansas River Valley in Colorado, 72
AM.J. OF AGRIc. EcON. 1200, 1202-03 (1990); Peter D. Nichols & Douglas S. Kenney, Wffteiing Growth in Colorado:Swept Along by the Cunent or Choosinga Better Line?, 6 U. DENY.
WATER L. REV. 411, 420-21 (2003).
386. See ink a Part II.H.
387. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Colo. 1982) (emphasizing priority
the most important attribute of a water right).
388. In the gold fields of California where the ditches often provided water to users, the view
prevailed that an appropriation established a claim to some certain amount of water. See, e.g.,
Smith v. O'Hara, 43 Cal. 371, 373 (1872). As the concept of beneficial use came to bc applied
as a measure of water necessary to accomplish a use, the courts began describing appropriations
in more dynamic tenns that limited the quantity of water based on actual needs. See, e.g.,
Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 281 (Colo. 1893) ("INlo one is entitled to have a priority adjudged for more water than he was actually appropriated, nor For more than he actually
needs.").
389. As Kinney noted in his 1912 treatise, neither users nor courts understood how much
water actually was required to grow crops in the early days of appropriation. KINNEY, suprwa note
32, §§ 875-76, at 1541-45.
390. See supra Part 11.B.
391. For many years states have been using such special management areas to address con-

flicts among groundwater users. See, e.g., Stephen E. White & David E. Kromm, Local
GroundiiterManagement EfDkctiveness in he Colorado and Kansas OgallalaRegion, 35 NAT.
RESOURcisJ. 275, 278 (1995).
392. Or it would allow junior appropriators to bid For water from a pool or bank that would
enable annual and multi-year decisions respecting uses of water.
393. See i-fa Part II.C.
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of Colorado. Here, during the record drought of 2002 around five thousand
junior wells, many of them large-capacity irrigation Wells, were shut down because they did not have sufficient replacement water to offset their depletions." ' The Legislature commissioned a study to examnine ways in which water supplies in the South Platte might be more effectively used so that juniors
wanting to continue using water might be able to do so.'5 The study recoinmended creation of a basin-wide Water management authority that would develop the tools and mechanisms necessary to more effectively use basin water
supplies." It seems very likely that sooner or later, states will put in place institutional mechanisms of this sort (as they have done in areas of intensive
groundwater development) in heavily used water systems-a point to which we
will return later."
C. PUBIC OWNERSHIP OF WATER, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE PUBI.C
VALUES OF WATER AND WATERCOURSES
Beginning in 1876 with the Colorado Constitution, all western states have
claimed public or state ownership of the water resources within their boundaries.
These claims represent the assertion of the sovereign right to determine uses of a common resource made available through natural processes.'
Whatever the original motivations lor these assertions, the result is that states
shoulder the responsibility on behalf of their citizens to act in a manner that
seeks to manage these water resources and to serve the best interests of these
citizens." State courts and legislatures determined that appropriation of water
394. REAGAN M. WASKOM, COLO. WATER INST., REPORT TO THE COLORI)O
LEGISIXVURE CONcERNIN;: HB12-1278 STUIY OF THE SOLTH PTXrE RIVER A.UVIAI,
AQuIFER 27 (2013).

395.

Id. at l.

396. Id. at 12 ("The HB1278 study leads us to the conclusion that the best institutional
mcehanism for attaining sustainable conjunctive use of surl ce and groundwater in tie S. Platte
basin is the formation of a basin-wide authoritv with the ability to work with all water management organizations, using comprehensive data and the best available science for the good of the
entire basin.").
397. See h'zka notes 521-26 and aecomp;aying text.
398. See GETCHES, supi-, note 6, at 84-86.
399. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) ("It is, perhaps, accurate to sav
that the ownership of the sove, eigm authority is in trust for all the people of the state; and hence,
by implication, it is the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subjeet
of the trust, and secure its benelieial use in the future to the people of the state. But, in my
view, the question of individual enjoyment is one of public policy, and not of private right." (internal quotation marks omitted)) (quoting Magner v. People, 97 Il1. 320, 334 (1881)); see adso
Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1977) ("The 'owinership' language of
cases such as those cited by appellant must be understood as no more than a 19th-centu.y legal
fiction expressing 'the importmace to iLs people that a State have power to preserve and iCgulate
the exploitation of an important resource.'") (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402
(1948)) (citing also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comi'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948)); Richard
J. lazrus, (mnging C'onceplions ofProper, and ,5overegntvin Nati-al Resources: Queslioning the Pulic 7Tust DoetTine, 71 IOWA L. Rrv. 631, 656 (1986) ("Notions of 'sovereign ownership' of certain natural resources md the 'duties of the sovereigi as trustee' to natural resources are simply judicially created shorthand methods to justify treating ditlerently
governmental transactions that involve those resources,").
400. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Supeior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 72627 (Cal. 1983); Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 841 (S.D. 2004);Jj.N.I. Co. v. State crrel.
Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982) ("Public ownership is founded on the
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to serve direct human uses was in the best interest of the state and its citizens.
They made that determination in an era of frontier settlement that depended
in significant part on taking water out of streams mad aquifers and using that
water to make living on the land possible. While that need still exists, the
West is a different place and tie public's interest in its water resources has
evolved. Yet the states hold on to the view that appropriation and use of water, often in ways and for purposes little changed from those initiated a century
or more ago, still fully serve the interests of their citizens. In fact, the gulf between the broader public values of water and the private interests served by
prior appropriation is wide and getting wider with each new appropriation of
water.
Most western states include a provision authorizing the permit decision
maker to consider the public interest associated with a proposed use of water. ' Some states also authorize consideration of the public interest in a
change of use proceeding."2 Very few provide any statutory guidance to the
decision maker regarding factors to be considered in the public interest review."3 Not surprisingly, there has been little use of this authority.
Yet the original proponent of this review criterion, Elwood Mead, appears
to have anticipated a more substantive role for the reviewer."0 ' Because he
viewed water as a gift of nature for the benefit of all, he believed in the need
lor public supervision of water use to help ensure the greatest possible benefits
to the public.' Mead's belief that the state had the responsibility to consider
the public interest when making decisions about uses of water reflected his
concern that private interest is not always consistent with the broader interests
of society. He succeeded in getting a provision inserted into Article 1 of the
new state constitution-the article setting forth Wyoming's commitment to
other such fundamental values as equality, due process of law, trial by jury,
and freedom of speech-as follows:

principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of the country, is indispensable

to the welfare of all the people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare ofthe people of the State as a whole.").
401. Johnson & DuMars, supra note 27, at 356.

402.

Id. at 373; see aho GETCHES, supra note 6, at 176-77.

403. Douglas L. Grant, Public iterest Reviewof lVater Riht Allcation anld Transferin the
West: Recognition of Puhhc Vdues, 19 ARIZ. ST. LJ.681, 688 (1987) [hereinafter Grant, Public
Intcresd.
404. The legislation he helped draft contained this provision: "if, in the judgmient of the state
engineer, such appropriation is detrimental to l)ublic interests, the state engineer shall refuse
such appropriation." 1890 Wyo. Srss. LAws 91, 101.

405. According to the State Engineer's Second Biennial Report:
It was based on the belief that water being one of the gifts of nature tie itle thereto
should forever remain in the public; that such public ownership was recognized by
tie people of this State prior to the adoption of our State Constitution and prior to
the enactment of any specific law on this subject, and that in the adoption our State
Constitution such public ownership was made a part of the fundamental law of this
State; that such public ownership is not only in accord with our laws but that the
greatest prosperity of our citizens will be secured by maintaining tie limitations above
stated.
SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 35
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Article 1, Section 31. Control of water.
Water being essential to industial prosl)erity, of limited amount, and easy of
diversion from its natural channels, its control mutist Lbe in teistate, which, in
providing for its use, shall equally guard all the vaiious interests involved."

His belief that it was the state's responsibility to "guard" all interests in water
led direcdy to the inclusion of a public interest review provision.
Inclusion of public interest considerations is recognition of the resource's

nature and its many functions and values that extend far beyond the concerns
of a party diverting water lor an individual use. ° Its earliest recorded use receiving appellate review was to enable the New Mexico state engineer to reject
an earlier water use application in lavor of a subsequent application to use the
same water For a more beneficial use.' °8 More recently, the public interest has
been applied to consider the potential adverse environmental effects associat-

ed with proposed water uses.

9

Consideration of the public interest appears to

be a duty in some, but not all, states."0

The limited administrative use of the public interest authority may explain
in part the active interest, at least in the academic community, in promoting
judicial use of the public trust doctrine to take account of the broader consequences of water diversion and use."' This doctrine asserts a continuing duty
to protect the public trust interests associated with uses of navigable water-

courses."' Though the public's interests were initially considered to be com406.

VYO. CONST. art. I, § 31; see also Kluger, supra note 265, at 18.
Grant, Piuhh" Interest,supri, note 403, at 702; Douglas L. Grant, Two Models ol Puhb"
Interct Revi'w of I ater AIlocvation iii the West, 9 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 485, 488-90
407.

(2006).
408. Young v. Hinderlidcr, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910). nddCCl, it appears such choices
among applications were the predominant use of tifs authority, a use that caused charges of favoitism and abuse of administrative authority. See Grant, lPubl" Interest, supra note 403, at
685-86.
409. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 449 (Idaho 1985); see also Application lor Permit No.

13-7697 in li Name of Twin Lakes Canal Co., at5 (Idaho Dep't of Water Resources Oct. 18,
2012) (final order). As Zimmerman explains, "the [Idaho )epartment of Water Resourcesl
denied an application for storage on Bear River (Oneida Narrows) lor hydroclectic and irrigation purposes where the benefits of those uses woere outweighed by the scenic, recreational, and
habitat values of the river." John R. Zimmerman, Environmentalleqtui'elents o/Allocating
Water i the WVCstern U.S, 59 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 8.01, 8.03121 (2013).
410. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 865 (CA. 1980); Shokal, 707 P.2d at 448; Tanner v.
Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 962 (Utah 1943); but see William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Ty',rrell, 206

P.3d 722, 732-33 (Wyo. 2009).
411.

Nat'l Audubon Soc'v v. Superior Court of Alpinc Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 725, 728 (Cal.

1983); see also In re Water Use Pennit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000); Harrison
C. Dunning, 7he Public Trust: A Fiondanental DocthnYe of American Property Iaiw, 19
Trust Iotection lbr Stream Flows and
ENVTIL. L. 515, 517 (1989); Ralph V. Johnson, PubI
Like Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1980); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwater:s of the Publc 7hst: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the 7kaditional Doctrine,
19 ENViL. L. 425, 468-69 (1989). Note, however, that public interest review applies only at die
time of allocation while the public trust doctrine purports to enable review and regulation of
existing uses that are found inconsistent witlh )ul)lic trust Values. Compare Vat'l Audubon
Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 728, th WilhamE 1West Ranch, LL(; 206 P.3d at 733.
412. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' PIbh 7rust
Doctfines: Public Vahes, Private Rights, and the Evohtion Toward anI EcologicalPublic 7'rust,
37 Ecot.OGY L.Q. 53, 59-61 (2010).
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merce, navigation, and fishing, these interests have evolved in some states to
more broadly encompass the functions and values of the water itself, including
its importance in maintaining water-based ecosystems. ' At least in California,
the public trust doctrine is said to limit the grant of use made in a state water
right as necessary to protect and maintain public trust values.' While potentially helping to 1ill a void in state water law, the public trust doctrine is a judicial doctrine that lacks definition and can only be applied on a case-by-case
basis."'
The insream flow right is prior appropriation law's primary adaptation to
concerns about environmental uses and, to a lesser degree, recreational uses
of water. Most western states now acknowledge the value of leaving at least
some unappropriated water in streams and lakes to support fish or for other
purposes. "' These adaptations have provided a mechanism under state law to
address non-private interests in water. Instrean flow law is discussed in Section 11.1 below.
In practice, some aspects of the non-private interests in water are now addressed under federal environmental laws."' Water quality is lanaged primarily under the Clean Water Act.4 ' Wetlands also get protection tinder provisions of this law. " ' Protections under the Endangered Species Act have
perhaps motivated the biggest changes in water use management, because historical dam and diversion practices so dramatically altered the ability of watercourses to sustain native species of fish and other aquatic-dependent life." ° It
is a striking illustration of state water politics that lederal requirements are
needed to ensure that states consider the non-private values of water and watercourses.
Public interest review applies only during public consideration of the creation of new water rights or perhaps the change of use of an existing right. It is
necessarily piecemeal and ad hoc. Nevertheless, the law of prior appropriation would be improved by putting in place more comprehensive require-

413. See, e.g., Marks v. Whimey, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Nat'lAuduhon Socv, 658
P.2d at 719.
414. Nat'lAudubonSoc ,658 P.2d at 721.
415. Russell M. McGlothlin & Scott S. Slater, No FKctions Required: Assessing the Public
•7nhst Doctrinein Puosuit olBalanced Water Managcrent, 17 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.53,

56, 90, 97 (2013).
416. For a survey of state statutes, see Cynthia F. Covell, A Suney of State Instream 17ow
Programnsin thc Westcrn United States, 1 U. DENy,. WATER L. REV.177, 180-90 (1998).
417. Getches, Metamorphosis, supi1a l10te
4l, at 53.

418. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2011). States have given very limited consideration to the water
quality eflects of water uses. GETrCHES r AL., supra note 44, at 13-15. States have attempted
to separate the administration of the Clean Water Act from use of water rights. Gregory J.
Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett N'V. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quldity Law, 60 U. COLO.

L. REV. 841, 856-57 (1989).
419. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
420. See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, AvoidingJeopardjy Without the Questions: Recovery Inplementation Programns [br EnidangeredSpecies ii Western River Basins, 2 MICH.J. ENVTL. &

ADMIN. L. 473, 484, 498 (2013); Cori S. Parobek, Of Farmers' TaLkes and Fishes' Takings:
Fifth Amendment Compensation Claitns "hen the Endangered Species Act and Vestem llatelrRights Coide,27 HARv. ENVrL. L. REV. 177, 193 (2003); Melissa K. Estes, Comment, 7he
ElFect of the Fedenal Endangered Species Act on State W4ater Rights, 22 ENxr'I.. L. 1027, 1039,

1050 (1992).
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nients for such considerations and lor all states to include such considerations
in reviewing changes of use. To 1)e effective, state laws need to give clear direction to decision makers respecting the public values to be considered."2 ' In
addition, these laws need to establish standards to be maintained that can
translate into objective criteria so that decision makers are not faced With making subjective judgments more than necessary. The exercise of making express what these values are and how they should be protected and maintained
would be challenging but potentially enormously helpful as we move beyond
the era of water allocation and development and into an era of water management.
Restoring the public values of water and its sources requires a programinatic effort that extends well beyond simlple changes in law. It will necessitate
an assessment of the health of our rivers and aquifers, a determination respecting the potential restorability of lost important functions, andi a coordinated effort to find ways to meet established private water use interests while
benefiting the desired public values. "
D. THE PROPEIRTY RIGHT
Prior appropriation emerged in a setting in which there was no clear law
authorizing the use of water on the federally owned lands in California.
Courts worked around this problem by focusing on creating a law that concerned only who had the better right as between two competing users, using
the rule of first possession to resolve such disputes. Courts spoke in property
rights terms, following the custon of that era, but recognized that, as with mining claims,, the property interest only protected the first possessor as against
other subsequent claimants and did not vest rights ats against the actual ovner
of the land or the water, the United States." 3 As tie states began to assert
ownership of water, with at least some support from Congress, they developed
statutory systems under which persons intending to use water had to proceed.
In so doing, they began to reshape not only the procedure by which a use
must be established but also the nature of the right itself. Mhile retaining the
priority rule to resolve conflicts between two competing claimants, states asserted the existence of multiple interests in the way water is used and directed
421, Scc, e.g., Michelle Brya Mudd, Hitchinog Our Wagon to a Dim Star. l'Viy Outmoded
Water CodCes ad "PublichIlcrest" Reiw Cimnot Protect the Public 7rust i I'Vestcm VWile'r

Law, 32 STAN. EN~rrL. LJ. 283, 329 (2013); Amber L. Weeks, Note, Definnhg the Public Interest: Adminitative Narrow'ig and Broadening of the Pdlic Interest in Jcsponse to the
Statutory Silence of Water Codes, 50 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 255, 257 (2010).
422. The Draft Colorado Water Plan expressly recognizes the importance of restoring and
maintaining watershed health as a State poliCy. COLO. WATER CONS ERVATION Bn.,
COl:ORADO'S WA'i11 PLAN (FIRs' DRAFr) 212 (December 10, 2014) Ihercinafter WATER

PIANI. Unfortunately, the Draft Plan does not provide much guidance respecting how this pol5ee LAWRENCEJ. MACDONNELL & COI.O. WATER WORKING GRP.,
GH'CHES-WILKINSON CTR. FOR NATruRim. RESOURCES, ENERGY AND Tf'HE ENV'T, NAVIGATING
A PATHWAY TOWARD COLORADO'S WATER FLFIURE: A REVIEW OF AND RECOMMENDATIONS

icy will be implemented.

ON COLORAi)O's DiAF WATER PIAN (April 30, 2015).

423. In mining law, die courts have recognized the doctrine of pedis possessio that protects
the righLs of possession of a clain established mid maintained while diligently searching for a
valuable mineral deposit. Se, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-48 (1919).
Upon discovery of a valuable mineral deposit, the possessory right transfons into a vested
property right even as against the tide owner, the United States. Id.
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state agencies to consider those interests. ' People like Elwood Mead, responsible now for ensuring that water serve not only the interests of the individual user but also the interests of the state, saw the water right more in contract or license terms-that is, the state authorizing private use of public water
because it believes the state will benefit.2 Thus Mead said: "The surrender by
the public to the individual of this right of use and the protection by the public
of the individual in its enjoyment is a free grant from the public, the only consideration being the public benefit to be derived therefrom.'" 6 Mead believed
all authorized uses attached permnanently to tie appropriation itself, not the
individual making the use. ' In short, individual uses of water represented a
means to a larger end-the development of a prosperous society. Mead's larger social vision of prior appropriation ultimately prevailed, resulting in a narrowly circumscribed right of use subject to ongoing public supervision to
guard all the interests in water.
An appropriative water right enables the control and use of some portion
of water, in priority, reasonably necessary to accomplish the authorized purpose of use. The holder of the right has entered into an agreement with the
state under which the holder is authorized to use public water for the holder's
benefit so long as the holder follows state rules and procedures governing that
use. Thus, Wyoming's law provides: "A water right is a right to use the water
of the state, when such use has been acquired by the beneficial application of
water under the laws of the state relating thereto, and in conformity with the
rules and regulations dependent thereon.... The property interest is the conditioned right of use. While courts have struggled with how best to describe
this property interest in traditional property law terms, it is clearly a highly circumscribed property interest.' First, it is a property interest that can be lost

424. Sce, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 31 ("Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of
limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state,
which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved.").
425. For a contemporary analysis favoring the use of contract principles for water uses, see
generally Shelley Ross Saxer, 7he Fluim Nature of ProperlyRights in Waicl; 21 DUKE ENVITL.
L. & P'oy F. 49 (2010).
426. SECOND BIENNIAl. REPORT, supra note 270, at 41.
427. Mead stated:
Under the rulings of die Board of Control the conditions which govern the acquirement of a perpetual right to the use of water must limit its subsequent exercise.
In other words such a right is simply a perpetual license to take and use this water for
a certain specific purpose in a certain definite place. Under these rulings water appropriated to run a mill is restricted both to that purpose and to that mill. The owner
of the right cannot use it to run another mill, nor divert it to the irrigation of land. No
transfers of appropriations to other locations or other purposes have been recognized, but, on the contrary, it has been held that rights to water for irrigation belong
neither to the canal builder nor the land owner, but attach to tie land reclaimed and
are inseparable therefiom.
SELECTFD WRrIiNGS, supia note 278, at 20.

428. \WYO. STAT. ANN. S 41-3-101 (2014).
429. Kinney noted the conditional nature of the right in his 1912 treatise. KINNEY, supra
note 32, § 762, at 1317. More recently, Professor Sax examined the nature of an appropriative
water right and concluded:
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through nonuse. Second, it is narrowly defined in terms of specifying a point
of diversion, a maximlum rate of diversion, a particular purpose of use, and a
particular place of use. The property interest cannot be used in any other
ltashion without going through a fornal change of use proceeding. Third, it
authorizes use only of an anount of water reasonably necessary to accomplish
its purpose. This is a maxinmm but not a fixed rate or volume of water, one
that may change over time as conditions change. Thus, if the quantity of water
required to irrigate an acre of land decreases because the landowner installs
more elicient sprinklers, then the diversion, right prestmably adjusts to this
lesser volume of water. In many states, water rights aue regarded as appurtenant to the land on which they are used. ' Separating the water rights from the
land requires some kind of formal legal proceeding."'
The essential interest in a water right is the opportunity to divert aid beneficially use water available in priority at the point of (liversion in accordance
wIth the terms established under the right and under state law. There can be
no guaranteed quantity of water since the amount physically and legally available is determined by hydrology and priority.
The courts have been mixed on applying takings law to governmental regulation that reduces the quantity of water historically available under a water
right.' 2 Under ordinary regulatory takings law, the exercise of legislativelyauthorized regulatory authority that only incidentally alfects the exercise of water rights should not run afoul of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment limitation on governmental takings of private property, as now outlined by the US
Supreme Court."' Law and regulation regularly al'ect the uses of property.
So long as the exercise of regulatory authority does not totally eliminate use of
IWlater rights have 1ess protection than most other property rights for several reasons
that %illbc described in this paper: (a) because their exercise may intrude on a public
common, they are subject to several original public p1ior claims, such as the naXigation ser'itude and the public trust, and to laws protecting commons, such as water
1)olh,16on laws; (b) their original delinition, limited to benelicial and non-wasteful uses,
imposes limits beyond those that constrain most property ights; (c) insofar as water
rights (unlike most other property rights) are granted by perlmit, they are subject to
constraints articulated in the permits.
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Proper, Rights and the Ftulre of[I4 4r Law, 61 U. CoiO.
L. REV.257, 260 (1990) (emphasis in original).
430. See, e.g., WYO.STAT. ANN. S 41-3-101 (2014) ("Water always being tie property of the
state, rights to its use shall attach to the land for inigation.").
431. Arizona law, for cx~unple, provides for a "sever md transler" process. ARIZ. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 45-172(A) (2014).
432. Several articles discuss tie application of "takings" law to water rights. See, e.g., Jamics
H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interkrence with the Use o['aMter: Wihen )o Uiconstitutional "Takings" Oceurj 9 U. DENV. WA'ER L. REV. 1, 23-55 (2005); John D. Echcverria, 7he iublic Trust Docine as a Background Princijles )efense in 7 ahgs Litigaijon,45
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 931 (2012); John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional
7Tking?., 11 VT.J. EN-rrt.. L. 579 (2010); Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in l?eclamation of
Water Contrilat Delivciies: A flfth Amendment Tkli g oflJropertv, 3( ENVrIT. L. 1331.
1361-71 (2006); Brian E. Gray, 7he Property'Rightin Water; 9 HASTINCS W.-Nw..J. ENVri,.
L. & POL'Y 1 (2002); John 1). Leshy, A Convesation about 7Tkings anod Water J&ghts, 83 T-x.
L. REV. 1985 (2005); Josh Patashnik, Ph- icd Takings, Jcgzlatorv Tkings, anod Wter ights,
51 SAN'TA\ CLARA L. R-V. 365 (2011).
433. The Court's regulatorv taking analysis is most completely presented in Penn Cent.
Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978).
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the property, the courts have not been inclined to find the exercise of governmental legal authority to constitute a regulatory taking.'
Some courts,
however, have apparently followed the other prong of this analysis under
which physical taking of some discrete portion of property for some public
purpose without compensation is determined to constitute a taking.'35 This
approach misconstrues the nature of a water right and assumes the holder of
the right has some property right in the water itself.'36 In ftct, a water right only
authorizes diversion and use of water in compliance with law. To the degree
new legal regulations place limitations on the historical manner in which the
water right has been used, including amounts of water that have been diverted,
the use must adjust accordingly. State authority in this area seems especially
evident since states are regarded as the legal owners of the water resources
within their boundaries.
Consequently, states have authority to enact laws regulating the manner in
which water rights are used. To date, states have been remarkably unwilling to
exercise this authority. The recommendations offered here are among the
things that states might consider to bring their prior appropriation laws up to
date.
E. BENEFICIAL USE
The original purpose for including the beneficial use requirement was to
distinguish between diversions from streambeds to enable access for mining
and diversions with the purpose of putting that water to some use."' It evolved
into the touchstone for finalizing the right-the concept that the vesting of the
right as against other would-be users of the same water did not occur until diverted water had been placed to actual use. According to the most common
definition of beneficial use, such use is the "basis" of the right.'38 The concept
has grown to encompass the notion that states can determine what types of uses are considered beneficial and thus can constitute the basis of an appropriation. ' Perhaps more importantly, it evolved into a means of objectively establishing a maximum quantity of water that may be appropriated, and as a test to
determine whether ongoing uses are reasonably efficient." This quantitative

434. ce Robert Meltz, Takigs Law Thday: A PTer for icPerplexed, 34 EcoI.ocY L.Q.
307, 328-32 (2007).
435. These cases follow Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
441 (1982). A useful summary of decisions applying takings law to regulation of water use is
provided in Patashnik, supia note 432, at 374-79.
436. Patashnik, supra note 432, at 387.
437. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
438.
c, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101,(2014) ("Beneficial use shall be die basis, the
measure and limit of tie right to use water at all times.")
439. See, e.g., Frank J. Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Source
of Surface Streans, 12 WyO. LJ. 1, 6-7 (1957). The Wyoming State Engineer's Office has
compiled an extensive list of beneficial uses. Recognized Beneficial Uses, WYOMING STATE
ENG'R'S OFFICE (Sep. 24, 2012), https://sites.google.co/a/%3,o.gov/sco/hiomc (under "Home,"
click "Recognized Beneficial Uses"). Inevitably, new purposes for water use will arise that will
qualify as beneficial. An example is the arising concern whether maintenance of stream flows
for instream benefits could constitute a beneficial use. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho
Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 926 (Idaho' 1974).
440. For a comprehensive discussion, see Janet C. Neuman, BenelicizI Use, Waste, and For-
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aspect of beneficial use is captured in that portion of its standard definition
that it is "the measure and limit" of the right."' In this capacity, the beneficial
use requirenment helped to put objective boundaries around asserted claims to
water and to give appropriators better information about how mlch water is,
in fact, necessary to achieve an intended use. "2 In the context of irrigation, tie
duty of water emerged as a guide."' A few states even statutorily or administralively established a maximum duty of water that becamne the standard allocation used in authorizing an irrigation water use."' In a few cases, courts have
determined that an existing water use did not meet the beneficial use standard
because of unreasonably inellicient methods of diversion or unreasonably
wasteful diversions and uses of water. " Thus the beneficial use requirement
has served as an outer boundary on water uses, intended to ensure some
standard of useful purpose and reasonably efficient practice in the legally protected uses of water. Here we consider what changes, if any, should be made
to the existing beneficial use requirement. We look first at its use in the process of establishing new af)propriations and then consider its application to
ongoing uses.

1 itue: The Ilcilicient Sealch ior ElIiciencv in 'Vcster Waitcr [Jsc, 28 ENrL. L. 919 (1998).
441. I. at 920.
442. Elwood Mead in 1889 took the then Unpreeelednte step of investigating the water requirements in irrigated agriculture that he then used to establish a dutv of water. SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT, supia note 270, at 25-32. The Wyoming legislature incorporated his recomminenidations into its initial 1890 statute, establishing a limitation of one cuhic feet per second
("cfs") per seventy acres of irrigated land. 1890 WYo. S.ss. LAWS 91, 98; WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-4-317 (2014). Under Mead's direction, the US )epartmnent of Agriculture produced sevcr studies in tie lhrst decade of tei1900s, providing guidance respecting the duty of water in
irrigation. See Samuel C. Wiel, Vhat iABcnelic [Jse(of WateiUF 2 CAL. L. REV. 460, 463
n.15 (1915) [hereinafter Wiel, Benecial 1icl. Subsequenty some western states, usually
through their land grant colleges, generated more state-specific analyses. See, e.g.,
Bear River
Basin Planning Team, ,Vy'oming .Sate Water Plan, Bear River Basin Water Plan 7ecHmic-a
Memoracla, Appcntcl" G: rop ConstimpLpivc [se, WYOMINC STATE WATER P1AN,
http://waterplan.statle.wv.us/plan/beai/techlnemios/cropcu.html (last visited May 22, 2014); see
also ROBERT W. HILt., UTAH AGRIC.EXPERIMENT STATION, CONSUM]I'tVE USE OF IRRIGATED
CROPS IN UTAH, RESEARCH REPORT 145 (1994); see also NCumn,, sUpIa7 notC 440, at 959 ("in
Washington, estimates of the amount of water needed for irrigating crops at various points
around tie state were developed by the Washington State University Agricultural Research
Center in 1982.This study is used by tie State Department of E-ology as a guideline in quantitying and issuing new agricultural water rights.").
443. Wiel, Benclicial Use, sopra note 442, at 462.
444. The 1913 edition of Wiel's treatise provides citations to the statutory duties existing at
that tinme. See WIEI., WATER RIGHTS, stipian note 98, § 487, at 522-25. A statutory maximm
duty of water for irrigation still remains in place in Wyoming. Wyo. STrAT. ANN. S 41-4-317
(2014). According to Janet C. Neuman,
Idaho also applies a standud water duty for new irrigation applications: one cfs per
fifty acres, which translates to 0.02 cfs per acre. Oregon applies a ran ge of (uties for

agricultural al)plications, some as high as six acre feet per acre. Utah duties range
from Iwo acre feel per acre to six acre fect per acre, depending on where in the state
the use is.
Neuman, supra nole 440, at 960 (footnotes omitted).
445. See, e.g., hi re Watcr Rights of l)eschutes River and Tlibutaries, 286 P. 563, 573-74,
577, 587 (Or. 1930), modiied, 294 P. 1049; Nichols v. Hufiord, 133 P. 1084, 1085 (Wyo.
1913); see also, Neuman, supra note 440, at 933-46.
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1. New Appropriations
In a world of increasingly limited supplies of unappropriated water it
seems worth considering whether states might want to develop more express
standards of water use efficiency that would be applied to evaluate proposals
for new appropriations. While some cities now impose such standards on
new development, states have not chosen to develop standards that must be
met in the permitting process for new appropriations. Instead, a few states
now impose requirements on urban water use intended to promote elficiency
in existing uses. " ' Nevertheless, states might want to consider incorporating a
general requirement that all new water appropriations be used efficiently.
They could implement this requirement by requiring new appropriators to periodically submit reports verifying the manner of compliance. More aggressively, states could establish best practices and require compliance with such
practices.
States might also encourage efficiency by imposing a use fee on new water
appropnations. At present, appropriators pay nothing to the state for their use
of public water. Proposals to impose such charges date back at least to the
1890s.' € Simplest would be a charge imposed per unit of water diverted or
withdrawn. An alternative would be a charge based on the quantity of water
consumed or the net depletion to the water source-intended to compensate
the public for loss of this amount of water from the source. The extent of an
appropriation's consumption or net depletion best measures the appropriation's effect on the water source. It is time appropriations are more carefully
defined so that, in addition to limits on the rate of diversion, they also include
limits on the total allowable quantity of water diverted and, importantly, on the
maximum consumptive use authorized under the appropriation."
States

446. California has
percent reduction in
§ 10608.42(a) (2015).
tablished in statute For
447. Elwood Mead
State Engineer:

been the most active in this area, passing legislation calling for a twenty
urban per capita water use by the end of 2020. CAL. WArER CODE
The State of Washington also has water use elficiency requirements esurban uses. WASH. REv. CoDE § 70.119A.180(1)-(2) (2014).
made the following statement in his Third Biennial Report as Wyoming

There is another provision, found in European irrigation laws, which is worthy
of carcful consideration by our legislators. Under these laws there is no such thing as
a firee appropriation. Every user of water must pay the state a rental therefor. These
rentals are, in most cases, very small, being only intended to pay the expenses of supervision mid to prevent the salaries of Water Commissioners and Superintendents
becoming a burden to the general tax-payer. The great value of the system is its influence in promoting economy. The nan who pays for what he gets will not be
wastefil. It also places the doctrine of public ownership in a forn to be comprehended by all, something not true of our method of free grants in perpetuity.
It is probably too eaily to seriously c6nsider its adoption. That it will come,
however, when increased use and augmented value make systematic distribution a
more important consideration than it is at present, is confidently expected.
THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT, supmatnote 266, at 59-60.
448. As Mead long ago recognized, people's use of water is influenced by its cost. See id. A
fee imposed on diversion has the benefit of encouraging ways to take only that amnount of water
necessary for the purpose. A fee imposed on depletion would have the benefit of highlighting
the most important physical effect a given water use has on the source of supply.
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should consider incorporating seasonal limitations on diversions/withdrawals
that better rellect actual water availability and the ability of water sources to
sustain such diversions.
State laws also should be clarified to ensure that the beneficial use consideration for proposed new appropriations takes into account public benefits as
well as benefits to the appropriator. In theory, the public interest requirement
should accomplish this result but, in practice, it rarely does. "' Some states already include the concept of reasonability in their prior appropriation water
law." In 1957 Dean Trelease talked about merging the concepts of reasonable and benelicial use."' The result was, he said, a rule "that a particular use
must not only be embraced within the general class of ises held to be beneficial, or must not only be of benefit to the appropriator but it must also be a
reasonable and economic use of the water in view of other present and future
demands upon the source of supply."" The significant difference from the
original benelicial use standard is iLs consideration not just of the benefit of the
use itself but its reasonability in view of other existing and potential uses of the
water source. As with riparian water uses,"0' is it reasonable in relation to the
amount of water available, to existing and desired human, biological, and
physical uses of the water, and to any associated adverse elects? Does it require a disproportionate amount of water in relation to the benefits it produces? Does it require alteration or modification of the water source in a manner
that unacceptably impairs other functions and values? Incorporation of reasonability enables consideration of ways in which existing uses inight be adijusted to better serve contemporary needs. It puts water users on notice that
historic practices are not necessarily sutficient lor new uses, that water is indeed a public resource intended to serve the full array of interests and not just
those of the appropriator, and that protection of vested rights (including priority) means using those rights in a manner consistent with the ever changing
needs of society.
2. Existing Uses
Courts have been clear that beneficial use is a continuing requirement of
an appropriation." Nevertheless, they have been reluctant to find that the
manner of use under an existing appropriation is wastefl and thus is not beneficial. ' Many writers have called for courts to apply the beneficial use requirement in a more active manner, carefully scrutinizing water uses in con-

449. See sulpnia Part II.C.
450. California inco-porated the standauml of reasonable use through constitutional amendment. CAL. CONST. arl. X, § 2.
451. Treleasc, supra note 439, at 16; Sec also Frank E. Maloney ctal., 17ricta",iR] CRsonablc
lBeneliciad" Vater Use Standard: Have East and West Mci?, 31 U. FLX. L. REv. 253, 254
(1979).
452. Trclease, supiii note 439, at 16.
453. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979).
454. Set e.g., Hofeldt v. Eyre, 849 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Vyo. 1993); Basin Elc. Power Coop.
v. State lid. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 563 (Wvo. 1978) ("Beneficial use is not a concept which
is considered only at the time an appropliation is obtained. The concept represents a continuing obligation which must be satisfied in order for the appropiiation to remain viable.").
455. See Patshlnik, supil note 432, at 412-13.
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troversy and requiring those uses to meet some higher standards of efficiency. '5 Thus, for exanple, instead of applying the traditional "consistent with
local customs" standard for evaluating uses, these writers would rather have
the court require uses to meet something like a "best practices" standard. ' So
far, no court has accepted this invitation, nor has any state legislature chosen
to require improvements in existing use efficiencies.4 8
Courts, presumably, are reluctant to take up this issue because of its
somewhat technical nature-water use practices are not an area of normal legal
expertise. But why have legislatures not sought to require more efficient water
uses? One possible explanation is an unwillingness to impose the improvement costs on its major user-the agricultural community-based perhaps on a
fear that many would not be able to afford such costs. 5 " Another may be the
fear that changes in long-standing water use practices would alter flow patterns
and disrupt established water supplies." ° Still another explanation is that no
clear case has been inade for why such changes should be made and such
costs imposed. What is the policy purpose for requiring improved efliciency
in existing water uses? Without such a clear objective in mind, it would seem
that improving irrigation efficiency would primarily benefit junior appropriators who would see more water available in the strean than before.
The strongest case for requiring more efficiency in existing uses, in my
view, is to help restore river health and regain some of water's lost public values. The purpose of efficiency, then, would be to achieve the existing authorized water uses with less water and thereby improve strean flows and either
maintain or reduce declines in groundwater levels.' There are many possible
456. See, e.g., George W. Pring & Karen A. Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Banies to
Conscrvation and Ilicient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, at
25-44 to -47 (1979).
457. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 440, at 982 (suggesting a "best practicable conservation
technology" standard).
458. Id. Nevertheless, there is evidence that water uses are in fact becoming more efficient.
Increasingly widespread use of sprinklers for irrigation appears to be one important factor affecting this trend. See, e.g., Irriation& Water Use: Backgrouncl, U.S. DEP'T.OF AGRIc. ECON.
RE FARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/1ai-n-practices-managemen/inigaton-wateruse/backgrotmd .aspx#.U398CShaagO (last updated.June 7, 2013) (showing increase in pressure
sprinkler use efficiency and overall reduction in water use).
459. See, e.g., Neumnan, supra note 440, at 988-89.
460. But in practice, these uses that are clearly ineflicient from today's perspective have existed for decades. The excess water diverted from streams has returned back to the hydrologic
system and become a source of supply for other appropriations. Reducing these return flows
by improving efliciency almost always will also reduce water historically available to these other
appropriators. Many in the inigation community oppose efficiency changes for just this reason.
The US Supreme Court decision in Montana v. Wyoming suggests that irrigation water rights
contemplate more efficient use of water; thus any effects on other appropriators resulting from
such efliciency improvements, including reductions in historical return flows, are not compensable injury. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S.Ct. 1765, 1768 (2011).
461. From an appropriator's perspective, the purpose of efficiency can be to reduce the Iabor associated vith traditional methods of irrigation (say, by installing sprinklers in place of furrow irrigation). It may increase the amount of water physically available at the point of use
(eliminating leaks, reducing seepage and evaporation) and enable increased use for the purpose
(e.g., more water available to the plants). From a public perspective, it might help reduce the
need to develop new or increased supplies of water-using the conserved water to meet increasing demands instead. In short, we need to think about the objectives of improved efficiency
and what measures are appropriate to accomplish these objectives.

Issue 2

PRIOR AI'PR'OPRJA TION: A RIAS5LSESMJiVT

approaches, ranging from prescription of practices, to imposing an across-theboard reduction in authon'zed diversions/wlithdrawals, to charging for diversions/withdrawals. Whatever the means chosen, it must be backed up with a
limitation on additional diversions/withdrawals by juniors or on new appropriations so the water stays in the source to help provide public benefits.
F. CONDITIONAL RIGHTS
In recognition that there can be legitimate reasons for a gap in time between an appropriation's initiation and actual beneficial use of water, prior
appropriation law early adopted the concept of relation back. " Relation back
allows an appropriator to enjoy the priority of the date on which he initiated
the appropriation rather than the (late on which he actually placed water to
benelicial use, so long as he pursued the development and water use under
the appropriation in a diligent nianner." Permitting states incorporated conditions that require the pennittee to complete construction of the necessary
facilities within a certain time and then apply water to beneficial use within an
additional specified time thereafter. " ' While the state permitting authority can
extend these time periods for good cause,'" the specified periods were expected to ensure that would-be appropriators actively pursued the development and water use in a timely manner.
In practice, it appears that states have allowed initial appropriation claims
to remain in active status despite nany years passing and little diligent development. For example, in Green River Development Co. v. IGMC Cotp., decided in 1983, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered a proposed change
in the place and purpose of water use under permits issued in 1908, 1910,
1920, and 1921 but not yet put to beneficial use. ' This situation does not appear to be especially unusual. A study completed in 1967 found 260,000
acres of land in the Wyoning's North Platte Basin covered by pernits in good
standing on which there had never been any actual irrigation."' The problem
is by no means restricted to Wyoming. A recent water rights records study in
Colorado found outstanding conditional water right clains for 157 million
acre-feet (mat) of water annually, compared to 258 maf lor perfected rights."
Moreover, ninety-two percent of the conditional rights were older than six

See, e.g., Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 95 (C.C.D Nev. 1897).
Id.
ee, c.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-506 (2014) (requiring construclion to be completedt
witlin five ycaus,
vcar.in and proof of beneficial use
live years atler construction completion).
465. Id.
466. Green River Dev. Co. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339, 340-41 (Wyo. 1983).
467. Michael V. Mclntire, The 1)isparity Between State Water Rights Records and Actual
Water Use Patterns,5 IANn & WATER L. Rrv. 23, 30 (1970) ("In the North Platte River Basin,
in which the acreage having adjudicated water rights already exceeds tie actual irrigated acreage
by over 220,000 acres, there are an additional 260,605 acres oflhind covered bv such conditional perits still in good standing.") (citing Richard T. Clark, Water Uses in the North Platie River Basin of Wyoming, 4 UNIV. OF Wyo. AGRIC. EXPERIMEN'" STATION REs..j. 23 (1967)); see
also Jackson 1. Battle, Paper Clouds Over the Waters: Shell Filings and Hiperextended Ier462.
463.
464.

mits in Wvotnig, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1987).
468. Charles J.l. Podolak & Martin Doyle, Conditional Water Rights in the Western United
States: htrodueblg Uncetlainty to PriorAppropnaon, 51 J. AM. WATER RES. Ass'N 14, 25

(2015).
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years and 23 percent were older than thirty years."
The original purpose of a conditional right was to protect the priority date
of valid appropriators while they diligently moved ahead with the actions necessary to be able to divert and use water.'7° While this purpose may continue
to be a legitimate concern for large-scale water projects that require many
years to plan, finance, and build, it seems to have been subverted instead to
become a means of claiming an early place in line while determining whether
there is in fact sufficient water demand to warrant constructing the necessary
facilities. This approach has charitably been labeled a "planning" approach,
but others have labeled it speculation."' No doubt there are legitimate reasons
why proposed water projects may require years to construct, but the extent
and nature of many conditional claims suggest the need to require more stringent review of the continuing validity of such claims. In a world of heavily appropriated water sources and increasingly uncertain future water supplies, not
only do such inchoate claims pose considerable uncertainty for those now
seeking an appropriation, they would, if finally developed, move ahead of existing but junior development in priority status. The threat of such displacement likely places a chill on legitimate new water development.
In theory, there are checks on such ongoing claims-procedures by which
their continued validity is reviewed. However, in practice, states have been
generally unwilling to invalidate conditional senior claims. For example, the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the continuing validity of conditional claims
established as much as fifty years earlier for the purpose of oil shale development. " ' The court relied on the oil company's ongoing efforts to find an economic means for developing oil shale as the basis for finding diligence for the
associated water development.'
In the unlikely event that oil shale ever becomes economically viable, the water uses associated with that development
would have senior priorities to years of actual water development and use for
demands both on Colorado's growing western slope and for the Front
Range."'
The burden placed on conditional claimholders to maintain these claims
should increase with time. After an initial period determined to be necessary
for the diligent development of the facilities necessary to put water to beneficial use, the claimant should be required to satisfy strict standards to maintain
the claim. Failure to meet these standards should result in a court invalidating
the claims.
G. FORFEITURF/ABANDONMENT

Appropriators must continue to beneficially use their vested water rights
for the rights to remain valid. Early courts applied the common law doctrine

469. Id.
at 27.
470. Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Daigberg, 81 F. 73, 95 (C.C.D Nev. 1897).
471. See Podolak & Doyle, supra note 468, at 17.
472. Mun. SubdisL, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701,
705, 708 (Colo. 1999).
473. Id. at 708.
474. MACDONNELL, supra note 359, at 33.

Issue 2

PRIOR APJ1?OPRIATIONM A RFA4S5'ESSMVEIVT

ofabandonment to invalidate unused. water rights.

'

The need to demonstrate

intent to abandon, however, limited the court's application of this doctrine. "6
In the 1880s, states began to establish statutory requirements under which
rights could be lost based on a specilied period of nonuse, without regard to
intent.' Nevertheless, courts in particular ais well as state administrators have
been reluctant to apply these use requirements. Citing the maxim that the law
"abhors" abandonment of property rights, courts have often avoided determining loss of water rights even in the face of decades of nonuse." Moreover,
courts have sometimes overruled administrative determinations of forfeiture
despite clear evidence of extended periods of nonuse where the courts could
find some extenuating circumstance or technicality. ' For example, courts developed the theory that a party did not have standing to bring a forfeiture action unless it could demonstrate that it would directly beneit. ' The result is
that there are large numbers of established water rights that, despite not being
used, continue to be considered valid claims to divert and use water. " ,
Once again,.each state already has legal mechanisms For eliminating unused rights, but they are not used or, when they are, courts have tended to resist their application. It appears that state legislatures need to act to make their
intent clear to eliminate unused water rights from existing state records. To
this end, such legislation should establish as state policy the objective of eliminating all unused claims and direct both tie courts and administrators to use
their authorities as necessary to achieve this end. In addition, legislation
should direct state administrators to establish annual use records and, if there
is no use during the statutory period of time (say, live years), to send a notice
to the holder requiring evidence submission within a specilied time (say, three
months) that establishes a permissible basis for the nonuse. Failure to provide
a permissible justification would result in proceedings to invalidate the claim.
There is a view that the so-called "use it or lose it" aspect of abandonment/forfeiture law causes appropriators to divert the Fully authorized extent
of the appropriation even when there is no actual need for the water.'" This
has caused calls to eliminate this requirement.'" Legislatures should consider
ways to assure appropriators that there is no benefit to diverting or withdrawing water that is not benelicially used. Kansas, for examnple, recently changed

475. Se KINNE.Y, supra note 32, § 1100, ai 1978-79.
476. Id. § 1101, at 1979-83.
477. See, e.g., 1888 Wyo. Sess. Ltws 115,.121; see also KINNEY, supra note 32, § 1119, at
2022-23.
478. See, e.g., WYOMING \VATER LAW, supia note 262, at 156 n.842 (providing a list of cases); sec. e.g., Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d
701, 705, 708 (Colo. 1999).
479. See, e.g., Snider v. Kirchhefer, 115 P.3d 1, 5-6, 8 (Wyo. 2005); Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 92 P.2d 572, 574, 578, 581 (WVo. 1939).
480. See, e.g., Snide; 115 P.3d at 8; Hagie v. Lincoln Land Co., 18 F. Supp. 637, 639-40
(D. Wyo. 1937).
481. We ate referring here to rights that have been placed to use initially, but for whatever
reason, are no longer in use. Thus, this group of rights is diffierent from the conditional claims
(iscussed in the previous section that have never been placed to Ienelicial use.
482. .See, e.g., Pring & Tomb, supranote 456, at 25-20 to -22.

483. Id. at 25-65; Arlene J. Kwtsniak, IVter Searcity and Aqutic Sustainability:Moving Bejond loliey li'nitations,13 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 321, 332-334 (2010).
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its laws governing groundwater use to make clear that nonuse of water from an
aquifer that has been closed to new appropriation is not a basis to apply the
state's forfeiture requirement."
H. TRANSFERS/CHANGES OF USE
'While all western states now authorize a water rights holder to make certain changes in the originally authorized use without losing priority, all limit
such changes by a "no injury" standard.'" To demonstrate al absence of injury, the change proponent generally must demonstrate that water legally available to other appropriators from the same source will be unchanged in quantity
and timing from before the change is made; the analysis necessary to demonstrate this condition can be complex and expensive to make. " Many factors
complicate the analysis and can be challenged by those seeking to prevent or
limit the change. The goal of requiring no discernible change in the hydrologic system benefits all existing users while substantially burdening the party
seeking change. There is a need to facilitate the changes in a manner that
avoids unnecessary interference with existing uses.
It is worth pausing on the matter of what is meant by the no-injury standard. A strong property-rights proponent might ask why this standard should
limit a property right holder's ability to change uses. " Why should a senior
appropriator be required to protect junior appropriators? It appears to be an
application of the longstanding limitation that one's use of his property cannot
unreasonably interfere with another's use of his property, in the context of
rights to the use of a shared resource." But note that this nuisance law limitation does not require no-injury whatsoever; it only precludes significant
harm. " A standard that limits changes to those not unreasonably interfering
with other uses would help moderate the degree of proof that the change proponent is obligated to put forward. Thus, as with new uses under the riparian
system, ' a change of an appropriative right should be pernitted so long as the
effects on other users are not unreasonable.
Prospectively, all new direct flow appropriations and changed water rights
should be quantified volumetrically. " ' Thus, in addition to having an authorized maximum diversion rate, the right would be defined in terms of a maximum water volume over some specified time period. In theory, the duty of

484. H.B. 2451, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012) (amnending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-718
(2011)). NonusC of water rights enrolled in the conservation reserve programalso does not
trigger the abandonment statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8 2a-718 (2014).
485. See Hobbs, sup-a note 24, at 165; see aso supra Part I.D.
486. Nichols & Kenney, supra note 385, at 420-22; see also David C. Taussig, 7he Devoluton ofthe No-lhjiny Standard in Changes of Water Rights, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 116,
146-47 (2014).
487. L. M. HARTMANN & DON SEASTONE, WATER TRANS ERS: ECONOMic EFFICIENCY AM)
ALTERNATIVE INsTrrUTIONS 7-10 (1970) (explaining that limiting water transfers is econonically inefficient).
488. See, e.g., RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8211) cmt. a (1979) (discussing private
nuisance).
489. Id. § 821Fcmt. c (explaining"signilicant harm").
490. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGIrS, supra note 191, at § 3:60.
491. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
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water serves this purpose, but in practice direct flow water rights are limited
only by a maximum diversion rate. In addition, at least With water rights
changes, the courts or agencies should specify the consumptive use portion of
the changed right. It is common to limit consumption to the historical consumption under the right as a means of meeting the no-injury rile."' Specifying the authorized maximum total consumption of a changed light both serves
to make more explicit the actual claim to deplete water held under the right
and to tacilitate future use changes. States should consider quantifying water
rights on the basis of consumptive use units that can be readily transferred to
new uses without the need for detailed hydrologic analysis.''
More broadly, there is a growing interest in enabling more flexible water
uses, both annually and over time. Traditionally, changes from irrigation to
urban use have followed purchase of agricultural water rights (and usually the
irrigated land ats well) and total cessation of agricultural activity (so-called "buy
and dry")."' Concern about agriculture loss, especially in rural areas with few
other economic alternatives, prompted increasing interest in what are now
called "alternative transfer methods," intended to enable transfers of water
without necessarily transfering ownership of the associated water ights. According to the Colorado Water Conservation Board,
[clonceived transfer methods include, but are not limited to: 1) interruptible
water supply agreements; 2) long-term agricultural land lallowing; 3) water
banks; 4) reduced consumptive use through efficiency, deficit irrigation
cropping changes while maintaining historic return flows; and 5) purchase by
end users with leaseback under defined conditions.
Many people see such approaches as a means of shifting some water from agriculture to other uses without unreasonably impairing the associated agricultural economy. Some legal changes will be necessary to enable such approaches, but the primar-y challenges are economic and administrative, not
legal.'9
492. See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 (Colo. 1999); see alsoTaussig, supa note 486, at 132-37.
493. Lawrence .1.MacDonncll, Public Water- Private 144,tcr An6-Specalion, 147ter Reallocation, and High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southedstern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
10 U. DENV. WATER L. Ri:v. 1, 15-19 (2006).
494. For an early example that generated litigation, see Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 26
P. 313, 314 (Colo. 1891); se also Lawrcncej. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, iWoving Agicultiuial Water to Cities: The Search [r Sin;uler Appioaches, 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENvrIL. L. &
POL'Y 27, 28 (1994).
495. See, e.g., COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., AI:ERNATIVrl ACRICUIrURAt. WATER
TRANSFER METHODS CRITERIA ANI) GUIEuIN.S FOR THE CoMPETnIVE GRANTi PROGRAM
(Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://cwcb.statc.co.us/LoansGrants/lterafiv-agricultural-watertr;usfer-methods-granLs/Docume nLs/AltAgGimatProgramCriteriaGuidelincs.l)df.
The Draft
Colorado Water Plan strongly discourages transfers based on dry up of irrigated land and encourages use of alternative mechanisms that would not involve the sale of die water right.
WATER PLAN, stupn'i note 422, at 193.
496. Id.
497. Colorado adready authorizes intelrruptible supply agreements. COiO. RY. STAT. § 3792-309 (2014). Colorado also made an ill-fated attempt to establish a water bank in the Arkansws River. See AIAM SCHEMPP, ENVri. L. INST., WESTERN WATER IN THE 21sT CENTURY,
27-28 (2009).
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I. INSTREAM FLOWS
To address the growing demand to protect some remaining unappropriated water flows for fishery maintenance and other purposes, most prior appropriation states now have adopted some mechanism for this purpose. The effect of these mechanisms is to keep a specified water flow between two
designated places on a stream, free friom future appropriation and diversion.
Coming as they did more than one hundred years after the creation of thousands of diversionary prior appropriation rights, these instream flow protections can only apply in places where flows still remain. But they require the
continuing availability of this water in this location, thus potentially limiting future upstream appropriations and requiring protection during change of use
proceedings. " Western states still hesitate to dedicate stream flows permanently to maintain instream values-learing that out-of-stream human needs
might be unduly restricted.' 9 Protection mechanisms are generally limited to
designated state agencies, which operate under carefully defined limits for
maintaining instream flows." While some point to state recognition of instream flows as evidence of the prior appropriation system's adaptability, it is
fair to note the constraints placed on such appropriations are not applicable to
other appropriations!'
Three modest changes would substantially improve use of instrean flow
laws. First would be to allow leasing of diversionary or storage appropriations
and their temporary change to instream flow use.6" Any interested party
should be allowed to do this, not just a state agency."3 The consumptive use
calculation for the leased right should be tolled during the leased period to
remove a disincentive for such leases.?' Injury issues are essentially nonexist-

498. See, e.g., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 439 (Colo.
2005).
499. Sec, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(11) (2014). According to Montana statute:
Except as provided in 85-20-1401, the department may modify an existing or future
order originally adopted to reserve water for the purpose of maintaining minimum
flow, lcvel, or quality of water, so as to reallocate the state water reservation or portion
of the reservation to an applicant who is a qualified reservant under this section. Reallocation of water reserved pursuant to a state water reservation may be made by the
department following notice and hearing if the department finds that all or part of tie
reservation is not required for its purpose and that the need for the reallocation has
been show by the applicant to outweigh the need shown by the original reservant.
Reallocation of reserved water may not adversely alrect the priority (late of the reservation, and the reservation retains its priority date despite reallocation to a different
entity for a different use. The department may not reallocate water reserved under
this section on any stream or river more frequently than once every 5 years.
Id.
500. John D. Leshy, histream Flow Rights: 7he Private and Puhblic ?oles, C616 ALI-ABA
163, 165 (1991).
501. See, e.g., Covell, supla note 334, at 191-95 (surveying statutory provisions regarding
limits on who may appropriate, the purposes of instrean flows, and water quantity amounts).
502. See EnvironnenalFlows, supra note 336, at 340-41 (providing a more extensive discussion).
503. 'There is no new appropriation of water, only a change of tise of an existing right.
504. Colorado has adopted this sal'eguard. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2014) (revised
by 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 587 (enacting H.B. 1280, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.
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ent since more water would be available in the stream. Second, diversionary
or storage water rights owners should themselves be pennitted to change their
use to instreamn flow purposes.' The water right has been placed to beneficial
use and a portion ol the diverted water has been consumed in the use. The
right holder seeks only to return that portion historically consumed to the
stream, a choice the holder should have. Third, direct flow appropriators
should be allowed to reduce their historical diversions to improve flows between their headgate and the point at which return flows from the diversions
would have otherwise reentered the stream.i'
Such a change would, ifanything, increase downstream flows thereby eliminating the need for traditional
no injury anafysis.5 °7 It would also provide a disincentive for appropriators to
divert water simply to avoid concerns about the "use it or lose it" requirement,
ultimately enhancing flows in specific river reaches.
While these modest changes would potentially facilitate some flow restoration, the work of restoring water-based systems to desired conditions goes
well beyond changes in law. It requires a more comprehensive eflbrt by states
to assess the existing health of their water-based systems, to set restoration and
protection goals, and to begin a long-term effort to accomplish those goals? °
Reducing diversions/withdrawals under existing appropriations would provide
tie primary means of achieving these goals.
J. GROUNDWATER RIGHTS

Prior appropriation groundwater law, developing as it did later than, and
separate from, surface water law, is still somewhat rudimentary. Important
physical differences in the nature of aquifers compared to surface water systems have created some problems. Inadequate knowledge about available
groundwater supplies, recharge rates, aquifer permeability and porosity, connectivity between aluifers and between aquifers and surface water sources,
and water quality affects our ability to make good decisions about gr-oundwater
uses. As our understanding of individual aquifers improves, so too will our
decision making respecting their use.
Perhaps the most pressing legal problem related to groundwater in most
states is the need to integrate uses of so-called tributary aquifers with interrelated surface water source usesi5 Conflicts between users firom these related
2008))).
505. Water rights holders are otherwise Iree to make a change of use so long as no harin will
result to other appropriators.
506. A bill to this effect passed the Colorado General Assembly in 2014 but was vetoed by
the Governor. See S.B. 14-23, 69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg Sess. § 2 (Colo. 2014); Goi' Hickenlooper veloes bill over unresolved concern for water righis, suppots pilotprognuln to keep
more
un/wer
in streams
(June
5,
2014),
httl)://wv.colorado.gov/cs/Satcllite?c-

lPage&childlpgenimc=GovHickenlooper%2FC BONLavout&cid = 1251653748188&pagenarne =

CBONWrapper.
507. See Environmentalliows, supriinote 336, at 381-82.
508. See id. at 385.
509. The need for such integration has long been recognized. See, e.g., Samuel C. Wiel,
Need of libed
Liw lbr Sufsce and Underound Wate,; 2 S. CAl.. L. REv. 358, 364-65
(1929). The process ha s been slow, seemingly occurring only when enough conflicts bcetwcen
surface arld groundwater users arise in a state. The state struggling with this issue most prominentlv now is Idaho, where, despite several years of effort to develop procedures to integrate
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sources are increasing. 501 Applying a.strict priority rule is likely to result in curtailment of more recent groundwater uses to protect longer-standing surface
water uses. States are taking steps to develop at least some rules respecting the
management of conflicting uses!"
The first step is simply to acknowledge that many aquifers are physically
connected to surfatce water sources and to make that express in law. Wyoming, for example, has identified this possibility with its recognition that
sources found to be closely interrelated should be treated as a single source of
supply.' The more difficult challenge is to decide how to manage conflicting
uses from these connected sources. Colorado has taken a very broad view of
what constitutes tributary groundwater, beginning with an assumption that all
groundwater is tributary!"3 In addition, Colorado allows for augmentation
plans whereby junior tributary groundwater users can pump water out of priority if they also account for and replace all depletions to surface water tlows.' 4
Other states have taken a more narrow view of which tributary groundwater
uses must be regulated to protect surface water sources. ' 5 Once again, this issue is complicated by a general lack of knowledge respecting the actual degree
of connection and the amount and tining of depletions to surface water
sources associated with groundwater pumping. Despite increasing efforts to
model these connections and the eflects of pumping, considerable uncertainty
remains.' 6
Ultimately, it seems less important to seek certainty respecting the precise
degree to which pumping from any particular groundwater well affects surface
water availability. Rather, a generalized fonnula for attributing responsibility
should be developed under which groundwater pumpers would be assessed
depletion fees based on the annual quantity of water pumped. These funds
should be used by an entity established for this purpose to take steps necessary to ofl'set depletions. This entity would use the depletion funds to build
groundwater recharge facilities and to acquire storage and groundwater rights
that can be released as necessary to ensure that surface water users receive the
water they require to continue to meet their actual needs.
A second area of uncertainty concerns the rules governing conflicts among
users from the samne aquifer. The strict rile of priority that applies to surface
uses, conflicts continue. SceJeliey C. Fereday & Michael C. Creamer, The Maximtmn Use
Docaetnhc ad Its Relcva;ce to Water Rights Adninistraion in Idaho 's Lower Boise River Basin, 47 IDAHO L. REv. 67, 68-70 (2010).
WATER FOLLIES, supra note 83, at 222.
511. Se, c.g., Rulcs for Conjunctive Management of Surface and Ground Water Resources,
IDAHO ADMIN. COnE r. 37.03.11.000 (2014).
512. SceWYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-916 (2014).
7bwn of
513. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized this presumption in Safirnek

510. See GLENNON,

lLjnon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951) (citation omitted). The Colorado Supreme Court has
also held that proposed pumping from wells to be located thirteen miles from the nearest river
would affect the flows of surface water. Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 330 (Colo. 1973).
514. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(8)(c) (2014).
515. Wyoming, for cxamnple, does not assumne that groundwater is tributary to surface
sources. WYOMING WATER LAxW, supra note 262, at 151. Nebraska struggled w'ith this issue
for many years because laws governing groundwater uses existed entirely separately fron those
governing surface water use. Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Neb.

2005).
516. See GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES, supla note 83, at 75.

s2PlIOR APPROPRIA TION A REASSE SAIENT

Issue 2

water users, under which new appropriations are not permitted if they interfere with existing rights, would preclude additional groundwater use. Thus,
most states do not protect groundwater appropriators from any particular
drops in water elevations or aquifer pressure levels' 7 In some cases, states
have adopted limitations on groundwater withdrawals that reduce elevations
below "reasonable pumping levels."'. Such levels are typically based on the
cost of pumping water and the expected value of its use.59 Above that level, all
pumpers are expected to take whatever actions are necessary to continue to be
able to pump their allocated water. Most states allow mining of groundwater
with only modest efforts, if any, to regulate the rate at which that mining occurs.j20

States need to take a more active role in making decisions regarding
groundwater use, especially in areas with high levels of development. The use
of special management districts is one mechanism states employ that can
help).;2 '1 Often, the creation of such areas makes it possible for the state or a
designated management authority to limit or cease issuing new permitsi2
Usually there are procedures for establishing more managed use of the aquifer
or aquifers within the district, including well spacing requirements, rotation
agreemnents, limits on punping, and even efficiency requirements lor continued use.5 1 In practice, states have been reluctant to impose active management in such areas and have attempted to encourage groundwater users to develop agreement on any management regiies.54 While a commendable bow
to local control, these elffltis are generally fated to failure because few users
are likely to volunteer themselves for reduced ises.a Rather, this is a problem that requires strong state management, based on the best possible understanding of the long-term water supply potentially achievable from the aquifer.
It is in the state's interest to maintain viable aquifers that can support urban
and rural econonies today and into the future." ' The states need to exercise
stronger control of these aquilers with special management needs.
A third problem is the growing number of so-called "exempt" wells that
27
support new exurban development across the West5
First, the ready availa517.

See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-933 (2014).

518. See, e.g., Douglas L. Grant, Reasmablc Grotmdwater Pumping Levels UIJdcr the Apprvpn'ation Dotoin~e: 7he Liw an(l Underlyig &lonrOniGoal.s, 21 NAT. R.SoURCES.j. 1, 1
(1981) Ihereinafter Grant, Economic Goalsj; see also Douglas L. Grant, I?easonablcGro,,ndwuaicr Iumping Levcls Under the AppropuialJon J<cijine: Underlving Social Goals, 23 NAT.
RE-SOURCE'S.I. 53, 53-54 (1983).
519. Grant, Economic Goals, sup.ra note 518, a( 14.
520. For a discussion on Arizona's ongoing efforts to reduce groundwater mining, see Rita
Pearson Maguire, Patching the Holes in the Bucket: Sak Vieki and the Fture oflVater Managemeit inArzona,49 ARIz. L. REv. 361, 362-63 (2007).
521. See generallyWhite & KI-omm, supra note 391.
522. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-91 2 (g) (2014).

523.

See, e.g., i. § 41-3-915(a)(ii)-(v).

524. See White & Kromm, supi-a note 391, at 304-06.
525. Id. at 306; see alsoJULENE BAIR, THE OGAIAIA ROAD: A MEMOIR OF LOVE AND
RECKONING 186-87 (2014).
526. The move by Kamsas to eliminate the concern about "use it or lose it" as a threat to the
maintenance of a groundwater right in aquifers closed to new appropriations is a common sense
step other states should consider. See H.B. 2451, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012).
527. Nathan Bracken, Eemnpt Well Issues il the 14est, 40 ENVrtL. L. 141, 145 (2010).
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bility of permits for such wells encourages an unfortunate spread of development into areas with little or no services that are often not well-suited to residential use."8 While counties typically control the actual land use decision, the
state determines whether permission should be given to use underlying
groundwater as the development's water supply sourcef5 Second, the exemption of these wells from regulation provides no means to resolve the growing
number of conflicts between exempt well users and other groundwater users."
States should eliminate the "exempt" well category. They should require a
stronger state role in determining the type of water supply that is necessary for
new development in rural areas, promoting where possible the use of renewable surface water supplies. States should also place the use of water from such
wells under state supervision, enabling state administrators to resolve conflicts
resulting from their use.
K. ADJUDICATIONS

While the states long ago developed relatively efficient permitting systems
for managing the initiation of new appropriations, they have struggled with archaic, unnecessarily legalistic processes for validating that these appropriations
3
have been completed and that the permitted use has been achieved.5
Because of notions that only courts can determine the existence of property
rights, states have continued to rely on cumbersome court procedures called
general adjudications that are regarded as necessary to legally determine the
priority date of all water appropriations from the same source."' Even in a
state like Wyoming where the 1890 legislature gave tie authority to an administrative board to make both general and individual adjudications, courts were
used to perfbrn a general adjudication of all uses in the Big Horn River basin-a process begun in 1977 and finished in 2014.5"
With the modern development of due process procedures in administrafive processes, there is no legal reason why state adminstrative boards cannot
make tie necessary determinations respecting water rights, with the ordinary
recourse of appeal to the court system if needed." ' As the Wyoming Supreme
Court noted in 1900, knowledgeable state administrators are far better suited

528. A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth ManagerentandWestern Water L'w.m From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 163,

165-66 (1999).
529. Id. at 174.
530. Bracken, supra note 527, at 199-200.
531. A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finalitv jYi General Water Rights Adjudications,
25 l)AHo L. REv. 271, 272-73 (1988); Thorson I, supra note 86, at 358-59; Thorson II, supra
note 33, at 304-05. For a critical examination of general stream adjudications, see Lawrence J.
MacDonnell, Rethidnbklg the Use of General Streiun Adjudications, 15 WYo. I. REv. (forthconfing 20.15).
532. Thorson I, supra note 86, at 358, 409.
533. The statute establishing the Big Horn adjudication is found at Wvo. STAT. ANN. § I37-106 (2014). For a website pro(iding history and major decisions, see BIG HORN RIVER
ADjuI)IcATION, http://hr'ac.courts.state. w.us/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). For a thorough discussion of this adjudication process, see Jason A. Robison, W3voming's Big Horn General
Stream Adjudication, 1977-2014, 15 WyVo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015).
534. See generally Lon L. Fuller, 7he Forms and L'nits ofAdjudicatioi, 92 HARv. L. REv.
353,365, 368-69, 400 (1978).
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to make these kinds of determinations than judges." Moreover, the property
interest is the ability to use a state resource. Since tie state is acting as the legal water owner, the legislature has authority to establish the procedures it
deems appropriate for establishing its use, including use of an administrative
process.
Adjudications are used initially for verifying that the proposed use authorized under a permit has in fact been accomplished. They serve as a record of
the nature and extent of the use as finally achieved and represents the best
record title to the legal right." Colorado's water court system is considered a
continuing general adjudication so that each newly decreed right is directly incorporated into the state's official water rights tabulation." ' Its monthly resume system is regarded as adequate notice to all existing appropriators so that
a special general adjudication process is not requiredf 8 While this process
operates through a court system in Colorado, other states could initiate a
comparable process for its administrative proceedings. As with Colorado, it
should be required that all pernitted appropriators file notice of actual beneficial use with the state and obtain a certificate verifying the vesting of the water
rightf 9
States have initiated general adjudications primarily to force the federal
government and Indian tribes to adjudicate their reserved water rights
clailns.5' Because the McCarran Amendment only waives federal sovereign
immunity in the context of a general adjudication, states are obligated to go
through a process that must review and determine the priority of every claim
to water within a basin, not just federal claims"' Typically there are thousands
of such claims that must be determined in a process that requires review of
each appropriation, each priority date, and each authorized right of diversion
or storage; this is likely to provoke controversy respecting the continuing validity and extent of at least some of these claims, and-at the end-does little
more than update state records." There are more efficient ways to improve
state water right records.
The real purpose of these general adjudications is to force the federal
government and tribes to submit claims for reserved water rights to state
535.
536.
537.

Farm liv. Co. v. Carpeniei, 61 P. 258, 266-67 (Wyo. 1900).
Thorson 1,supra note 86, at 424-25.
See Coio. RFv. STAT. § 37-92-306 (2014). Known as the "postponement doctrine,"

the result is that "no decree may be awarded with a priority (late earlier than the most junior
decree awarded in the previous calendar year." TARLOCK Er AL., supia note 292, at 304.
538. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(3)(a); Pueblo W. Metro. Dist. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 689 P.2d 594,601-02 (Colo. 1984).
539. Wyoming, fbr example, provides for obtaining a certificate of appropriation. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 41-4-511 (2014). The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, deciled that failure
to obtain a certilicate did not affect the validity of the right. Larmnie Rivers Co..v. LeVasseur,
202 P.2d 680, 684 (Wyo. 1949). States should consider adopting a policy that failure to file
wouldn't cause loss of right but would shift prioritv date to date of actual use.
540. SecTa'lock, supra note 531, at 272.
541. Secid.
542. TARLOCK ir Al.., supra note 292, at 305; see also Adjudicatjon, IDAHO DEP'T OF
WATER R.s., http://%wvw.idw-.idaho.gov/WaterManageicnu/Adjudicationl ureau/dcfault.ht
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (describing die Snake River Adjudication: "The SRBA was art administrative and legal process that began in 1987 to determine the water rights in the Snake River Basin drainage.").
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courts. While slate courts are required to apply federal law in determining the
existence of such rights, experience to date demonstrates that state courts may
well interpret federal law differently. "a The result is that reserved rights are
determined differently from state to state and often in ways that seek to limit
these rights in order to protect state interestsi" It is unrealistic to expect the
US Supreme Court to bring uniformity to these decisions. While this is an
issue that reaches beyond prior appropriation, it is a matter that requires congressional attention as we seek to improve water decision making in the
West.'
A better way to keel) up to date on state water right and water use records
is to establish annual reporting requirements for all water users under state water rights. With online filing, the burden on water users would not be undue.5' Failure to report for some specified period would create a presumption of forfeiture that would be subjected to review at periodic intervals.
Conversely, reported uses would be presumptively correct and would help develop. better information that could be used to help improve water decision
making and management. Individual disputes about actual water use would
be heard through state administrative processes. Water ownership and use
records are woefully inadequate in the western states.5 1 While considerable
care is applied in issuing the initial right, little is done thereafter to keel) track
of ownership, actual use, or changes of use under this right. Many states are
now creating online systems that enable access to state records regarding existing rights." Unfortunately, these records are often incomplete and do not
provide an accurate reflection of actual water use. It is time for states to take
the next step in providing a more up-to-date and accurate record of water use
and ownership under state water rights." '

543. Justin Huber& Sandra Zellmer, 7he Shalows Where FederalReselved Water Rights
1ounder: State Court Derogation of the Winters Doctrine, 16 U. DENy. WATER L. REv. 261,
262, 289 (2013); see also Lawrence J. MacDonnell, GCene;d Stream Adjudications, the McCarran Amendment, and Reserved Water Rights, 15 Wyo. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
544. Il at 275-76.
545. Congress should shift review of federal reserved rights to the federal court within the
state. Once adjudicated, there should be a process for their integration with state water rights.
546. Users would need to have appropriate measuring devices.
547. Mclntire, supra note 467, at 23-24.
548. See, e.g., e WRIMS - Eleetronie Water Rights InIfOnation Management System,
STATE
WATER
Rr:s.
CONTROL
BD.,
CAIJFORNIA
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGEINCY,
http://wwwv.waterboards.ca.gov/wateirights/water-issues/programs/ewims/index.shml
(last updated Oct. 8, 2014); Water Rights, COLORADO'S DECISION SUPPORT SYSTENIS,
http://cdss.slate.co.us/onlineTools/Pages/\VaterRights.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); Seatehing Water Right Records, UTAH l)IV. OF WATER RIGHTS, http://www.waterrights.itah.gov/
wrinfo/quety.asp (last updated Mar. 26, 2004).
549. Colorado attempted to require all water rights holders to simply register their ownership
with the State Engineer's Office, an effort that was successfully resisted hy the water user comnunity. Consequently, ownership infoniation is not available on the state's decision support
system.
See generally Water Rights, COLORADO'S DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS,
http://cdss.state.co.us/onlineTools/Pages/WaterRights.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). It is difficult to understand why those holding the valuable privilege of use of a state resource should
not be required to provide requested information to the state, including making an annual report of uses.
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BE. SUMMING UP: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY STATE WATER LAW AND
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The task of water appropriation to establish use rights is essentially comnplete. The work now is to rationalize the millions of existing appropriations to
better address contemporary and future needs. As part of this transition,
states should consider updating their basic water laws along the lines suggested
here. "-; The basic framnework of valid and active water rights would remain,
but the large number of conditional claims would probably diminish substantially. There would be few new appropriations-only those that could meet
vigorous benelicial use requirements and protect a more robust set of public
values as well as private rights. Through a mix of incentives and requirements,
existing uses wOuld continue to become more elicient to reduce diversions
and improve stremn flows. Water use charges would motivate more ellicient
use. Reporting on actual water use would aid water management and would
help clear state records of unused claims to water. New institutions and
mechanisms would emerge to help meet changing water demands requiring
consumnptive water use, and to improve local water management. Tributary
groundwater uses would be fully integrated into the systems governing surface
water uses. Continued special attention to water sources with high ecological
or recreational values would result in improved conditions to support and
maintain those values. These ob jectives are all achievable, but not with existing law. It is time for some changes.

550. The pressures potentiallv motivating such changes seem to be growing. Perhaps lbremost is the inescapable reality that a fully approprialed water supply taces an ever-growing popilation wid a changing set of (lemands. To the degree these new amd changing demands are eitier not being met, or not met qiickly enough, there will be pressure for legislative change.
Uncertainties associated with climate change exacerbate this situation. Competing dermuids for
an increasingly constrained water supply are likely to produce new kinds of conllics that will
prompt courts to look for ways to gradually modify existing law to favor new interests. New direction from legislatures and courts will cause water administrators to more actively ad creatively administer water rights mid manage water. Chlange will likely be slow, but it will come.

